One is many : democracy, communication and the self. by Brown, Alison Leigh
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1989
One is many : democracy, communication and the
self.
Alison Leigh Brown
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brown, Alison Leigh, "One is many : democracy, communication and the self." (1989). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014.
2040.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2040

ONE IS MANY: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNICATION
AND THE SELF
A Dissertation Presented
by
ALISON LEIGH BROWN
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
FEBRUARY 1989
Philosophy
© Copyright by Alison Leigh Brown 1988
All Rights Reserved
ONE IS MANY: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNICATION
AND THE SELF
A Dissertation Presented
by
ALISON LEIGH BROWN
Approved as to style and content by
Robert Ackermann, Chairperson of Committee
Stone, Member
l T^U
Robert Paul Wolff, Member
Robert C . SI
Philosophy Dep
. ,
Acting
t
Head
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am very grateful to Steven Harvey, David Johnson,
Cynthia Kaufman, Tamsin Lorraine, Roger Morey, Mecke Nagel
and Becky Thomas for reading drafts of the dissertation and
making valuable comments. I am particularly grateful to
Cynthia Kaufman for pointing out various counter examples to
the two principles found in Chapter Four and for suggesting
ways that I could save the principles.
The members of my committee—Ann Ferguson, Jennifer
Stone and Robert Wolff--have been very helpful. I thank
them for reading suggestions, hard questions and concern for
my project.
Bob Ackermann, the director of the dissertation, has my
deep g r a t i t ude-- f o r his patience, for the time he has given
up, for his confidence in me and for his seemingly endless
supply of reading materials and suggestions. I thank him
for the terms "demogenic" and " heterodemo tic" and, for the
concept, central to the last chapter of the dissertation,
that societies cohere because of the everyday activity that
makes up lives, and not because of top-down political
formations.
The Brown and Harvey families have been supportive of me
and I thank them for this and for their strength. Tom Reed
IV
has been very supportive of my project. I thank him for his
many comments and suggestions; I am especially grateful to
him for his ideas on autonomy.
This dissertation, such as it is, is dedicated to my
sisters: Becky and Elizabeth.
v
ABSTRACT
ONE IS MANY: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNICATION AND THE SELF
FEBRUARY 1989
ALISON L. BROWN, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
Ph.D.
, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Robert J. Ackermann
Theories of democracy contain unnoticed (implicit)
assumptions about the nature of the self and of communi-
cation which result in their transformation into authori-
tarian theories. An examination of these assumptions yields
the possibility of a non-authoritarian theory of political
action. Such a theory requires a conjunct theory of self
which allows for a procession of multiple concrete selves.
In the dissertation I show certain historical relations
of particular theories of self and of communication to
particular democratic theories based on shared assumptions
(liberalism, hegelian-mar xism) and criticize the
hierarchical nature of ensuing theories of action; I
discuss possible democratic theories that might result from
the construction of theories grounded in conceptions of self
and of communication that have not been seen as conjunct
with particular political philosophies (namely the
conceptions of Kierkegaard and of Bataille) ; and, finally, I
construct a theory of self having the necessary assumptions
to produce a non-authoritarian theory of concrete political
action.
vi
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INTRODUCTION
....the relations that reign between philosophicalideas are what are called relations of forces,ideological, and therefore political relations of
orces. But it is bourgeois philosophical ideasthat are in power. The question of power is the
number onequestion in philosophy too. Philosophyis indeed in the last instance political.(Althusser {1982} p. 168)
In this dissertation I examine certain relationships
between theories of the self, theories of communication, and
theories of democracy and political action. I am motivated
to examine these relations because of a suspicion that
political theorists often begin with unnoticed assumptions
about the self and about communication which inevitably turn
their theories into authoritarian ones. My purpose is to
develop conceptions of the self and of communication
consistent with an anti-authoritarian, maybe eventually
non-authoritarian, politics.
My work divides itself into two parts: critical and
constructive. In the critical portions of the dissertation
I examine two schools of democratic theory with an aim to
exposing the assummptions just noted. In the latter half of
the dissertation I attempt to describe selves that might act
politically, without following old hierarchical patterns,
and the communications that facilitate those selves. Before
turning to the major divisions of the text, I describe the
method I use in both divisions and indicate my use of some
of the important terms in the dissertation.
2Methodology
in both the critical and the constructive portions of
this work I deal with generalized views—par ticular ly in the
critical portion. There are several reasons for this. Most
importantly, I wanted to offer a critique concerning not
merely a given philosopher who held a specific view about
political action, nor even a philosophical tradition, e.g,
liberalism. Rather, I wanted to criticize the cultural
background that produces the assumptions of the specific
philosophers and philosophical traditions that I cite.
Consequently, I use texts more as symbolic of cultural
tendencies than as the considered views of individuals. It
would be inconsistent for me, given the conclusions that I
want to reach, to focus on refuting the specific
formulations of any given thinker. Furthermore, many of the
thinkers on whom I do focus, particularly in the latter
half, do not easily lend themselves to systematic treatment.
It is especially noticeable in Kierkegaard's "corpus," where
attempts to trace the same themes from text to text must
f ail
.
Wherever possible I have kept "philosophy" within the
conceptual space that includes "self" and "communication."
Political philosophy has been opened into psychological and
social space. Two techniques have been used through the
3dissertation to keep political philosophy naive enough to
illustrate its presuppositions, rather than its apparent
content. First, I have tried to use non-political texts by
important philosophers when discussing the assumptions of
their political views. Second, when I use political texts I
have tried to read them psychologically—as motivators to
action and not as explanations of past history. An example
of the first technique is found in Chapter One where, when
discussing Locke, I draw on his work in epistemology,
formally ignoring the work he has done in political theory.
An example of the second technique is found in Chapter Two
where I exposit some of the psychological requisites to
being a Hegelian/Marxist.
That a materialist conception of the self is needed is
noticed by many theorists. (See for instance. Smith {1988}
p. 21.) Throughout I have tried to be consistently
materialist trying to succumb neither to essentialism nor
to idealism. There are two occasions where I have had to
fall from materialism in order to explain myself. I mark
these places. One is in the formulation of two principles
of demogenic action. The other is when I assume, as I do
throughout the dissertation, that absence of hierarchy is
categorically preferable to its presence. The technique I
use to keep myself as materialist as possible is to frame my
research always in terms of how actual selves might respond
to theses I examine, criticize or suggest. I try to
4privilege that standard above others—even consistency-but
it is impossible to know if i have succeeded in this
respect. The question that structures my examinations is:
what would it feel like if an individual acting in
political context believed the propositions in question and
what actions could be motivated by that feeling."
Terms
I list below some of the terms I use most frequently in
the dissertation [1] .
Cul tur
e
: I notice no difference between "high" and
"low" cultures. I distinguish between "culture" and
"Culture" in that the latter is spoken through and to the
vessel selves by power and the former is an emergent
commonality that is not accessible to vessel selves. In
short, "Culture" embraces what is normally called "high
culture" and "low culture," that is, the entire ideological
apparatus of an existing power structure.
This distinction in itself is not value-laden as there
is no reason in principle that "Culture" could not produce
and engage in objects and practices that are valuable.
Indeed, cultures will be formed within a Culture, although
5in demogenic opposition to it. I make the distinction only
because "culture" can be power-less or anti-hierarchical.
Because "culture" is largely invisible to "Culture," the
following sort of remark can be made:
It is a major anomaly of contemporary American
politics and culture that socialist thought hasbecome restricted mainly to highbrow
circles--circles in turn restricted mainly to the
upper social classes, whose self-interest is
ultimately inimical to socialism.
(Lazere {1987}, p. 18)
The claims
basis in fact;
Culture is all
obvious can be
invisibility.
apparently made in this bit of text have no
they are advanced on the assumption that
there is. That they are written as if
explained by "culture's" relative
Demogenic : This is an adjective used mainly to describe
strategies and selves. A demogenic strategy is one that
helps to produce new selves (or a new self); a demogenic
self is one capable of transforming itself, when context
allows, into a different self. A demogenic self can be
contrasted with a vessel self in that the former makes new
selves from the vessel self who is an empty shell for power.
A demogenic self does not have a body but is a body.
Heterodemot ic : This is an adjective used mainly to
describe groups. A heterodemot i c group is one that does not
depend on its duration for any of its purposes and that does
6not exclude on any grounds but that of absence of
properties. The aims of heterodemo tic groups are
they have no long terms plans. They could never e
possibilities for either social or political life-
suppose they might (or anything could) is Utopian
idealist in the extreme. Heterodemot ic groups are
bureaucracies what the Hegelian slave is to the ma
all the possible senses [2]. He terodemo t ic groups
State Power what culture is to Culture.
demogenic
immediate;
xhaust the
-to
and
to
ster--in
are to
Ideology :
Ideology is the
I use this term non— idiosyncr
stuff of vessel selves.
at ical iy.
--formation : "Information" is an important term for me
because I will argue that there are democratic theorists who
assume that a self is exhausted by its information. I
mean, as I think the theorists I examine mean, that a self
can be regarded as the sum of useable and retrievable data
in a human system. Thus a self's information includes the
impulses of its nervous system, its genes, its
memories—short- and long-term, and so on. A self exhausted
by its information refers to the ideological construct that
often goes by the words "individual" or "person." It does
not refer to only that of which an "individual" is conscious
right now.
7Power: Desire for power is the end result of the
primary internalisation of repression. As such, the desire
for power follows a habituation of hierarchical patterns.
It formally reproduces inequality and is inherently
exclusive. Because power is a relation, the desire for it
must include a tacit or explicit desire for a domineering
role in a relation. I use power only as a relation, and as
a relation that is attendant on hierarchy. it requires the
unconscious or conscious assumption of a third term that is
necessarily an abstraction
—often a principle. This third
term allows persons to recoil from the use of force. This
is neither good nor bad in theory. A full discussion occurs
in Chapter Four.
Self/s ubject : There is a tension in the dissertation
between "self" and "subject." "Subject" is such an
appropriate choice for the construct I term "self" that an
explanation for its rejection is in order. First, though,
a note on usage. When the thinkers on whom I am commenting
produce too great a dissonance with the term "self," I use
subject" in scare quotes. "Subject" without scare quotes
refers to someone else's usage. "Self" undergoes a similar
waver ing
.
I use "self" rather than "subject" for two major
reasons. The first is that "subject" connotes much more
8than I connote with "self." The history of "subject,"
especially its recent history is a study all its own. As
the remarks on method indicate, I have tried to use naive
(not necessarily ordinary) language wherever possible.
Self" seems more naive to me.
Second, and more importantly, are three specific
connotations that I want no resonance with. The first is
the use of the term by Althusser, the second its use by
Lacan, and the third its ordinary meanings that are
associated with political subjection, as in "the King's
subjects'" or "she 'subjected' herself to a long day's
work." Both Althusser's and Lacan's uses of the terms
overlap to some degree with my usage but differ more than
they agree.
Althusser's "subject," which contains imaginary
representations has some resonance with what I have called
vessel self--bu t also a dissonance. Lacan's "subject," the
divided self who is suspended between the symbolic and the
imaginary describes a stage right before political action.
Lacan's "subject" is perhaps closer to "self" than
Althusser's. But as I will explain in Chapter Four, Lacan's
self is born once, in oedipal struggle. I wish to allow for
multiple births.
9vessel self: The vessel self is the interpellated
subject and nothing more.
The Thesis of the Thesis
Contemporary social and political philosophy is often a
struggle between those who would announce the death of the
self, and those who would rescue the self as a guard against
fascism, communism, or some other perceived enemy. On this
terrain, the death of the self seems the negation of the
assertion of the self, but the opposed views work with a
simple principle of individuation; every living individual,
every breathing human body, is associated with a single
self, or with none. A third possibility, that a living
human being may be associated with a trivial self, the
vessel self, but also with various concrete selves created
in political action with others, has occasionally been
suggested as a third possibility that would unsettle the
tired parameters of the existing debates about selves. I
know of no sustained effort to establish that this is a
concretely realizable and coherent possibility. The thesis
of my thesis is that such multiple selves are possible, and
I try to indicate in practical terms how they are formed,
and how they can act. Indeed, my thesis is that these
10
selves are not only possible, but that they are possible
because they have already been actualized. it is to prove
this that I try to achieve naivete regarding selves,
communication, and democracy. The concepts as they are
currently used are too rigid to allow the conceptual space
in which an awareness of the existence of concrete demogenic
actors would be possible.
Notes to Introduction
1. Some of the entries cross-refer. Forvessel self is in the Culture entry and in theentry but not defined until its own entry.
i nstance
,
Demogenic
Rofn
2 ‘ Including the sense of "invention." m "The SubiectBe ore Subnectivation,
" Slavoj Si2ek points out thatreaders often overlook the invention of the Master by theSlave as a means of externalizing repression.
That's why we could say that it's precisely in themoment when we achieve victory over the enemy in theantagonistic struggle in the social reality that we
experience the antagonism in its most radicaldimension, as a self-hindrance. (2i2ek {1987} p.
This "loss of a loss," made much of by Bataille (see Chapter1S a possible route for selves—not a necessary one.The point is. that there really is more culture than Culture-
more demogenic selves than vessel selves and moreheterodemo tic groups than bureaucracies.
CHAPTER I
THE SELF EXCHANGE: DEMOCRACY AND
COMMUNICATION AS INFORMATION BROKERING
Three decades ago the current notion of justice as
fairness was introduced into philosophical discourse and
then justified by a revised contract theory. (See Rawls
{1958} and {1971}.) Theorists were forced to re-evaluate
their notions of justice and its justification. Some
thought it odd that there be a return to a theory apparently
rendered obsolete by a scientific utilitarianism and its
offspring. Others thought it odder still that the return
should be so widely acclaimed. I think that the return to
contract theory is not very surprising in that contract
theory was never really abandoned in the justification of
liberal (or other) theories of democracy [1], An image
which represented and then stood as literal justification
for the king's right, that he was the head of the state, has
remained in the culture long after it could have any
representational value. The culture never became rid of the
image of a just head of state directing the body politic to
carry out its commands. The image remained widespread even
though such an image was no longer necessary to further any
interest in the culture. This is not to say that the image
is unchanged or useless: it has evolved with us. The
portion of the image concerning the body became more
13
involved; but the "body has retained a mind or brain
outside of itself, even if the "body democratically chooses
rts own "head," subject to recall. m his theorizing
against the divine right of kings, John Locke begins a
dissipation of concentrated power—each person is said to
have sovereign rights independent of any head of state.
J. S. Mill, whose theories should have made contract theory
forever meaningless, maintains the image that makes a
reemergence of contract theory possible when he writes in On
L-lberty that: "Over himself, over his own body and mind,
the individual is sovereign" (Mill {1961} p. 263).
Two deaths the death of God and that of Monarchs—have
played havoc with democratic theory and practice. With God
and Monarchy there was a chain of command, a chain of being.
With neither the notion of a chain is nonsense. For what
can it mean that the individual is sovereign in Mill's
sense? I will argue that it can mean nothing— that it makes
no good sense. That it is an incoherent formulation and
that it is a foundational value in much democratic theory
are responsible for tensions and contradictions in
democratic theory. I hope to trace these tensions in
democratic theory to the conceptual framework which has
allowed us to talk as if sovereignty over self made sense.
It has remained possible for us to talk as if such phrases
made sense because a discourse that embodies such locutions
lingers on. I will argue that the theory of self and
14
communication that holds up liberal democratic theory makes
ostensible sense of Mill-talk and Rawls-talk by concealing
nonsense in the stock of accepted discourse.
The work of Chapter One is to analyse the notion of
democracy which is based on a theory of communication that
includes tacitly or explicitly held themes. In all my
discussions and arguments the structure of my theses will
be: if a series of beliefs are held about the self, and
about what it means for selves to communicate, then beliefs
about democracy and society follow which pose serious
problems for any attempt to think through a
non-authoritarian social structure, and for locating styles
of political action that do not end in the seizure of power.
Holding certain beliefs seems to preclude an adequate
conceptual framework for living democratically. I try to
locate some of those beliefs.
The first theme— to be examined as a part of an age's
ethos as much as a philosophical thesis--is that the self is
taken to be equal to the information it contains. This
theme can take many forms and finds expression in
philosophers as diverse as Locke and Lyotard. Once embraced
this theme yields the result that no meaningful distinctions
can be drawn between communication theory and political
theory. Lyotard's work can be used an as example of such a
confusion--as when the logical extension of his work entails
that politics might become a battle over communication
15
systems. A second theme is that individuals have some
special sovereignty with respect to themselves. it is
possible that the image has innocent origins. it has become
dangerous over the years as it has become internalized and
then projected outward. The third theme is not, nor could
it have been, so innocent. I am referring to the idea that
there is an analogy to be drawn between the body politic and
the human body such that the brain is to the human body what
the parliament (or legislature or head of state) is to the
body politic. This cluster of themes (some of which are
believed only tacitly) is responsible, in large part, for
the problems that accompany traditional democratic theory.
The third theme is only possible in our age because of the
persistence of the first two themes. It is no longer the
king or queen who is the head of state but those whom the
body politic elect to represent their interests.
I will discuss two problems that result from the three
themes. Each problem has its basis in a manner of viewing
communication which is consistent with the three themes
mentioned above. The first problem arises because of
widespread belief in the following additional cultural
themes. First, many people take selves and ideas to be
fixed, separate and equal. Ideas are so seen and a vague
analogy has come to be made between the ideas and the selves
who "have" them. Democratic theory has often made use of
this analogy between self and its ideas to buttress concepts
16
pertaining to "free citizens" of the state which has them.
Separate' and "equal" are adjectives often applied to
citizenry. That the citizenry might also be "fixed" is not
always seen as contradictory. with respect to democracy,
these separate equalities will be used to describe citizens
of the state. As a consequence, novelty in persons and in
ideas is taken as miraculous
— i.e., explanation for novelty
or change must be seen as incoherent and impossible.
Novelty and change within the democracy cannot be seen as
necessary or even possible in a society which defines its
citizens as fixed individuals. For example, if classes
have essential characteristics only a certain kind of class
struggle is possible. Finally, communication is seen as the
exchange of already fixed ideas. Justice or fairness in the
democracy is viewed as the appropriate exchange of desires
or interests culminating in whatever distribution of goods
and services such an exchange implies. This becomes a
problem given that there can be no appropriate analysis of
desiring or desires when the self is restricted to
information available to it. Accordingly, and predictably,
fairness becomes the exchange of correct or legitimate
desires [2]
.
One can see that this problem is serious
because when desire becomes coupled with correctness,
totalitarianism and domination have been invited into the
system along with the "objective" measure of correctness.
(To say nothing of the fact that it obliterates desire as
17
such.) Not every claim to correctness ends in
totalitarianism; there is a pattern, however, that leads
from the assumption of correctness, to intolerance to
totalitarianism. This pattern will be discussed in more
detail below in "Justice: Contracting Correct Desires." My
ultimate aim in this chapter is to show that the road to the
dispersal of power is blocked and twisted by the marketplace
of interests in which selves are valued, understood and
talked with as potential sovereigns. The notion of
sovereignty requires legitimation.
The theory of communication according to which selves
exchange already available information cannot offer any
significant strategies in the political arena. Because
knowledge is power, and everyone is the monarch of his or
her own information, democracy is the free market exchange
of bits of "self." Exchanging parts of oneself is the only
available strategy; but, as I will argue, it can have no
significant effect on the structure of political affairs.
There are two reasons why this is so. First, a strategy can
only rearrange bits of information according to preset
rules. For example a convention can change to a caucus, but
in both cases preexistent preferences are tabulated.
Second, and more importantly, such strategy is
self-centered. If one had internalized the image, one would
always be busy figuring out who one was, and what one was
allowed
,
too busy to act or try to figure out who anyone
18
else was from their point of view [3]. That is, in a
democracy whose participants view themselves as mini-states,
the only consistent strategy is anarchist individualism.
(The state could not be any but a state of war of all
against all with the difference that the state's state of
war had something like a world gover nmen t--which is
incoherent.) it is impossible to believe in one's efficacy
against and in concert with social institutions given that
particular conceptual picture. Or to put it another way,
within this view of affairs, social institutions can appear
only as groups of individuals who band together solely for
purposes of self-interest.
The second problem mentioned above is the following.
First, given the theory's presuppositions, new ideas are
always no more than new combinations of the old "fixed"
ideas. Restricted to this basis, communication is the
combination and exchanging of ideas. As such it can only be
as successful as the adequacy of the technology which
transmits it. The translation of this aspect of information
theory into democratic theory is again that the institutions
of democracy are already given. One's job as a good citizen
is to analyze the structures available in order to find the
best manipulation of them. What is most emphatically not
one's job, is the production of new institutions. Thus a
conceptual work place exists wherein it is possible for
rational persons to condone or despise political groups
19
according to whether they are sanctioned by the "head." For
example, it is possible to consistently maintain within this
framework that the Casey - North - Poindexter secret groups
are "wrong" for exactly the same reason that secret cells
within the FMLN are "wrong." "These people take things
into their own hands... they have no respect for the tried
institutions." This kind of judgment might turn out to be a
correct one in some cases; it is not worthy of being
generalized into political theory as the example shows. if
it has no place as a general principle of political theory,
it has no place as a major assumption of the same.
Democratic theory has a difficult time preserving a
meaningful private/public distinction if the selves under
analysis are uncertain of their own boundaries, and, if
those selves find images from formal images. Once humans
were said to be made in God's image; now our image is
sometimes said to be derived from society. Portions of
society, however, can be formally equivalent in spite of
differences with respect to end and ideology. As Weber
reminds us "the principle of hierarchical office authority
is found in all bureaucratic s true tur es . . . I t does not matter
for the character of the bureaucracy whether its authority
is called 'private' or 'public'" (Weber {1946} p. 197). Our
images derive from our power source so selves become
uncertain of where they might be. Theoretically, they must
be uncertain of their own boundaries in that everyone's
20
information is potentially available to every other self.
Mass communication networks are discussed as a panacea to
many social ills and as the beginning of universal
understanding [4]. "Separate but equal" fairness is a
short-cut consequence, and the private sphere seems in
principle to melt away under the assault from theory.
Voting becomes a symbol for an ultimately powerful political
act because it is modeled on the universal exchange of
ideas. The end result is unspoken: no one says that voting
is talking to one another. But that is the model and the
model is satisfied by interacting computers exchanging
memory banks. That this model is absurd as explanatory or
heuristic is not be discovered by asking if we would accept
this exchange of steely information as our decision
procedure; instead, we can see the inadequacy by asking
whether such a communication is what we, any of us, would,
at root, prefer. These two problems indicate that neither
social institutions nor political action can be explained in
terms of a contract theory of democracy.
I will proceed as follows in this chapter. First I will
discuss the manner and extent in which thinking about
liberal democratic theories and societies involves the
illegitimate image of head of state and body politic
alluded to above. Second, I will further discuss the first
problem using the work of John Rawls as symptomatic of the
assumption of structural stability. Third, I will discuss
21
the second problem to indicate that traditional theories of
democracy cannot legitimate coherent political action [5]
.
There is no necessity to the order in which I discuss
the two problems of democratic theory that I have chosen.
It is not the case that any given democracy or its theories
have to encounter these problems in this order. I do
believe that modern democratic apologetics inevitably
encounter both problems. If it can be determined that there
are conditions under which democratic institutions cannot be
changed and if it can be further determined that those
conditions exist, then one will know that the theory will
not provide solutions to certain flagrant social illnesses.
If it can be determined that there are conditions under
which political action in a democracy is inherently
quiescent, then again theory or democracy must change if
social improvement is to be conceivable. One must survey
the most basic levels of conceptual analysis before being
capable of defining a more flexible form of democracy.
Image-Making : Every Man A King
Theme One: The Unified Self of Information
In the Essay
,
Locke mentions as "evident" several
counterintuitive properties of "self:
22
Self is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever
Mater iai
e
'simn?
UP ° f whether ^ritual, or
which i
s
'
senqfh ^
'
° r CoraPounded / it matters not)
Pain,
extends. Ihus'evlryone**inds.^ha^whUsf^ieusness
comprehended under that consciousness, the littleFinger is as much a part of it self, as what ismost so. upon separation of this little Fingershould this consciousness go along with the little
he
g
Ii; t?:
d
F
leaVe thV eSt ° f the Body, 'tis evidentt l t le inger would be the Person, the samePerson; and self then would have nothing to do with
Body--- In this personal Identity isfounded all the Right and Justice of Reward andPunishment; Happiness and Misery, being that, forwhich every one is concerned for himself, not
mattering what becomes of any Substance, notjoined to, or affected with that consciousness. For
as it is evident in the instance I gave but now, ifthe consciousness went along with the little Finger,
which it was cut off, that would be the same self
which was concerned for the whole Body Yesterday, as
making a part of it self, whose Actions then it
cannot but admit as its own now. (Locke (19751
pp. 341 - 42 )
;
Under what conditions can it be assumed as obvious that
one's little finger (albeit with memory) is as much a part
of oneself as What is most so?" How can it be evident that
a finger with a mind" would be the person who once held
that mind? In the end one can agree with Locke. If a
surgeon were about to throw out an amputated finger in order
better to concentrate on the brain which had been the focus
of an operating session, and then, suddenly, the finger were
to cry out in something resembling language, however
remotely, someone would at the very least put the finger,
the person
,
on ice. So while Locke may be right, there is
23something strange about his use of "self-evident" and
everyone would agree" in connection with his bizarre
fantasies. And not only because "everyone would agree
after cons ider able thought on the matter, but also because
when one assents to the finger's being the same self it is
through a sense of moral duty—
-"that finger could be me or
someone else I love." That is, the assent here would be a
slower and more complicated one than that to "the cat is on
the mat" when the cat is, in fact, on the mat.
I believe that the reason Locke holds these notions of
personal identity to be obvious is that they are based on
what is obvious, namely, that one values in the political
realm those "things" with which one is capable of
communication. What is more questionable, but what Locke
has to hold, is that one values most highly those whose
communications most closely mimic one's own, in this case,
the case of Locke, the free individual. Locke begins by
recognizing the importance of communication, but his
explicit valuation makes the bourgeois "free" individual the
paradigm of the locus of communication. Locke conflates the
two concepts of communication and the communicating
individual. For Locke, in my terms, one is one, and there
are as many political agents as there are named individuals
in the ordinary sense of legitimate, named, rational
persons. One's personal identity expands to include that
with which one is able to identify in thought. Locke says
that one cannot care about "what becomes of any Substance^
not joined to, or affected with that consciousness" of
oneself. The key concepts to retain are, first, that for
Locke one is what one is able to identify with in thought
and, second, that one can only care about what one is in
this sense.
Colin Cherry, a mathematician and information theorist,
makes similar points centuries later. Cherry values the
individual and the individual's capacity for communication
to the extent that, like Locke, he merges conceiver and
concept in one "personal" identity. Locke's "self"--the
finger who remembers being itself, i.e., who remembers the
other body's information-- is supplanted, metaphorically, by
the printed word:
Inasmuch as the words we use disclose the true
nature of things, as truth is to each one of us, the
various words relating to personal communication are
most revealing. The very word "communicate" means
"share", and inasmuch as you and I are communicating
at this moment, we are one. (Cherry {1957} p. 4)
Cherry thinks that
sense, the sense of
("We understand one
if one understands
unity, part of one
another. This one
others, one is in some
personal identity,
another is the unity"
(Cherry {1957} p. 4)
.
I juxtapose Locke and Cherry here
with which each of two very different
to be able to communicate. For both.
to point
thinkers
personal
out the ease
might be said
identity is
defined in terms of the selves with, or about whom, one can
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think. Communication for these thinkers is the conscious
transmission of information between selves; it seems an
alarmingly wide conceptual leap that Cherry does not write
merely of the reader having become one with him, but also of
having become his book [6]. The alarm subsides when one
notices that the personification here occurs only because,
as with Locke, Cherry's views depend on consciousness being
specifically "human." A detached piece of body is me if and
only if it remembers being me [7]. if one could throw one's
consciousness into a lamp the lamp would be oneself only if
it could communicate as one had done. When Cherry wrote his
consciousness into a book, the book was made him because the
book mimics his communication process. Nonetheless the
personification of the book and the finger creates a
limiting tension for the strict criteria Locke and Cherry
utilize in common for what counts as understanding,
discourse, or shared consciousness. If personal identity is
tied up with shared consciousness and memory of self,
however vaguely, then one could literally, in forgetting
oneself, cease to be oneself. What had appeared a very
loose notion of personal identity appears to include more
than Locke had bargained for. Could Locke have thought: "I
am myself when and only when I am remembering who I am?"
There is an answer to this sort of problem in the Essay ; it
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turns out Locke has a way to keep the individual person
within the boundaries necessary to his theory.
Locke describes failure with respect to communication,
as when he describes a case where minds have not merged:
I know not, how Men, who have the same Idea, underdifferent Names, or different Ideas, under the sameame, can in that case, talk with one another, any
more. than a Man, who not being blind, or deaf, hasdistinct Ideas of the Colour of Scarlet, and the
sound of a Trumpet could discourse concerning
Scarlet-Colour with the blind Man, I mention in
another Place, who fancied, that the Idea of Scarlet
was like the sound of a Trumpet. (Locke {1975} p.12 6 )
This passage strikes me as odd. Locke seems to be
saying that unless one has perfect communication one has no
communication; not only does one need shared experiences to
communicate, one must have had identical experiences. The
passage is even more odd if one considers the sound of a
trumpet an appropriate description for the color scarlet.
Locke makes the opposite point I would have made: my
reaction is "How like me this blind man is." Locke's
reaction is "This man, compared to me, is a lunatic." Locke
notices that sometimes people will not communicate; but
then what does this mean for personal identity? And if I
forget how blue looks to me at d
A free reading of Locke would
lapses outside of self. Conside
Personal identity is the unity o
usk am
allow
r this
f one's
I no longer myself?
these momentary
argument: (1)
information, (2)
Everything assimilable by a consciousness is a part of that
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consciousness' personal identity, (3) Persons who do not
share names for ideas nor ideas for names cannot communicate
with one another, therefore, (4) one cannot be oneself if
one confuses one's ideas and the names one has given to
one's ideas, though one can be oneself in a different body.
(l)-(3) seem Lockean, and yet Locke would surely reject (4)
Locke's response, I think, would be that (4) does not follow
from ( 1 ) - ( 3 ) because such confusion, in oneself, is not
possible. (4) is therefore not coherent, and cannot be a
conclusion. Locke accepts that one can be oneself despite
modification of body. But one can communicate with only
those selves who see things as one does. One uses words,
according to Locke, in two ways: first, to record one's own
thoughts and, second, to communicate one's thoughts to
others. Communication can fail--that which fails does not
become part of us. We cannot fail to communicate with
ourselves, however, and hence we are always ourselves, in
the sense that we are always selves that contain unified
information. That we can never be confused in ourselves is
suggested by such passages as the following:
...we talk to our selves, any Words will serve the
turn. For since Sounds are voluntary and
indifferent signs of any Ideas, a Man may use what
Words he pleases to signify his own Ideas to
himself: and there will be no imperfection in them,
if he constantly use the same sign for the same
Idea: for then he cannot fail of having his meaning
understood, wherein consists the right use and
perfection of Language. (Locke {1975} p. 476)
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believe these claims is to begin to image oneself in
impossible ways. a self becomes something that cannot
forget itself; it has very strict boundaries. It is the
sum total of its information. As such, it is represented to
itself as capable of acquiring immense power. But the
inner, homogenous self is allowed to talk to itself with any
sounds it pleases. it is given licence to create freely.
The power of creation is limited only when one is forced to
deal with others, specifically those others who are not like
one's self. Difference is seen as irrational, ludicrous,
expendable. Locke has barred from "self" everything
"irrational"
—all those things for which no universally
understood names exist. The power of a self is its ability
to expand its "rational" repository of information.
Again, Cherry makes, or refers to, a point remarkably
like one of Locke's. "in the Country of the Blind the
one-eyed man is not a king—he is a gibbering idiot" (Cherry
{1957} p. 19). Notice how domineering are the theories
which result from this notion of self. Unless two selves
are completely similar, they will not be able to make any
sense at all to each other. A finger can be Locke, Cherry
can become me through a book, and yet these imaginative
suggestions collapse to the truism that there is no room for
a one-eyed person in a country of blind people. Implicit in
this notion of self is the notion that difference is
impossible to grasp. Information acquired must be of a
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certain kind—namely rational and universal
— to be
assimilated by others. Ruptures of what Cherry describes as
mob-1 behavior are incomprehensible. Any communications
that are irrational cannot be assimilated, only difference
in the amount of information one has acquired and then only
to the point where some sort of qualitative change
occurs—as in the case of sighted and sightless persons. if
qualitative difference is suspected, it can can only be
feared or ridiculed. One never fails to be oneself because
one always shares information perfectly with oneself. One
is never different from oneself. Insofar as one is
consciousness, one knows who one is. if one is only careful
with the way one uses words and names, one can communicate
with anyone else taking equal care. One's hindrance to
perfect information lies in the other. Cherry is no
stranger to the desire for a universal or perfect
communication. He says:
Awareness of the universal nature of "communication"
has existed for a very long time, in a somewhat
vague and empirical way, but recently the
mathematical developments which come under the
heading of the "Theory of Communication" have
brought matters to a head and many there are who
regard this work as a panacea. (Cherry {1957} p. 2)
While Cherry does not think that the mathematical models
solve every communication need, he sees looming
communication problems only as a lack of information coupled
with insufficient processing space and/or storage capacity.
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Winch is to say Cherry believes that the models of
information theory are helpful with respect to the problems
one faces in understanding others. Thus, Locke and Cherry
appear to have similar views, while perfect communication
is possible in theory, it can happen between two or more
people only in special cases. Even limited communication is
impossible between people who take in information in
radically different ways or who have radically unequal
access to information. Cherry says that perfect
communication is not practically possible but he believes
that it is theoretically possible—as we saw in the citation
where he claims that he and his readers are one in
communication. Such communication is possible but only with
peopl e-1 i ke-me
" [8]
.
That this is a view not so much
explained but taken for granted by two such diverse
theorists suggests that the Culture that produced them both
assumes some version of the theme as well. Theory sets the
possibilities from which we choose, by narrowing the
possibilities we can see; thus, theory sets the goal towards
which we can move. To assume what Locke and Cherry have
assumed in this respect is to be incapable of affirming a
politics of difference.
While Cherry finds communication a "social affair"
(Cherry {1957} p. 3), the nature of the social is
impoverished. The process of coming to communicate is said
to be evolutionary. Cherry maintains that this process is
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what makes society itself possible: "we evolved a host of
different systems of communication which render social life
pos s i bl e . . . Commun i c a t i on renders true social life
practicable, for communication means organization" (Cherry
{1957} p. 5). Communication is best understood as an
evolving set of signs. in addition to transferring
information from one person to another, the task of
communication is, for Cherry, twofold: first to further the
evolution of those signs by new models and "languages" which
make communication quicker and better organized and, second,
to increase the stored knowledge of society. Since none of
us know everything, rational group decisions must depend on
the quickest possible flow of information along the possible
channels. Individual memory can give way to public
repositories of information. Cherry believes that new
selves exist now due to increasing amounts of information,
and new ways of dealing with these increased amounts.
Cherry's view of society as a clearing of information
embodies the lack of recognition of social institutions that
I referred to earlier. Everything is in place except the
possibility of faster channels of information transfer.
This is a superficial but unsettling view of social
existence
.
I will discuss one last thinker whose views rely on the
theme that a self is exhausted by its available information.
Lyotard is especially appropriate here since he. like
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Cherry, thinks that humans now "know" in different ways, and
he shares Cherry's interest in information theory and the
possibilities that computers bring. (This is the strand of
his discourse I seize. I believe that many of his
views-reconstructing new notions of truth and justice, and
allowing free play of language games, for examples-are open
to criticisms parallel to those I will make with respect to
opening computer banks "to all." The important point is
that whether one refers to narrative or me ta-nar r a t ive
,
science or pre-science, the subject is constituted by what
it "knows.") For Lyotard, "...young or old, man or woman,
rich or poor, a person is always located at 'nodal points'
of specific communication circuits however tiny these may
be" (Lyotard {1984} p. 15). Selves are places in
communication networks, completing the exhaustion of the
individual self whose beginnings were noticed in Cherry.
One cannot be the "man who knows everything;" but as a
species, we can pool our information as a means of
confronting challenges. The social disappears; we are a
collectivity of information sharers. As one commentator has
put it "Lyotard does not trust the integrity of
'communities' any more than of 'totality'' (Arac {1986}, p.
xiii)
.
Restricting the size and scope of a language game
does not lead to better communication or groups with more
integrity. Instead, as Lyotard puts it, people find their
places in a network of words that is radically
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work is vastly
discussed, the
once again:
c. So, although the impetus behind Lyotard's
different from that of the two thinkers just
familiar ontology of individuals surfaces
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ls no need to resort to some fiction ofsocial origins to establish that languagegames. are the minimum relation required for society
of t^
S
n
e
r n - bef ° re hS iS b° rn ' if only by virtuehe ame he is given, the human child is alreadypositroncd as the referent in the story recounted bythose around him, in relation to which he willinevitably chart his course. (Lyotard {1984} p. 15 )
If one believes that such is the condition of the human
child, one must also believe that humans can always only
make sense to each other in terms of information that
predates them. (Whether or not the latter proposition is
true is not significant here. it may well be true but it is
inconsistent with radical individualism— a view shared by
many who have also assimilated the possibly true proposition
under discussion.) When that view of society and selves is
taken, there is no reason to argue for the view that
language g ame
s
conceptually precede society; nor can an
argument be made for the view that systems of communication
make society possible. There is no dialectic between
structure and person, society and speaker. All that can be
are exchange and organization: these constitute society.
The values of a society arise from the exchange of
information in which one finds oneself already enmeshed.
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Values may be fluid but they are fivpHtlxed in the sense that
they have nothing to do with us.
The conclusion both writers reach from their accounts of
communication regardless of their emotional reaction to this
conclusion, is that they are nothing without society and its
language games. This conclusion follows from their theories
of communication. The dominant political theory, however,
which they both implicitly accept, tells them that they are
individuals who interact politically with other separate
individuals. The self of communication and the political
individual are hard to reconcile; this difficulty results
in a tension.
In a moment I will turn a theoretical instance of such
tension. An instance in the world of such a tension is that
encountered by those with a great burden of communication
(and to some of politics) the artist. What an artist must
reject in order to create is precisely what cannot be
r e jected--namely the political individual with all its
baggage. The apolitical individual must be created anew
continuously and this can only be done politically— in
groups, symbolically, for reasons of survival.
But perhaps the theoretical instance will serve better
explanatory purpose. Lyotard, like Cherry, is insistent
that communication theory is not a social panacea; he
argues, in fact, that for society to rearrange itself as it
ought, all need to pay attention not only to language and
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the real world
Ordinary commun
because they fa
agonistic aspec
this aspect of
novelty:
heories but also to the power struggles in
often called games by theorists and others,
ication theories are weak on Lyotard's view
il to take account of what he calls the
t of society. Game theory can account for
society because it contains an element of
Each language partner, when a 'move' pertaininq tohim is made, undergoes a 'displacement,' an
alteration of some kind that not only affects him inhis capacity as addressee and referent, but also as
sender. These 'moves' necessarily provoke
' countermoves '
--and everyone knows that a
countermove that is merely reactional is not
a 'good' move. Reactional countermoves are no morethan programmed effects in the opponent's strategy;they play into his hands and thus have no effect onthe
. balance of power. That is why it is important
to increase displacement in the games, and even todisorient it, in such a way as to make an unexpected
move' (a new statement). (Lyotard {1984} p. 16)
How does one do
of one's information
the place one holds
Perhaps this is why
parentheses-
-because
the unexpected if o
and only this and
in relations which
"new statement" is
there is no adequa
ne is the sum total
if one's "essence" is
tell one who one is?
in
te answer to this
question. Or perhaps novelty comes about through
increasingly complex combinations of codes, signals or
ideas. One finds a hint in Lyotard that he believes that
quantitative changes can become qualitative. One day
humanity will have the perfect communication—at the point
at which the computer is big enough. Thus he says:
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We are finally in a position to understand how thecomputerrzat^n of society affects this problematicIt could become the 'dream' instrument for
^
lng and re9ulating the market system,
extended to include knowledge itself and governedexclusively by the per format ivi ty principle. inthat case, it would inevitably involve the use ofterror. But it could also aid groups discussinq
metaprescr lptives by supplying them with theinformation they usually lack for makingknowledgeable decisions. The line to follow for
computerization to take the second of these twopaths is, in principle, quite simple: give thepublic free access to the memory and data banks.Language games would then be games of perfectinformation at any given moment ... Th i s sketches the
outline of a politics that would respect both thedesire for justice and the desire for the unknown.(Lyotard {1984} p. 67)
But to get to the point where this could be a move or
strategy one would have already to have admitted that the
grand narrative is the narrative. That is to avoid the
terror of our world by giving information to "the people" is
to suppose that the terror already allowed is allowed
because most people do not know about it. Someone might say
that many already know where terror begins and grows. It
would seem that Lyotard's informational resources are too
impoverished to ground the political intuitions that
threaten constantly to interrupt the progress of information
exchange
.
Locke, Cherry and Lyotard may have seemed an unlikely
trio for joint scrutiny. However, it is of considerable
interest that they share the notion that the self is
exhausted by its information [9]. Locke presents the most
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restrictive limitations on this notion. Lyotard seems not
afraid of Locke s irrational or incomprehensible
information. He does not, however, allow free and equal
access to information when we read closely. Nodes are there
for everyone "however small." Implicit in this language of
node size is a mirror of reality showing the largest nodes
(or to use more precise information theory language than
does Lyotard, the most centrally located and most frequently
used nodes) existing for the young, rich and male. That
memory banks will be free is a theoretical claim that
provides no relief in practice for those not party to the
information network in its more celebrated points. (Making
computer banks free in this context is like paying workers a
little bit more for their being exploited.) Despite the
differences between our social thinkers, their theories of
self and communication allow information to shift while the
structure of society is unchanged.
Theme Two: Sovereignty of Self Over Body
I have begun by showing some potentially dangerous
political beliefs which can result in those that believe
that the self is equivalent to its available information. I
turn now to the second theme. If the self is its
information, particularly the information that is
transparent to itself, then the self rules itself with
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respect to that of which it is constituted. The self is
sovereign over itself in both its physical and mental
manifestations, insofar as they are not determined by
external laws of causation. Each self in our democratic
theory should rule only over itself provided, of course,
that it is a rational self. No self should rule over any of
the other selves with which it is linked in the society of
equals. When selves are so regarded, democracy can be but
one of two things: a truce between selves brought about by
social contract, e.g., a republic; or an impartial clearing
mechanism fueled by the moral electoral activities of
thoughtful agents, e.g., a democracy. in both cases, selves
must be viewed as equal, sovereign, moral agents who
exchange information.
"Whence morality?" The analysis thus far has pointed to
equality as important. Negating differences other than
those expressed in terms of the quantity of available
information—which turns to qualitatively different
content or those expressed as different preferences leaves
only equal political selves. Consider J.S. Mill's
discussion of moral obligation in Utilitarianism:
The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard
of duty may be, is one and the same— a feeling in
our mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant
on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated
moral natures rises in the more serious cases, into
shrinking from it as an impossibility. This
feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself
with the pure idea of duty, and not with some
particular form of it, or with any of the
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merely accessory ci
Conscience; though
actually exists the
encrusted over with
from sympathy
,
from
fear;.. The ultimate
morality (external
feeling in our own
rcumstances, is the sense of
in that complex phenomenon as it
simple fact is in general all
collateral associations, derived
love, and still more from
sanction, therefore, of all
motives apart) being a subjective
minds. (Mill {1961} pp. 214-15)
Duty and, when properly developed, conscience, are
feelings in the mind. Mill's formulation is so constructed
that it becomes impossible for a person to do anything
morally wrong, provided, of course, that he [or she!] has
been properly indoctrinated. There is only one pure idea of
duty connected to our feelings. The ultimate sanction of
all morality is this subjective feeling, which is derived
from indoctrination. The internal sanction must be first
external in that outside place where we learn what is our
duty, what ought to cause pain, what is to be feared or
loved. The "external motives apart," must be that which
makes the internal duty. Mill underpins the feeling with
the principle of utility; however, his argument is such
that nothing could count as a rationally defensible
counterexample to the principle. ("I recoil in horror from
British colonization of India," might be the statement of
someone whose subjective feelings are "wrong," or
"incorrect," or "shortsighted," or whose indoctrination had
failed.) And this problem is not Mill's problem. It is a
problem where the terms of our morality (our ethos) and the
terms of our political systems are not just incompatible but
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make each other appear completely incoherent,
"vote your conscience" might mean in agonistic
Consider what
language
games
.
Mill understood very well that many people value power
over liberty. My point is that power is so over-valued that
it is entrenched in all analysis and his "liberty" requires
power relations to exist. The internalization of values
that result in a moral conscience, I will argue, is
coextensive with the urge for power. The urge for power is
tied up with morality at a very basic level and is
consequently tied up with a pattern toward totalitarianism.
When one scrutinizes the idea that each self is allowed
within the system to react to Conscience, problems arise
regarding the adjudication of ideas. The tension here is
that each self is "empowered" as determiner of moral
rectitude; nonetheless a limit must be imposed by various
institutions and selves cannot be allowed to determine what
their political duties shall be. In part our inability to
formulate a decision procedure in this regard is based on
what appears to be a contradiction in that theory. Thus,
when Mill writes in On Liberty that "the only part of the
conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is
that which concern others. In the part which merely
concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute"
(Mill {1961} p. 263), we want to respond by saying that it
follows from his views of moral and political obligation
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that there can be no such thing as that which "merely
concerns himself."
Wherever there is a right, the case is one of justice.
Here, however, is an absolute right to be free from justice
m a11 one ' s "individual" undertakings. Individuals, their
vision blurred by the sovereignty they have been told they
possess, but who also have legitimate needs to engage in
political activity, ask themselves "What part is that, that
concerns only me?" and readily see that this a question that
cannot be adequately answered given the liberal images and
language. Because the question cannot be answered and
because individuals know that political activity is to be
kept separate from "other" activities, they do not know how
to proceed politically or socially.
When individuals can no longer believe in the
reproduction of freedoms within democracy, when individuals
cannot find coherent places in the political network, and
when, moreover, the society is constantly throwing up images
of voting as a panacea, as the ultimately democratic
institution, then such individuals have no genuinely
political strategies.
The tension that arises is not, of course, due
specifically to the work of J.S. Mill and such is not my
claim. Instead his work exemplifies such tension already.
In the world of politics selves must consider the following
contradictory propositions, all of which are integral parts
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of their cultural heritage. A self is entitled, by right,
to judge moral action according to conscience. A self is
not entitled to act on these judgments unless the results of
the actions harm no other self
. A self is sovereign. A
self has no political power and no means of group
identification that has not been predetermined. A self may
exercise political power and foster existing groups and
cr
" ea te new ones. Selves seem hopelessly caught in
subjectivist and objectivist systems. Mill would restore
order by invoking Conscience
,
an abstraction that collapses
morality into the objectivist system as a means of judging
an equality that his utilitarian pronouncements cannot
justify
.
That the self as information is necessarily in tension
with the political individual manifests itself in a
controversy surrounded by the possibility that if one dares
to bring up the notion of an objective value, one is
automatically seen to be totalitarian [10]. Because the
individual is sovereign over the mini-state which is the
person's own body, justice can ultimately only be a
compromise between sovereigns, unless something is said
about the self that is beyond the resources of liberal
grounding. Anything less than this is a violation of the
sovereign's absolute right to rule its domain. But if
values are not objective an appeal to morality can only
apparently solve a crisis in the theory of already existing
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power in a democratic setting. That morality is brought
into play indicates that the theory of equal selves
presupposes an unequal conception of power relationships as
a background for actually doing social business.
Theme Three: Body Politics
I now turn to a discussion of the image that the head of
state is to the citizenry, or the body politic, as the
brain/mind is to the human body which houses it. It was not
quite correct to say, as I did earlier, that when the state
is imaged, the body politic must place the leader at the
head--in the brain or mind. Menenius Agrippa represents the
Roman leadership as a great all-consuming stomach. This
sort of corporeal variation does not detract from my point,
as it may only indicate whether the persons participating in
the imagining are for or against the state in question. Why
is this practice undertaken at all? That one can so refer
to the state is possible because of the assumption that the
state is organic. Aristotle makes the state (and not just
society) a "creation of nature" (Aristotle {1941} p. 1129).
The identity of the state is in its essence, its remembrance
of itself:
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al %SinCe the whole is of necessity prior toe part; for example, if the whole body b ePdestroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except inan equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stoned/\v/? r wt;en . destroyed the hand will be no betterthan that. (Aristotle {1941} p. 1129)
Until the body politic finds its "head" or "brain" in a
state, it is not really made up of individuals, any more
than a finger, without a memory of itself as person, is a
person. Without a head of state, according to the image,
the body politic cannot exist.
I maintain that it is the deceptive coupling of the
image of the state as a head having a body with the theory
of the self as the sum total of its information that can
lead a theorist to say: "in the part which merely concerns
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute" (Mill
{1961} p. 263). There is no adequate theory of the body
which can be consonant with such imaging. In the image
which is used to describe social arrangements, the people
are the body politic. The head of the state is what makes
us possible. Within the possibilities of the image, the
notion of equal selves is incoherent. This is why authority
always comes in. Equality cannot make sense by itself; it
is an apparent starting point whose political implications
seem anarchic or disorderly. It is assumed that authority
must appear in order to head off chaos. This is a
psychological point. I am not suggesting that the "people"
need a "leader." My point is that we are often shown a
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strange political anatomy wherein no group of persons seems
possible qua group without a leader as its head. in a group
of people the often presumed correct posture is either to
look to the natural" leader or to assume that role [11].
In addition to the fact that no coherent theory of the
body allows the image to picture us in any believable
manner, there is now the fact that the power of the monarch
can no longer be seen as sovereign because we are each
sovereign over our separate and individual selves. it
appears, therefore, as if there is no place for the way in
which most are told to perceive themselves in the social
picture. Having no room in the political space for a unique
sovereign. Culture validates the picture of each individual
as a mini-sovereign with absolute rights with regard to
itself. The result is a vision of political power which is
the brokering of the mini-sovereigns' interests. Heads of
state are hired, through contract and vote, by the body
politic. Contract theory need not view itself this way; it
continues to do so because the image persists alongside
subsequent developments of it. The image persists alongside
a theory of the self which seems to deny that we could
possibly so image ourselves and our state. If a theory of
the self can accommodate the image, such a theory must
already contain authoritarian elements. Selves that do not
allow hierarchical relationships with respect to one another
cannot be power brokered by elected sovereigns in the extant
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theories of democracy. But, power must appear from
somewhere. The theories we have been discussing cannot
explain where power comes from. It is just always already
there as something that individuals have with respect to
their own bodies. Equal selves are said to give up their
already present power to elected officials (in only relevant
respects). That power is prior to rights or political
process is, if not impossible, at least confused and in need
of elucidation in extant theories.
The newer philosophies of the body seem to encode the
notion of each one's sovereignty over one's self. Each
becomes the "mind" ruling over one's own body, reducing the
image to its simplest expression [12]. That little really
novel is involved here can be seen by applying the method of
Individuation; there are as many bodies as there are
subjects. The philosophical problem is usually described
not just in terms of human or animal bodies. Instead all
bodies, what are called individuals, are treated as
conceptually equivalent. The connection between the problem
of bodies (individuals, identities) and communication
(language, sentences) is inextricable. So, for instance,
"individuals" have been described as "not properties or
relations; r athe r . . . they enter into relations and have
properties" (Hiz {1971} p. 253). Bodies, as such, are not
given. The only things that are given are "certain
sentences" (Hiz {1971} p. 261). An individual is an event
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abstracted "fro. a mass of facts.- flnd an individual is a
body. Later, we will see how this one-to-one correlation
has to be broken if the authoritarian presuppositions of
power are to be avoided
[ 13 ]
If my argument so far is reasonable, then it can be said
that the reason why some focus increasingly on the body is
that the sovereign control given in myth and culture is
looking for expression through the exercising of that
"absolute" right over what is owned: the body, it seems
impossible to free ourselves for multiple selves as long as
we are encumbered not with body but with a body theorized as
something against us which we must control through
ownership. Perhaps a good way to show how difficult it is
for us to find a body for the self (or to find a
relationship between selves and bodies that is at root
non-dominating) is to compare Descartes to Deleuze and
Guattari on the body. First Descartes, from the
Meditations
:
I must begin by observing the great difference
between mind and body. Body is of its nature alwaysdivisible; mind is wholly indivisible. When I
consider the mind— that is, myself, in so far as I
am merely a conscious being— I can distinguish no
parts within myself... on the other hand, I cannot
think of any corporeal or extended object without
being readily able to divide it in thought and
therefore conceiving of it as divisible. This would
be enough to show me the total difference between
mind and body, even if I did not sufficiently know
this already. (Descartes {1954} p. 121) [14]
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The image of the Citizenry is complicated further in that as
a Part of the body politic the citizenry is somehow one with
the state but, as Descartes already knows sufficiently well,
we know that we are not the state. The state is indivisible
("one country under God indivisible"), the citizenry is by
its very nature divisible. Descartes uses a method of
individuation that breaks with the requirements of
democratic theory. Thus, Cherry opines concerning the
question of the divisible body and the unified head:
Business, industries, and armies are not mobs, or crowds.
They have defined purpose, they have formal structure," they
have rules "which determine on the whole how messages
(orders, instructions, etc.) shall flow and communication
unite the parts into a whole, purposeful, goal seeking
'organism'" (Cherry {1957} p. 23). When leaders do the
citizenry's thinking, the result is a unified organism
striving toward a goal. Left to itself, the citizenry is
nothing more than a mob or a crowd.
Unfortunately, for information theorists, mobs and
crowds exist. Cherry asks "why does society continually
split into two, like the two opposing teams in a game:
capital and labor, the two parties of a stable democracies,
the two sides in a war...? is such dualism inherent in the
way we think?" (Cherry {1957} p. 26). He leaves the
question unanswered. The unified democratic organism seems
to require division if it is to function as it ought to
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function. The tension which here occurs in Cherry's writing
underlines the impossibly inconsistent images given to
selves to think about themselves. if one thinks correctly
(i.e., rationally) one's body will feel right and one's life
will be well-ordered. if the government follows the rules,
ity will follow. But unity cannot be even the ostensible
goal of a democracy that requires an elected leadership.
Descartes undertakes a thought experiment to convince
himself that he has no body: "Nutrition and Locomotion?
Since I have no body, these are mere delusions" (Descartes
{1954} p. 69). in addition he convinces himself that the
body is no great thing. Western culture has devalued the
body ever since. Descartes, even as he places himself at
the center of the universe, tells us that bodies are so
negligible that he sees no reason for supposing that he did
not create their images entirely: "As for my ideas of
corporeal objects, they contain nothing so great that it
seems it could not originate from myself" (Descartes {1954}
p. 83) .
Deleuze and Guattari, by contrast, have done a great
deal to reclaim the body for us--although my relationship to
them must remain that of friendly expositor given their too
fragmented view of self. it is very interesting that in so
doing they have also produced a political work. Instead of
centering the "I" anywhere— let alone in a mind at the
center of the universe--they describe a substance that is
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everything/nothing, everywhere/nowhere. The reason I find
this dispersal one that I call a reclaiming of the body is
that I believe the focus on sovereignty with respect to
mind/body concerns has partitioned individuals into bodies
unduly. There is no reason, save convention, for viewing
individuals as distinct [15]
.
The body without organs is the matter that always
fills space to given degrees of intensi ty , and the
partial objects are these degrees, these intensive
parts that produce the real in space starting from
matter as intensity=0. The body without organs is
the immanent substance, in the most Spinozist sense
of the word; and the partial objects are like its
ultimate attributes, which belong to it precisely
insofar as they are really distinct and cannot on
this account exclude or oppose one another.
(Deleuze and Guattari {1983} pp. 326-27)
Desiring and not thinking is overlaid on this substance;
The body without organs, the unproductive, the
unconsumable, serves as a surface for the recording
of the entire process of production of desire, so
that desir ing-machines seem to emanate from it in
the apparent objective movement that establishes a
relationship between the machines and the body
without organs. (Deleuze and Guattari {1983} p. 11)
Imaging the body requires dealing with
way. "It [the body without organs] is the
image" (Deleuze and Guattari {1983} p. 8).
was faced with the decision of making desi
desire in some
body without an
Thus when Plato
ring primarily
either a production or an acquisition, he chose to make it
an act of acquisition. The result, metaphorically put, is
51
that the society has valued financiers over manufacturers.
(See Deleuze and Guattari {1983} p. 25.)
That rational thought in the ideal world has been valued
more than production through desire in the material world,
is a factor contributing to the neglect concerning the role
of the body. When important issues are neglected, however,
they do not go away; they reassert themselves in other
ways. That analyses of the human body have failed to
develop which approach in depth or seriousness those of the
mind has led to an overemphasis of some aspects of the body.
This shows in the way politics proceeds. So, for instance,
democracies are very concerned about free speech. But in
many democracies, this one included, body language and
non— spoken expression are among the more restricted
communications. So for example, dress codes for men and
women (and for adults and children) vary wildly and in
patently unfair ways. (Imagine, if by current law men were
permitted to say things women were not allowed to say. And
yet it is illegal for women to dress (or undress) as men
do.
)
This fact is symptomatic of the covering up of the body
and its desiring at the level of theory. But by the same
token, the authoritarian presuppositions of democratic
theory cannot be broken by opposing the individual body to
social s true tur e--although it works better than words--or by
breaking the body into a collection of desiring machines.
Because the state is modeled on the rational organization of
the human in democratic theory, its function includes that
of controlling the desires and interests of the body politic
under its control. Lyotard's picture of a well-managed
information network, or state, shows that on his view
desiring never transcends acquisition for production.
Despite his wonderfully innovative discussion of "subject,"
he remains solidly in the school which reduces the self to
information, and the state (or the corporation) to the buyer
and seller of information. Because selves are their
information, on this model, the state turns out to deal in
bits and pieces of self. in spite of the unfortunate images
which flow from it, this theory is heady with possibility.
When what is exchanged is bits of mind, acquisition is
endless, concrete resources and emotions which are in short
supply get forgotten. Who is not seduced (momentarily) by
the following optimism and who can believe it is written in
a time of increasing scarcity of necessary goods?:
The stakes would be knowledge (or information, if
you will), and the reserve of knowledge--language
'
s
reserve of possible utterances— is inexhaustible.
(Lyotard {1984} p. 67)
Lyotard's political remarks are the natural extension of
this image. Kant says that "under the Law of nations, a
state is regarded as a moral person living with and in
opposition to another state in a condition of natural
freedom, which itself is a condition of continual war" (Kant
{1985} p. 115). Lyotard's agonistics just bring to
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consciousness what strings of images had "shown" us: that
selves are mini-states in "a condition of continual war."
My argument in this chapter reveals that the view of
sovereign mini-states at war within themselves and against
each other exists because of two anterior views: first,
that the self is its information; second, that the society
has so valued the internal that to have a body image the
body must be seen as owned by the self [ 16 ]. in order to
have any political control, those in power or those seeking
power have attempted (and often accomplished) control of
bodies. These attempts became codified in political theories
such as Mill's. Problems in theory which arise for
democracy arise much earlier in the conceptual framework
than most theorists allow. I see the problems as centering
around what a self is, what selves want, and how selves are
able to talk to one another despite the fact that society
has been separating selves for centuries. I now turn to the
two problems. The first concerns what these themes entail
for contract theory. The second concerns the democratic
theory of diverse electoral activities and agents.
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Contempor ary Problems
Justice: Contracting Correct Desires
The first problem I discuss falls under the heading of
justice, in that the problem in question concerns the
legitimate exchange of interests (and the manifestations of
those interests) between individuals. This problem concerns
the theoretical structure of a democratic society when it is
viewed as justified by some version of a social contract.
By contrast, the second problem concerns actual electoral
change in a functioning democracy. However, I wish to make
it clear that the distinction between the first and second
problems is not that between abstract and concrete problems.
As has been the case throughout this chapter, my points are
conceptual ones. Locke shows himself to be an idealist when
he maintains that a person persists as the same person
through time and space so long as that person remains
conscious of itself.
Deleuze and Guattari do not accept the notion of a
unified self existing through time and space. They make
material Locke's notion that one can be oneself in a
different body, thereby exploding the notion of personal
identity through time. Furthermore, and more importantly.
their view about the material necessity of that process
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Which is the body without organs makes the picture of selves
as mini-sovereigns forever at war henceforth impossible.
That is, once the possibility of the "self" expressed in
Anti-Oedipus is envisioned, the intuition that one is a
separate individual loses its force. Conceptual imaginings
along the lines of what one finds in Anti-Oedipus can
suggest how to break the authoritarian presuppositions of
extant democratic theory, among other reasons, because one
could on occasion believe oneself to be non-antagonistic
with respect to others and not to be engaged in attempting
to assimilate their information. Deleuze and Guattari only
suggest a possibility. Many of their conclusions are
questionable for instance their overly enthusiastic
valorization of schizophrenia. They do constitute such a
radical departure from the theories of self which proceed
them that their work is interesting just for that fact. By
Chapter Four, I will propose an account of political action
based on a different theory of the self [17].
The problems which surround the notion of democracy as
an exchange of correct desires begins with the notion that
when two or more persons communicate, what they are doing is
exchanging fixed ideas between fixed selves, where those
selves are located at the "nodal points of specific
communication circuits" (Lyotard {1984} p. 15). This notion
is related to the political notion that one has a separate
but equal self at war with others. One slips into the
notion of
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correct desire (or preference or interest) even
though the system depends on subjectivism, since the "war"
can only be seen as incredibly unfair to some of its
participants. Some members of the society can never enter
the so called Great Conversation," because their points of
intersection in the circuit are too small. I believe that
Lyotard's blunted awareness of this inherent unfairness is
related to Rawls' abstraction from our actual nodal points
of communication in his description of the original
position. Instead of turning to the necessity of political
action to correct inequality, Rawls and Lyotard abstract
away until the possibility of political action is erased.
We have at most the preferences of individuals, waiting to
be reconciled.
When ideas and selves are viewed at fixed nodal points,
the notion that novelty in communication is some sort of
miracle becomes inevitable. Many people just wonder at this
capacity. This conception concerning the ability to do new
things when talking leads to the political conception that
things are too complicated (crooked, large, hopeless) for us
to worry about them [18] . One has to hope that a novel
solution will appear. When novelty in communication is
viewed as miraculous and when politics is a mirror of
interpersonal relations as expressed through communication,
then change in politics is viewed as outside the control of
any one self. Instead of leading to joint action this
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cluster of thoughts leads to frustrations because these same
selves have been led to believe that they are sovereign,
complete and fixed. The relevant theorists have no
responses that cannot be reduced to the exchange of
information between individuals.
Some theorists reject the view that novelty is
inexplicable. There are two possibilities for what occurs
when communication of the new takes place: either a
combination of old signs has occurred which captures an
element of novelty or, paradoxically, novelty is found when
selves penetrate through language to "real" ideas. Each of
these explanations presupposes a fixed and true idea either
at the base of the human thought process or as existing
validly "out there" somewhere. To make sense, both views
require a correspondence theory of truth. The first view
implies that as things change in the world, selves make up
new combinations of root ideas in order to maintain a
correct description of the world. Ultimately the selves
will arrive at the "right" combination of ideas and the
right way of seeing the world. The second view implies that
somewhere there is a code to all correct (true) ideas. When
selves have discovered all the "rules," the code will be
apparent. The "democracy" which follows from the conception
of body politic complete with ruler at the head, seals
selves off in a paradigm of subjectivism; communication and
personality, however, follow external paradigms. Justice,
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the exchange of interests, must be seen as subjectively
determined if democracy is necessary to the correct form of
social arrangement. However, justice cannot be seen as
subjective because the philosophy of the self that I have
shown underlies it, implies external absolutes. Thus, what
might have been a theory of brokered desires must eventually
become a theory of correctly brokered desires. One way to
put this is that there can be a defensible philosophical
distinction between justice and Justice. I am not merely
making the point that no court can impartially administer
justice. I am claiming that if one accepts the philosophy
of self and communication outlined thus far then one must
also accept, if one wishes to be consistent, that there are
correct desires which are theoretically identifiable and
that these correct desires are fixed.
It is appropriate to return to communication theory once
again to see how ideas and selves are held to be fixed, but
also to see that the tension which exists for political
theory begins at this more basic level. Schank and Birnbaum
state in an article "Memory, Meaning, and Syntax" that:
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understanding language is in reality to understandideas. Language is a means of communicating thoseideas and, as such, is merely so much baggage to bestripped away to reveal the contents. The rules weuse in this stripping process are, of course, ofgreat interest. (Schank and Birnbaum {1984}
pp. 246-7) ;
The sort of rules in which Schank and Birnbaum are
interested concern how to use stock phrases, how memory aids
m the generation of new sentences, and which, if any, human
rules parallel those used to program computers. They
believe that understanding these rules will help dispense
with Language so that the content, the Ideas, might be
understood
.
This view is far from simplistic. Schank and Birnbaum
see language as a complicated series of processes:
Language cannot be separated from the reason for its
existence and use in human society. Communication
is at the heart of language, after all... how
language effects communication must be the ultimate
goal. No study of language can achieve this goal if
it fails to view communication as a process.
(Schank and Birnbaum {1985} p. 246)
At root, however, the processes are held up by what must be
seen as "perfect" ideas. The ideas are not seen as part of
the process. Even though Schank and Birnbaum separate the
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processes of language acquisition, following a rule, and
conception (having ideas, from the process of communication,
they do so equally: "No one type of knowledge is more
crucial than any other in the process of understanding." it
seems unclear that these processes must remain separate.
But from what has been written so far, there is no great
puzzle
.
Every element, every thing, is separate but equal. And
somewhere, at the bottom of all the rules and processes, the
ideas, and the people who think (about) them, are fixed.
Selves and ideas are fixed; if one is a self, one is that
self until one is nothing. The self does not undergo
processes according to adherents of this view; the self
owns processes. Processes are properties of the self.
It is no wonder that Cherry is puzzled not that
businesses and states are organized, but that mobs are
unruly. He cannot figure out how mobs can act at all.
Selves are equal and separate; the mob is hardly a
collection of such primitive elements. Thus it strikes the
thoughtful communication theorist as incoherent that one of
us might be mob-like rather than organized, or that mobs
could take concrete action.
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Cherry's moments of existential worry pop in and out of
his text. The person at the top has no theory of how events
move. When Cherry is not worried, it is because of a
retreat made possible by the tidy conception of truth:
"speech is like painting, a representation made out of given
materials" (Cherry {1957} p. 74).
Novelty in speech consists in Cherry's world from the
creation of metaphors—old "stuff" that is merely recycled.
Metaphors arise because we continually need to stretch the
range of words as we accumulate new concepts and abstract
relationships" (Cherry {1957} p. 74). So the disturbing
picture of the self, being battered about the corporate
halls by personalities and ambitions which cannot be
understood by Cherry's "young man," is not hopeless. The
sovereign in the self will be able to adapt to new tests by
stretching its range of words, by learning new ways of
talking and hence of understanding its world. What is
nebulous may come to make sense.
Neither class distinctions nor concerted political
action can make sense in this picture. That both do make
sense points up something wrong with the theory and not with
the brute fact of the former and the historical reality of
the latter. in the U.S., and perhaps in other democracies,
the notion that selves are equal and separate has played a
large role in the ideology that permits an account of
society as jointly concerned democratic actors working
collectively [19]. But for some, Mike Davis for example,
this is only the backdrop for an analysis of the
depoliticization of the U.S. working class:
The American working class, on the other hand
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Part of the unique problem with discussing modern
democracies is that all political groups may be
"depoliticized" and "disorganized" in the ways Davis
suggests are true in connection with the working class. The
reason is that the notion of collectivism does not fit the
picture one has of oneself regardless of class. Insofar as
people suffer the symptoms released by widespread acceptance
of themes one through three, the working class will not be
able to find its enemy class because that class will have
done no more political bonding than the working class.
Democratic classes are piles of brick without mortar insofar
as democratic theory cannot recognize the existence of
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mortar
. Democratic theory is thus far from an innocent or
neutral account of social structure.
Individuals interested in the power felt through
consumer practices which become increasingly political may
feel more in common with other related individuals than with
individuals in the same party or class as given by political
theory. An easily observed example is found in
environmental practices. One feels a kinship with those who
share one's eating and domestic maintenance habits
regardless of traditionally conceived political
similarities. Likewise, one has trouble getting on
politically with those who fail to share this grouping even
if all other political "properties" are compatible. it is
unclear that any significant political activity can come
from such consumer oriented grouping [20]. What is
exchanged in a market counts. But I am not working towards
the exercise of power over production in the classical
sense, an exercise that can be based on similar
authoritarian principles to those which underlie traditional
political theory. The notion that at root there are fixed
selves deciding the distribution of fixed ideas (of justice)
reaches its most articulate and intelligent political
expression in the work of John Rawls:
Men are to decide ui advance how they are to
regulate their claims against one another and what
is to be the foundation charter of their
society... In justice as fairness the original
position of equality corresponds to the state of
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nature in the traditional theory of the serialcontract.
. .Among the essential features of thL
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including principles o! a h ? system
U971} pp. 11-17, virtues. (Rawls
Just as Schank and Birnbaum wish to strip all
communication processes down to bare Ideas, so Rawls wants
to rid us of the process which is the body and with it any
desires that could differentiate selves; in fact, Rawls
wants to do away with any reality. This process of peeling
away anything "divisible" is done in order that selves might
meet as equal and timeless sovereigns. in this form, he
believes, selves will be able to decide not only on the
principles of justice but on an entire ethical system. The
ideas found at the root of things will be the right ones.
Interests, when selves are nothing, will be the correct
ones. in this context it is very difficult for selves to
understand themselves as "political animals." The logical
translation of contract theory into our age makes us
warriors to each other, or brokers of our interests, and not
jointly concerned political animals. Paranoia is integral
to Rawls' original position. There, people can only meet
politically when stripped of their personalities; only then
can they trust each other enough to talk. Change cannot
enter the system once the original position has been left,
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except for changes permitted hwy y e by the economic structure
therein agreed upon. Political anfinn arunti i action does not appear- we
make a contract decision and abide by it. Political
stagnation is implicit in any modern contract theory which
shares a basis in Locke's theories of self and
communication
.
Political action opens up the possibility of
novelty, of unanticipated consequences. But our
theorists cannot get the point. Cherry has said
real
information
that
novelty
into me
is very
novelty
arises in language as the rearra
taphors. What novelty means and
different in communication theor
,
Cherry says:
ngement of concepts
how it is measured
y. In assessing
...it is not their probabilities as 'appearing' tosome one person that are considered, but theirfrequencies of use by a certain population, such asare observed in 'newspaper English,' 'prose,'
telephone speech,' et cetera— the average or
statistical properties of a source
. And for this
reason in particular, this mathematical work shouldbe interpreted with the greatest care, in situationsinvolving r eal people
. (Cherry {1957} p. 14, my
emphases)
Thus in situations involving real people, which can only
mean here in small situations, novelty comes about by a
sovereign, free act of rearranging metaphors. In large
communication fields, novelty is measured by the frequency
of a sign. The less frequent, the newer it is. One would
have thought that this was a definition of scarcity and not
novelty. The political parallel shows why this bizarre
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usage is not theoretically bizarre. Freedom is in the realm
of the individual self. Each self may have a perfect
nderstanding of itself through its clear understanding of
its language. it is free to create names and ideas at will,
as we saw in Locke. Once, however, the selves find
themselves in the political realm, they are restricted by
the rules of the institutions that exist. Within the
restrictions imposed by those rules the selves may arrange
and rearrange institutions. No actual novelty is allowed.
Selves contract away the right to create new defining
principles and institutions. if a principle is used rarely,
it appears to be new. Change in the big picture is
contracted away when all the weapons which could bind us
into groups have been checked at the door.
The notion of rules (in communication) and principles
(in democratic theory) share interesting features. Schank
and Birnbaum, who benefit both from more sophisticated
technology and a more developed cognitive science than was
available to Cherry in the Fifties, have worked out a
computer program to help understand those rules of
processing which, they say, assist human beings in adapting
to novelty. The human capacity is described by this
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To understand better the process of coping with new
situations, Schank and Birnbaum analyze rules given
computers to perform similar feats. The manner in which
this sort of human capability is transferred to the computer
is through the computer's memory of similar, though not
identical, things which are connected in complex patterns
thought to mimic in crude fashion patterns that human minds
might have. "Understanding an experience or situation
crucially involves recalling from memory the previously
experienced situation that is most like the new input, and
being able to use that memory as a source of expectations
relevant to current processing" (Schank and Birnbaum {1984}
p. 214) . Schank and Birnbaum have set up a complex network
of rules which account for how both computers and humans are
able to adapt to novelty; however, "novelty" here, as in
Cherry, turns out to be only a reinterpretation of the past.
Despite the advance of two separate sciences, this view
is not significantly different from the view that "novelty"
is a new arrangement of old words. Novelty in humans is
rearrangement of the fixed ideas. Novelty in machines, or
in networks of machines, mimics humans. But it is an
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p cfect mimicry. Humans touch on new metaphors. Machines
and networks of machines "mimic" novelty by only
occasionally throwing up a sign. One must be careful not to
confuse this process with the human one. If one does, then
the human cannot be said to be doing very much if anything
when talking or thinking.
(It might be noted, as an aside, that the circularity of
the methodology is responsible for some of the confusion
surrounding the idea of novelty. The computer is modeled on
the human. The human behavior is analyzed. Then the
computer functions are studied to tell us about real
people
.
)
The Rawls ian political animal cannot be said to be doing
very much in the political arena. Insofar as Rawlsians
could approach political action, they would be focussed on
rules, prohibitions, procedures, and principles. His
idealized political process is tightly structured. Each
step is outlined, defined and then re-outlined and
redefined. The result of the rules is hardly a recipe for
novelty or political change in the social arena. Rawls has
placed a condition of finality on the principles chosen in
the original position— a condition so strong that the
principles may not even be overriden by considerations of
prudence or self-interest (Rawls {1971} p. 135). How could
novelty enter such a system? In the theorizing of language
by
acquisition such an entrance is no less problematic than in
its democratic counterpart.
The right thing to do when the need to effect a change
presents itself is to have a meeting of the minds wherein
the "best" group of persons "win." The dictates of that
group must then be followed. This takes place as a vote, a
discussion at a town meeting, in a class room or in a family
meeting. The group making the decision is effecting a
democratic event. However, under the contract theory, there
can be no reason to participate in such an event. The first
decision is binding until a war breaks out. Whatever is
decided in the original contract is the only "right"
ecision. There can be no reason for changing society which
is consistent with the recurring images of our political
discourse. I believe that rational men and women who agree
with Rawls' theory of justice have to remain apolitical if
they wish to remain "rational." They would know that any
attempt at playing democracy after getting back into the
dress of their original personalities would be the
conceptual equivalent of war. Peace or smooth democratic
living is a real or pretended selflessness which is at root
ir rat ional--to consent to it one must forget who one is.
Any change in structure must make somebody worse off by the
.
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rules of the game so it is not f=>ir-a r play to attempt any
change
.
So long as "self is seen as the sum total of its
information
, and so long as "self is seen as fixed or
essentially fixed due to the fixed ideas from which its
thoughts are created, the only form of government which can
viewed as fair is one based on tolerance. Nothing in
the theory allows us to find "truth" but truth must be
presupposed because each "self" is based in it. One's
thoughts are oneself, and as such are merely more or less
successful combinations of fixed ideas. Tolerance for ideas
or principles, then, must always take precedence over
respect for the body or interests. Selves are ideas or
partakers m truth. Bodies are mere concepts or images
which are poorly defined and get in the way of a unified
political structure or communication network.
Tolerance for ideas is itself limited. The transition
from "desire" to "correct desire" with respect to the
exchange which makes up justice guarantees this limitation.
Even though the writers we have discussed all stress the
importance of communication, self, and novelty, they are
unable to account for any but the most mundane
communication: the dull dispersal of already known
information, and of new items in the received conceptual
notation
.
New" becomes faster. New remains a miracle.
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War, mob action and political srt-inn = i if x L i ac io all remain a mystery.
Cherry's analysis is applicable:
Since man has evolved language and systems oforganized thoughts, the evolution of socTalrganiza t ions can no longer be said to proceed bv
social * o
T°day WS SSe planned experiments, the
Y
rganization we call businesses, industriesgovernment economics, and all the great
iorld havP h
nt SyStems which form our modernw e become so complex and costly, and their
that
U
olann
Uld CepreSent faster on such a sca^ep ing, control, and social design arebecoming ever more prominent. (Cherry {1957} p. 21)
increasingly it seems that the control of information is
the control of politics. Some might argue that this is an
empirical truth. To control information, however, one is
controlling, literally on this view, bits of self. And yet
the realm of information is the realm of the sovereign self.
Only someone who can communicate can be properly considered
a member of the social order; only someone who can
communicate can be properly considered a person [21].
Dissent is allowed in the social order only among those who
already fundamentally agree with one another. Only correct
dissent is allowed into the political dialogue. Even Mill,
champion of individual freedoms, sometimes, although rarely,
talks of dissent as if it were a necessary evil which would
go away if one could dig down to bare Ideas. In On Liberty,
he says :
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Political consensus is far away, to be sure (and to be
celebrated), but on this model it has always to be the
understood goal of political life. Fairness must be the
exchange of information and desires among the selves of
society. The market, the polls and the media are the
exchange locations. That is, if the self is an individual
who is capable of merging with similar selves on occasion,
and if the individual is the locus of accountability, then
bartering towards consensus is the only conceivable form of
fair government.
Electoral Reform: Statement Making
As mentioned earlier, there is another notion of
democracy which is consistent with the head of state image
even though it does not appear at first glance to be so.
When the theory of contract becomes too confining, it
becomes imperative for people to talk not only about how to
maintain certain freedoms but also about how to fight for
and act towards new ones. In the last section I analyzed
what it would feel like to view oneself as an individual in
a democracy, if one believed, as the conclusion of an
argument, that one's proper place is that of being
represented and that one is being fair in abdicating
7 3
political action to others in order to maintain a certain
stability. Now I will discuss how it might feel if one
believed that one had a duty not merely to be a passive part
of democracy, thereby miraculously maintaining the present
levels of freedom, but also to act in a way consistent with
constructing new freedoms. The conceptual framework with
respect to this second conception of democracy differs from
the first mainly in that electoral reform is seen as an
active and obligatory part of one's life. But the second
also reduces to the first in that each election (or other
legislative terminus) can be viewed as the certification of
a new contract within the limits of theoretical contract
theory. The difference is that here acquiring new contracts
is perceived as an obligation.
The problems that one holding this belief pattern would
encounter are (1) one could not really believe that the
democracy could reproduce itself from inside itself and (2)
one could not make sense of the private/public distinction
necessary to one's making sense of one's political actions.
An individual who has gone beyond acquiescing in the social
contract to make reforms is aware of political unease in a
way that the simple contractee of last section cannot be.
Contracts need an adjudicator or a group of adjudicators to
function as they ought. Thus each new contract needs to be
interpreted for the parties making the contact. (For
example, it was thought necessary to filter the result of
74
the citizens' vote with that of the electoral college in the
United States of America.) Outside of any contract, then,
is someone or something sanctioning that contract. This
continuously hierarchical structure of democracy, coupled
with the notion of individual sovereignty, effectively bars
political action, within the system, that can change the
system. We can change things but not to the point of
changing structure. I am not alone in making this
assessment with respect to the inherent conservatism of
democracies in this particular extent [22].
An extreme, and insightful, interpretation of what to
make of this peculiar "moving" stagnation is that of
Alessandro Pizzorno. He has recently suggested that the
sooner political actors realize that politics is not what it
seems, the sooner they will be able to identify (or cause
others to identify) new ways of doing politics which call
attention to the impotence of the old way. His suggestions,
however novel they might seem, ultimately must be seen as
stemming from a deep seated conviction that the more
political events change the more they remain the same. An
analysis of Pizzorno as representative of democratic
electoral reformists follows.
Pizzorno suggests that politicians receive training in
acting (that form of acting normally associated with the
theater) and that citizens learn how to best exploit their
identification in groups. These suggestions are interesting
and pragmatically sound—even if ironic. Because he
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addresses but one strand of what may have been a
double-edged response to democracy's ills, he does not
transcend the grips of hierarchy. The nature of his
critique serves as an example that when electoral reformers
imagine their terrain to be that pictured by a state with a
"capital," their action is reducible to simple acquiescence
in a contract.
Pizzorno argues that the value of democracy lies not in
the freedom of political choice but in the freedom of
political identification. He defines the freedom of
political identification as the "right that these
identifications have to exist, their right not to be
nullified or even determined solely by the authority of the
national state” (Pizzorno (1985) p. 69). He admits that
democracy is only a set of mechanisms for social control"
(Pizzorno (1985) p. 69), but indicates that on his view this
freedom for political identification is sufficiently
valuable to force an acceptance of democracy which does not
depend solely on expedience. The problem which Pizzorno
sees for political theory is that of explaining political
identification. That is, Pizzorno sees a need for a model
that can explain how and why people identify as they do.
He argues that neo-utilitarians fail in the construction
of such a model because they place too much weight on the
interests of individuals. Symbolic theorists offer more
promising theories because they include categories such as
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solidarity and ritual; nevertheless these theories fall
short of providing an explanatory model for reasons similar
to those pertaining to neo-utilitarian theories, m short,
according to Pizzorno, just as the neo-utilitarians cannot
know what any interest is, due to well-known political
paradoxes, e.g., the voting paradox, so too symbolic
theorists face this epistemological impasse.
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For any object, either symbolic or material, to have
value its utility must entail "the idea of intersub jective
recognition" (Pizzorno {1985} p. 56). Thus, to have a real
nterest in the political process, interested parties must
"maintain membership in the collective unity that will
acknowledge them" (Pizzorno (1985) p. 56). Pizzorno argues
that the only means of having an identity (political or
otherwise) is for a person to be identified by other
individuals. Meaning for political action is found in the
criteria formulated by the identifying collectivity in which
an agent exists. Thus the meaning we give to our activities
is meaningful only in intersubjective terms. Pizzorno sees
a need for a theory that can explain and account for "the
activity that establishes identifying collective" (Pizzorno
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theory which is capable of doing this will
those thi ngs which theories of utility
One teaS0 n why this theory provides superior explanatory
Power to Rawlsian theories is that it recognizes political
analysis from two sides: the side of identification
activity and the side of instrumental activity. These kinds
of activity are separate yet act dialectically within the
identifying collective. Identification activity is that
which reinforces group solidarity through ritual, rhetoric,
information gathering and dispersal, etc. Instrumental
activity involves putting into practice the programs
constructed by the groups. Once these distinction are made
the model's advantages become apparent. For instance
according to this theory voting can never be seen as
irrational. Voting can be viewed, when hopeless, as an
identification activity. One of many strengths in
Pizzorno's view is that he points out that when individuals
act politically, they do so for good reasons and are not,
unbeknownst to themselves, engaged in meaningless,
irrational activity.
Because the individual's interests are necessarily group
interests, voting for a losing candidate is not irrational.
Instead it can be seen as an act of solidarity with the
individual's group. Herein lies the advance both of
electoral reform (as compared to contract theories) and
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Pizzorno's theory (as compared to Rawls' theory). Persons
" the POUtiCal
they are doing but they
know u ways that are opaque to theory. People act, among
other reasons, out of friendship, respect for moral
p r inciples, and loyalty to groups. There are reasons for
voting, lobbying, and most other traditional forms of
effecting electoral reform. Nevertheless, this excellent
analysis ends by recognizing a framework that limits the
political to a game outside of the actors' control.
Pizzorno's model, thus, requires supplementation. First a
more detailed account of the self is necessary to its
transcending the problems just sketched. Second it requires
a normative component that is as well developed as the
explanatory component. These suggestions for
supplementation do not constitute a systematic criticism of
what Pizzorno has developed. His underdefined "self does
not present a serious obstacle for a model which confines
itself to explanation.
The main point here is that the extent to which people
believe themselves incapable of changing democratic
institutions from within the institutions themselves is so
great that serious theorists have concluded that the purpose
of politics (and not of social grouping) is to identify with
and offer solidarity to groups. This is a purpose but
cannot be the only or even the major purpose. The notion in
itself is ruthlessly hierarchical in that it presupposes
may or may
ruggle out there with which one
not offer solidarity, such a stance is inherently
hierarchical. it implies that some must struggle while
others may choose to identify with the struggle which is not
really their struggle. Pizzorno is a theorist who does not
fall prey to the assumptions that lead to this conclusion.
It is important that a normative twin to his explanatory
portion be found. Part of that should include a manner of
reassigning images that pervasively reproduce the belief in
the assumptions I have been discussing.
Two conclusions can now be stated. First, if the self
is seen as exhausted by its information, and communication
is seen as the mere dispersal of that information, the
result will be a political theory that is individualist and
aggressive. That is, one can hardly help but view oneself
as a self-contained entity with absolute rights to one's
thoughts about which one is the absolute judge in every
case. That thought becomes the coin of the realm, rather
than the bodies over which selves are said to be sovereign,
is due to the fact that no adequate theory on which to base
a reasonable body image is available. Consequently, the
body is devalued and in the process the entire "self" is
devalued, at least indirectly. The special form of
alienation that follows from these confusions is not
compatible with being an effective democratic actor.
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A second conclusion is that there is a problem
surrounding democracy understood as a form of government
which is just because everyone is seen as equal by blind
justice. To avoid war of all against all, some antecedent
and objective standard which explains what counts as a
correct interest or desire must be posited. This positing
requires an adjudicator or a group of adjudicators with whom
citizens make explicit or tacit contracts. It is difficult
to view history as moving toward consensus because the
standard which stands outside is not under anyone's control
nor can it be brought under anyone's control.
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CHAPTER II
SELVES IN CONFLICT
In this chapter the conception of democracy on which I
focus is that which belongs to the Hegelian/Marxian
tradition
[ 1 ] . Marx, in his Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of
the State, indicates that what differentiates democracy fr™
other social arrangements is that "in democracy, man does
not exist for the sake of the law, but the law exists for
the sake of man, it is human existence, whereas in other
political systems man is a legal existence." Democracy is
"the solution to the riddle of every constitution;" it
"relates to all other forms of state as its Old Testament;"
and, states "are untrue to the extent that they are not
democracy" (Marx {1975} pp. 87-89). Like Marx, I think
that insofar as states invested with power exist, the better
state will be the more democratic one. The best state of
affairs is that where there is no longer the need for a
state. Until that time, for every state there will be a
civil society trying to make it democratic; for every
democratic state a civil society trying to make it more so.
The riddles of democracy viewed from a Hegelian/Marxian
perspective are "Who are the humans of democracy?" and "How
do they communicate across the socio-economic classes whose
struggle is necessary to the formation of that state of
affairs? But Marxian democracy, even though it allows for
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"men" making themselves and their state, remains too
abstract. That it remains too abstract is due to the
Marxian importation of Hegelian self. Fo r the purposes of
this chapter I refer to a way of being Marxist and of
reading Marx which I call Hegelian/Marxian [2],
The question "How can the Hegelian self, the self
constituted by its struggle with itself pass beyond such a
struggle while retaining an identity?" is an idealist
question about an ideal journey. Understanding this
question will help us to answer a concrete political
question about Marxian history, namely, the question of how
the political can dissolve into the social as the critique
of capitalism works itself out in history, m our terms the
question becomes more precise: how can a heterodemotic
social life ultimately supplant political democracy? I
believe that such a supplanting is made possible by eroding
political democracy with demogenic strategies. By demogenic
I mean that practice which creates new selves. Demogenic
strategies will always be heterodemotic, that is, they will
not close off the possibilities for different kinds of self
except in one case— that where the self, to be itself, must
restrict all selves but the kind it is. The work of this
chapter is to show that Hegelian/Marxian selves have been
barred from demogenic activity by the authoritarian
presuppositions of their construction.
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I am neither making the conceptual claim that
authoritarian presuppositions of a theory of the self held
by Hegel and Marx make that theory incompatible with the
principles of political democracy; nor am I making the
pragmatic claim that actual people whose selves are very
much as Hegel and Marx say they are find themselves unable
to engage in democratic political action. My claims are
that the principles of political democracy are based
on such authoritarian presuppositions as I have pointed to
in Hegelian Marxism, and, that if people actually believed
theories consistent with Hegelian Marxism, they would be
psychologically barred from demogenic activity.
In an essay that goes from seeming to being back to
seeming again with dizzying rapidity. The German Ideology
,
Marx says:
The separate individuals form a class only insofar
as they have to carry on a common battle against
another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms
with each other as competitors. On the other hand,
the class in its turn achieves an independent
existence over against the individuals, so that the
latter find their conditions of existence
predestined, and hence have their position in life
and their personal development assigned to them by
their class... We have already indicated several
times how this subsuming of individuals under the
class bring with it their subjection to all kinds of
ideas, etc. (Marx {1978a} p. 179)
The State is conceived as a set of collectives locked in
the political conflict (as well as other forms of conflict).
The Social would allow the true assertion of individuals as
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themselves : "m order, therefore, to assert themselves as
individuals, they must overthrow the State" (Marx (1978a) p.
200). The political and the social are in direct contrast
another, to live in the social one must do away with
that which make possible the political as this passage from
The Coming Upheaval" indicates:
Does this mean that after the fall of the old
^fY . there wil1 be a new class dominationculminating in a new political power? No The
wili'subs ti tut
th*— ^s deve^pment.W l e for the old civil society anassociation which will exclude classes and ?heirantagonism, and there will be no more political
pr ec isel
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' since P^ica! poSer is
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fc e official expression of antagonism inc vj 1 society
. . .Do not say that social movementexcludes political movement. There is never apolitical movement which is not at the same timesocial. it is only in an order of things in which
n
? T" 6 S lasses and c lass antagonisms that
—ocial evolutions will cease to be "political
revolutions ." (Marx {1978b} pp. 218-19)
How "political revolution" becomes a concept—one which
need no longer be used for analysis— is what needs
explanation. The trappings of Hegelian dialectic may have
introduced assumptions that no Aufhebung of the political
can dissolve. To discuss that possibility, I will consider
the theory of communication which underlies the
Marxian/Hegelian conception of democracy. I will argue that
a form of Hegelian theory stands at the foundation of
Marxian/Hegelian democratic theory. Marx's critique of
Hegel's dialectic cannot transcend the limitations of
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Hegel's implicit view of the possibility of communication
A1 though Marx'S criti que of the idealist theory of the stlte
is in general successful, he fails to avoid some of the
basic tenets of Hegel's philosophy. f suggest that this
leads to a conception of self that cannot itself lead to an
adequate theory of communication, and a conception of self
that is ultimately responsible for an uncertain distinction
between the social and the political in Marxian/Hegelian
theorizing. Conflict becomes conceptually irresolvable at
the level of selves in such theorizing, a fact that may
explain why Marxian/Hegelian democratic theorists often
revert to bourgeois conceptions of self when discussing
social and political action. Individuals may not be bound
by the rational calculations of shopkeepers; classes,
however, are.
The discussion of Hegel's theories of self and
communication makes up section one. There I argue that
Marx's critique of Hegel stops short of a full inversion of
the dialectic. I specifically argue that Marx takes up
Hegelian concepts of self and communication without
scrutinizing all of the presuppositions. Some questions of
Marx's strategy are "What can the 'social' mean to a
P 1- ® — ^ ®vo 1 u t i ona r y Marxist? and "How can one enter the
social?" in section two I analyse the relationship between
Marx and Hegel with respect to the category of the human. I
show that from this context it can be seen that the fact
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that Hegel is anti-democratic and Marx pro-democratic is
linguistically determined but that neither seems to have
been implicitly aware of their linguistic determination.
The manner in which they viewed science, rationality, and
the human are linked in turn to their views on
communication. in section three I discuss problems that
arise from the tension that exists between the kinds of
selves found in Hegelian and in Marxian theory. I argue
that no theoretical compatibility can exist between the
members of some social community and those same individuals
regarded as political actors. This incompatibility creates
severe problems for our conceptions of political actors.
Previous attempts to deal with this problem at the level of
communication will be discussed in terms of their
inadequacies. I also discuss some concerns involved in
seeing violence as a political strategy. The questions here
are "Who can one count as political interlocutor?" and "Must
one be violent?" To some extent, the theoretical
incompatibility to which I refer may give rise to a
suggestion that action be "irrational," i.e., violent, thus
avoiding the demands of coherent theory by the relief of
just doing something. I believe it is possible to
articulate theory more coherently in approaching the
question of practice.
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Hegej^ i an/Mar xi ari Selves Doing Battle with Capital
Hegel expresses a problem of communication which is very
different from the Lockean problem we discussed in Chapter
One. Early in the Phenomenology
. Hegel says:
. !?
eY
u
S
?
eak
.
° f the exis tence of external obiectsbe
.
more Precisely defined as actual,?^ tely ^9 ular ' wholly personal individual
\l aCh ° them abs °lutely unlike
-
any thing
nllV ^ axistence ' they say has absolute
nn
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lnby and truth. They mean 'this' bit of papero which I am writing—or rather have P P
W
u
1
5
t
fu
'this'; but what they mean is not
what they say. if they actually wanted to say
to
h
^L Pa pu C WhiGh they mean ' if they wantedsay it, then this is impossible, because the
sensuous This that is meant cannot be reached bylanguage, which belongs to consciousness, i.e. tothat which is inherently universal. In the actual
attempt to say it, it would therefore crumble away*those who started to describe it would not be able'to complete the description, but would be compelled
o leave it to others, who would themselves finallyhave to admit to speaking about something which is
not. They certainly mean, then, this bit of paper"here which is quite different from the bit mentioned
above; but they say 'actual things', 'external or
sensuous objects' ,
' absolutely singular entities'
[We sen ] and so on; i.e. they say of them only what
is universal
. Consequently, what is called the
unutterable is nothing else than the untrue, the
irrational, what is merely meant [but is not
actually expressed]. (Hegel {1977} paragraph 110)
The "they" of this paragraph represents "those who
assert the truth and reality of sense-objects." For Hegel
sense-certainty is incompatible with meaningful expression
because at this stage one cannot mean what one says. The
self one finds for oneself at this stage is about to
perceive truth but cannot yet express this meaningfully
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because it is not yet sufficiently self-conscious. Language
at this level "directly reverses the meaning of what is
said. There is no way for intentions to be translated into
shared discourse.
Why is Hegel already concerned with language at this
point in the Phenomenology ? After all, it is not until
"Lordship and Bondage" that an Other is introduced, and the
obvious problems of communication addressed. As Judith
Butler points out, only at the later point "do we become
convinced of its [an Other's] existence" (Butler {1987} p.
42). Butler describes the subject at this lower stage of
development as one who "mistakenly restricts his dependence
to the world of natural objects," who "shows no
understanding of human embodiment," and who because of the
peculiar arrogance attached to ignorance is "swiftly" on the
way "toward defeat" (Butler {1987} p. 42). Butler's puzzle
concerns why Hegel had not introduced the Other earlier in
the journey to selfhood: "Why did the journeying subject of
the Phenomenology begin its journey alone?" (Butler {1987}
p. 46)
.
Her answer helps to solve the puzzle about the
genesis of language in a subject with no language.
Butler notices that "desire" and "Other" would be
impossible in the dialectic if they had not always already
been there in some form before their actual appearance. For
Hegel, "coming into existence. .. is never... a creation ex
nihilo
,
but is, rather, a moment in the development of a
i
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Concept (Butler {1987} p. 47). For Hegel, there can be no
reality, nothing at all, without the Other. "There can be
no experience outside the context of intersub jectivi ty"
(Butler {1987} p. 47). As we shall see language for Hegel
is consciousness for others. it is a consciousness for
others that presupposes a perception of self which is a pure
perception (see especially Phenomenology paragraph 652).
The puzzle about language's seemingly premature appearance
can be solved in a strictly analogous manner to that of
desire. That language is ontologically prior, cannot be
demonstrated until the proper form of consciousness has been
achieved; nevertheless there is no consciousness—not even
that embodied in " sense—cer tainty"—without language.
Language is the construct that makes Hegel's teleological
system, with its succession of stages of consciousness,
coherent as a totality. The context of intersub ject ivity
necessitates some explicit awareness of something that makes
such a context possible: language.
The discussion of language at the stage of
self-certainty becomes coherent i^i retrospect . Language is
a necessary precondition for the consciousness of the stage
of sense-certainty even though its existence is not known to
the subject at this specific point of development. Three
problems remain. Hegel's early discussion of
sense-certainty leaves the reader wondering how it is
possible (1) that language "directly reverse the meaning of
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what is said, (2) that "what they [those who assert the
truth and reality of sense-objects] say is not what they
mean" and (3) that anyone could go beyond sense-certainty to
perception. The last worry is the most important because it
can be generalized: how is it that anyone could ever
successfully go from one stage to the next on the journey to
selfhood. Although the question of consciousness is
explicitly raised later, it is also true that the nature of
communication is already problematic beforehand--these
clusters of implicitly nesting concepts do not provide a
motor for movement along the path of increasingly articulate
self-consciousness.
How is it possible, then, that language turns everything
into its opposite? How can it be that the language of
self-certainty does not let "what is meant get into words at
all" (Hegel {1977} paragraph 110)? It is claimed that this
ability results from language's "divine nature." I will
examine two interpretations of the claim that language
facilitates these strange abilities. First I will analyse
the discussion of languages here as provisional: Hegel
means only that "they" are prohibited from saying what they
mean in language at this level of development. The
self-conscious "1=1" of absolute knowledge will not be so
prohibited. A second way of reading the claim is to
attribute to Hegel an equation between language and the
mediation between consciousness and things. Even a
97
self-conscious ” 1 = 1 ” cannot fully express
self-consciousness in language. Both interpretations
require that something in the equation of communication be
constant, and that is language. The inconstancy of things
across stages and even shifts in consciousness are balanced
by the fixed point of language. Language, the mediator,
stands outside of the process. Language, the bearer of
ideas, must pre-exist in order to lay out the path to
absolute knowledge.
As many commentators have noted, Hegel requires a
necessary metaphysical place for each self (see for instance
Butler {1987} p. 5 who uses the term "subject," which I do
not use for reasons explained in my introduction).
Language, as abstract mediation, establishes this necessity
through change. it is thus at once the prime mover of the
system and that in which subjects find their necessary
metaphysical stage. As such it is possible that language
does what had seemed impossible, viz., reverse the
intentions (meanings) of speakers. This ability on
language's part is properly called "divine." This point
will stay with us through section three where we begin an
analysis of discourse theory as a possible solution to the
fixed and totalitarian nature of the "divine" and mysterious
system of words and language. We will not be rid of the
implications of the point until the end of Chapter Three
where we find that Kierkegaard's anti-system and
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anti-politics places something else in the structural
position Hegel had reserved for language.
It is instructive in comparison to note Marx's use of
the metaphor of the journey to (true) selfhood. Marx turns
the dialectic again on a new terrain as the following
passage and subsequent analysis of it suggest [3] :
The result of
mere product (
use-value whic
result, its pr
surplus-value
actual transfo
capital--which
were only in i
they were dest
399-400)
the capitalist process is neither a
use-value) nor a commodity
, that is,
h has a certain exchange-value. Its
oduct, is the creation of
for capital, and consequently the
rmation of money or commodity into
before the production process they
ntention, in their essence, in what
ined to be. (Marx {1963} pp.
Marx s account of the transformation of money into
capital only makes sense if there is a necessary
metaphysical place in the system for them. The entities
referred to by the terms "money" or "commodity" cannot be
what they mean except at the moment of transformation. The
money, the commodity, and capital mimic life processes but
capital is especially interesting. Capital turns people
into their opposites so that they literally are not what
they can be at some more authentic level. It is not only
that "in general ... the characters who appear on the economic
stage are but the personifications of the economic relations
that exist between them" (Marx {1967a} p. 85), but also that
these characters have just one script— that of the
capitalist: "In a social order dominated by capitalist
99
production even the non-capitalist is gripped by capitalist
conceptions" (Marx 1967b} p. 39). Capital is the "power to
—
mmand " and the wea ke r the capitalist becomes, through
sloth, the more social power he acquires. Marx says in the
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts that this power is
not possessed "on account of his personal or human
properties but in so far as he is an owner of capital" (Marx
{1975} p. 295). Capital turns the weak into the strong and
the strong into the weak:
...the more the worker produces, the less he has to
consume; the more values he creates, the more
worthless he becomes; the more his product is
shaped, the more misshapen the worker; the more
civilized his object, the more barbarous the
worker; the more intelligent the work, the duller
the worker and the more he becomes a slave of
nature. (Marx {1975} p. , 325)
Only when capital is gone as a part of material production
will people be able to exist with their selves right side
up
.
Marx seems at some level to have implicitly accepted the
Hegelian notion of necessity for self—development and
language. The capitalists' desire for profit turns the
economy from the originating standpoint, even if desire is
ultimately theoretically linked to material processes. The
workers' desire to survive allows them to maintain the
contradictions of capitalism of which they are increasingly
aware. The solution to solve the problems these desires
present is the supersession of private property but the
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selves theorized cannot supersede in any manner unsanctioned
by the capitalist script. So, for Marx, Capital stands to
material processes as language stands to the ideal journey
for Hegel. in either case, abstract universals are the
things which produce change, thereby moving history [4].
Economic transactions can be seen here as analogous to a
mysterious transfer of information, what seems at first to
constitute in reality the entities under investigation must
give way to the final explanatory terrain; Marx can be seen
to be a metaphysician who has not completely escaped the
Hegelian terrain. Conflict and transformation occur for
both according to design in pre-established "space." And,
it is no wonder, that theories of money and of the state
that are met now repeat this entrenched situation. We have
no discourse in which to discuss money or state in which we
are free from either endless conflict or mysterious
transformations.
The possibility that speakers cannot say what they mean
is related to Hegel's thesis we have just discussed that
language necessarily reverses the meaning of what is spoken.
Hegel says that what the selves at the stage of
sense-certainty mean is not what they say. One means to
discuss sensuous particularity but "divine" and "universal"
language cancels the project. One may wish to ask Hegel if
one pointed to a "this," whether one's gesture would be
universal or particular? Hegel would have to commit
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himself to the proposition that gestures are universal to be
consistent. One's question then becomes "How can we fail
to mean what we say when what we mean is as trivial as it is
hands?'." where is the cancelling universal of language?
It is different to ask whether we can mean what we say
than to ask whether meaning is necessarily reversed by
speaking in that the former is the more general. That
meaning is reversed directly by metaphysical necessity is
sufficiently concrete that it translates easily into Marx's
material necessity. That is, there is a parallelism between
Hegel's assertion that "language reverses meaning" and
Marx's "capital reverses being." The question concerning
generalizations is not answerable or capable of
formalization in any straightforward way. It seems as if
Hegel also cannot mean what he says here. Language is
mediation but so too is the subject. Perhaps, we are on the
way to knowing of what we speak but it is impossible that we
can mean what we say until it is the "l = i" who speaks.
Strictly
,
if Hegel and Marx are still using the old language
to communicate to others, they will end up meaning something
^iffsrent from what they say.
Butler says that "the permanent irony of the Hegelian
subject consists of this: it requires mediation to know
itself, and knows itself only as the very structure of
mediation" (Butler {1987} p. 7-8). One means what one says
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just when one is no longer oneself. Again a parallel with
is tempting. Vulgar economists cannot mean what they
say because their language reverses itself like the language
of the "they” in Hegel's section on sense-certainty
[ 5 ],
The teleological nature of the system, the goal of the
transparent "1=1," expresses the position of the "they" that
cannot say what they mean. If "they” could already say what
they meant, there could be no point in movement. Marx
repeats the structural position: "All science would be
superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of
things directly coincided" (Marx {1967b}, p. 817). Marx
treats the Hegelian self so that when a self achieves the
satisfaction of desire, it must cease to exist. But quite
the contrary, he says that one becomes a self exactly when
desire is consummated. The contradiction inherent in the
metaphysics will not go away.
One might point out that one will never really get what
one wants. One might allege that it is the critique, and
not the theories under attack, that is idealist. My
response is that when Hegel and Marx are doing theory, the
result that "at the end" all movement ceases is not just a
syntactic tautology. Instead, both systems have as their
end some absolute negation and void. One cannot reach this
end and not only because the end is unreal, but because one
cannot move. Two structural features thus stand in the way
of action: the incredibility of the endpoint and the
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inability of moving toward that endpoint. it is not a
feature of the world that keeps us from ending history in
this sense
, but an aporia cast up in theory.
One wants to know from Hegel how it is possible that the
distorted nature of self at an early stage of development
can attain the next stage or even possibly undertake to do
How can sense-certainty become perception? Hegel's
description of the transition begs the question: "I point
out as a here
,
which is a Here of other Here's; i.e..
it is a universal. ! take it up then as it is in truth, and
instead of knowing something immediate I take the truth of
it, or perceive it" (Hegel {1977} paragraph 110). That
this begs the question is sharply indicated in Kierkegaard's
general criticisms of the Hegelian system. We will examine
that critique in the next chapter but we can already see
that Hegel does not solve the mystery of why we move from
the sensuous "this" to the perceived and universal "this,"
or indeed why any movement along the path indicated in the
Phenomenology should ever take place. It is necessary that
each self make this transition but there is no reason to
accept the transition as necessary. The talk of necessity
can be read precisely as a tacit admission that no
explanatory mechanism of movement is in view. One repeats
meaningless propositions in sense-certainty until, uttering
higher level nonsense in place of the old, one perceives.
Language's divine nature indicates the path of the journey
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Without explaining or even motivating its undertaking.
Language, although not possible without the Other, makes it
possible for us to be outside of ourselves so that we can
confront the Other. As the mediator of consciousness and
things, language is primary. But the necessity of its place
leaves the connection of language to linguistic ascent
opaque [6]
.
Hegel noticed early that language "kills" reality in a
peculiar manner. That is, the contradictions it expresses
may be resolved in language even while the conflict that
gave rise to them rages in the world. Everything imaginable
exists; one of language's uses is to mark off that which we
cannot bear. Notice the twisting ontology in this passage
from Hegel's Preface :
Nor is there such a thing as the false, any more
than there is something evil. The evil and the
false, to be sure, are not as bad as the devil, for
in the devil they are even made into a particular
subjective agent
; as the false and the evil, they
are mere univer sals
,
though each as its own essence
as against the other. (Hegel {1977} paragraph 39)
Here language forces meanings beyond what is said.
Hegel is describing why spirit could never attain scientific
knowledge without facing negativity not as false
propositions but as that which gives substance its form.
Hegel's conclusions are that it is impossible to ever face
truth or falsity because they do not ever exist; there is
never a negation of the negation. To frame this problem of
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ontology in Marxian and political manner, the issue becomes
one of the possibility that the social and political might
ever transform each other into something else. The problem
with language at least suggests that the social will not
"win out." if a transformation to some new form seems
incoherent how can the negation which manifests itself as
revolution be worth the sacrifices of the revolutionary?
The theory can only be explanatory to a revolutionary class
that is already class-conscious. in late capitalism, where
classes are difficult or impossible to find, theory
stagnates and action appears irrational.
Not finding a class, one needs to look to oneself. in
Hegel 1 an/Mar xi sm, the nature of selves is predetermined, and
so is the path by which one can become one's final self.
There is a journey to be undertaken, but the parameters of
the journey are rigidly bound by language. Language marks
the place of selves. Communication between selves is always
a struggle over something. The script of the master and the
script of the bondsman are already there for them; the
struggle in which they hold a place is out of their control.
The over-determination of the situation is compounded when
one realizes that in the Hegelian system one's progress is
determined by how one uses language.
Earlier we saw that a marker of sense-certainty is that
"they cannot say what they mean." Other examples of one's
language abound or at least markers of appearance of one's
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outer being and one's position. The bondsman becomes
himself (for himself in the technical Hegelian sense) when
the inner fear becomes an outer fear that can be shared.
The explanation of the transformation in this respect is
interesting: "Without the formative activity, fear remains
inward and mute, and consciousness does not become
explicitly for itself" (Hegel (1977} paragraph 196). As
Reason, expression is not only the marker, but the essence
of self-consciousness:
Having discovered this [that thinghood is Spirit's
T^Lr e .lngK f0r
‘ 1
l
:Self] self ~consc iousness thus knows
i
1
5
-
°
be reallt y in the form of an individualitythat drrectiy expresses itself, an individuality
which no longer encounters resistance from an actual
world opposed to it, and whose aim and object are
only this expressing of itself. (Hegel {1977}paragraph 359)
By the time that consciousness has become absolute
spirit for and in itself, the expression of fear is pure
negativity or death; in this sphere (that of absolute
freedom!) what is called government is merely the
victorious faction, and in the very fact of its being a
faction lies the direct necessity of its overthrow; and its
being government makes it conversely, into a faction, and
[so] guilty" (Hegel {1977} paragraph 591). The marker of
this stage is to be found in linguistic expressions in the
outer sphere. We can tell this stage because its movement
"cannot achieve anything positive, either universal works of
language or of reality, either of laws and general
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institutions of consciou s freedom, or of deeds and works of
a freedom that wills them" (Hegel {1977} paragraph 588).
In every stage of the journey, then, the significance is
measured and realized externally. it remains to examine the
connection between the inner and the outer if we are to
adequately understand the mysterious role communication
plays in the Hegelian system. Hegel says of the connection:
inn!? r
f place
'
ln regard to the relation of thethl
f l
outer
' il: seems clear that therelation must be grasped as a causal connection
beinaJnM^fr 1011 ° f ° ne beln9-in-itlelf to anothereing m-itself, qua a necessary relation, is acausal connection... NowTfor spiritual individualityb ?*e an effe
?
t the b°dy it must, qua cause, beitself corporeal. The corporeal element, however,in which it acts as cause is the organ, but the
organ not of action against external reality, but
of the internal action of the self-conscious being
operating outwards only against its own body.(Hegel {1977} paragraphs 324-5)
He then goes on to point out the "absurdity" of
observational views, specifically that which assigns
functions of the spirit to various parts of the body (then
we could know mysteries of the spirit by examining dead
bodies) and that which holds that the spirit lives in the
body. "For this is at once incompetence and deceit, to
fancy and to pretend that one merely has not the right word"
(Hegel {1977} paragraph 328)
.
For Hegel, to understand is
to be able to express: "If one had the Notion, then one
would also have the right word." The causal connection
between internal and external is the necessary relation
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found in words, that refines language through all the stages
until at the end, when one reverts, transformed, to the
unity of inwardness (Hegel {1977} paragraph 804). The
ultimate transformation is that the external ization of the
self is its inwardizing.
"Their (Spirits-) goal is the
revelation of the depth of Spirit, and this is the absolute
Notion" (Hegel (1977) paragraph 808). The absolute place of
language is abruptly cancelled just when it is fully
developed
.
Hegelian philosophy is strange at exactly the place Marx
identifies. We are either nothing in being everything or
everything in being nothing and it is impossible to relate
these stages. I have argued that Marx pinpoints the problem
in Hegel's philosophy but that he does so at too abstract a
level. Marx ends up with a problematic democratic theory
because his partially borrowed theory of self and of
communication does not lend itself to any possibility of
political action that is not from the beginning endlessly
confrontational. The Hegelian/Marxian self can only be
political there is no concrete social imaginable for humans
as we know them [7]
.
To realize Marx's vision, the mote
that made it possible has to be removed by recognition of a
more coherent theory of the self and of communication.
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Hum^n All Too Humana Erasure of the Merely Animal
The Structure of a Hegelian/Marxian Dialectic
Two passages must be addressed in order to handle the
discourse which concerns the relationship of Marx to Hegel
These passages are important to Marxian theorists and
activists alike. The first is the famous passage from the
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts ; the second is from
the afterword to volume one of Capital.
Because Hegel equates man with self-consciousness,
the estranged object, the estranged essential
reality of man is nothing but consciousness, nothingbut the thought of estrangement, its abstract andhence hollow and unreal expression, negation. The
supersession of alienation is therefore likewise
nothing but an abstract, hollow supersession of thathollow abstraction, the negation of the negation.
The inexhaustible, vital, sensuous, concrete
activity of self-objectification is therefore
reduced to its mere abstraction, absolute
negativity, an abstraction which is then given
permanent form as such and conceived as independent
activity, as activity itself. (Marx {1975} p. 396)
My dialectic method is not only different from the
Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the
life-process of the human brain, i.e.
,
the process
of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea," he
even transforms into an independent subject, is the
demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is
only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea."
With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else
than the material world reflected by the human mind,
and translated into forms of thought. (Marx {1967a}
P. 19)
There are three important points in the preceding
passages that I must immediately address before I can
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reassess the relationship of Hegel to Marx with respect to
democracy
. when I make the reassessment, I win do so in
terms of a concrete category distinction which both
philosophers find important, namely that between humans and
non-human animals.
The first of the points I feel compelled to dispel is
that Hegel's "consciousness" which is said by Marx to be, in
the end, everything that is cannot be everything in the
Hegelian system. Language is the "object" which must play
this role; language plays this role for Marx although
possibly in a more sophisticated manner. Consciousness
cannot be the only activity for Hegel—not even in the final
stage of the progression. In that final stage perception is
still crucial in an important, but often overlooked, sense.
Marx states in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
that true science will be the science of sense perception
(Marx (1975) p. 355). This sense perception must be social
sense perception and recognized as such. For Marx, the
species must be species-conscious in order to do science and
this is why doing science is making revolution.
The second point is that Marx believes that for Hegel
there can be no overcoming of human alienation. This is
because the overcoming of the alienation must itself be a
new alienation, since only a change in consciousness seems
at stake. The negation of the negation must be a permanent
form of the Hegelian system. A Hegelian/Marxism must
Ill
Perhaps terminate in the belief that there is a permanent
form of alienation (political life,. what is clear is that
for the majority of Marxist actors the revolution must be
permanent. The slogans •'Finish the revolution" or "Complete
the revolution seem to presuppose an end somewhere but it
is theoretically unclear what that end might be. The
success of a revolution remains a revolutionary break in
Hegelian/Marxism, and perhaps in Marx's thought itself.
What cannot be foreseen is the determinant negation that
would produce socialism. To describe a classless society is
merely the abstract negation of capitalism, as indicated by
the difficulties that socialists have found in describing
utopia. The realization of utopia requires a materialist
practice that would give the classless society its concrete
form.
Finally Marx accuses Hegel of failing to see that there
is no substantial difference between the ideal and material
worlds." Hegel is said to personify the movement of
history into a subject and to overly abstract the Idea. And
yet how can we understand Marx's class analysis without the
aid of the heuristic device that allows us to personify the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie? What moves history if not
contradictions between actors, a situation which impels an
analysis involving selves and (other) selves?
These three points do not imply, nor do I think that any
points that could be made about this relationship could
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imply
, that Marx and Hegel are structural mirror images o£
each other with respect to world history and conflict. They
indicate however that Marx's rejection of Hegel cannot
itself provide a structural difference. A Marxian critique
of each Marxist rejection of a Hegelian position is still
possible. What I hope to have shown is that their
relationship here is very complex and that Marx's belief
that he had turned Hegelian dialectic on its head can now be
seen to be in some deep way incomprehensible. The inversion
still consists of abstract negations. it cannot be what he
claims for it, viz., that he makes history the history of
doing, not of merely thinking. The reason is that the
movers of history must be posited as always external to the
"humans" who are about to move. I also suggest that persons
who have a Hegelian understanding of self, language and
history will be (rationally) open to theories of permanent
revolution. Throughout the rest of this section, then, I
will assume Marx can be read as if he were Hegelian, and
that Marx's inverted Hegel will still carry a core of
linguistic communication that is shot thcough with with a
potentially authoritarian but unachievable telos.
An Application of Hegelian/Marxian Dialectic
Going back to the start of this chapter, such a Marxism
must conceive democracy as the primacy of human control of
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political process, and as revealing the secondary nature
of laws, government and state. As Marx says in "On the
Jewish Question:" "all emancipation is reduction of the
human world and of relationships to man himself” (Marx
{1975} p. 234)
. Marxian/Hegelian democracy is the
political freedom to be human—the freedom of humans from
politics, but this is prima facie only a slogan in current
language. We need to learn what it would mean if it could
be brought to say what it means. One way of bringing about
this understanding can be explored by focussing on a
distinction, namely that between human and non-human
animals. This distinction depends on "self" and
"communication" which can now be seen as building blocks in
revolution. People had been seen as "real" people by
entering language. The second transformation makes them
even more "real" by entering revolutionary discourse as
member of a class-conscious class.
If the conflict of reality finds itself bound and begat
by language, then every "thing" that can talk is forced into
conflict. People become people by entering language. We
can see now that Hegel's person, while accorded rights in
the Philosophy of Right
,
is restricted from being human
(strictly speaking) until a mastery of abstraction is
achieved. The self in Hegel who counts is a uniquely human
self which is constructed independently of its body.
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As we found a dividing line in the information theorists
a dividing line in the Phenomenology as to what
counts as truly human: "The individual who has not risked
his life may well be recognized as a person
, but he has not
attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent
self-consciousness" (Hegel {1977} paragraph 187)
. The
philosophers whom we have examined have criteria that define
a humanity one may or may not have. Hegelian theory does
not exclude and as such is an advance. Nevertheless, the
reason it does not exclude is that it is not really
conceivable that anyone could not follow the path to
selfhood at least to this point, namely that it exist "in
and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for
another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged"
(Hegel {1977} paragraph 178). If we get that far we risk
our lives in the relevant sense [8]. One risk, however,
could stop us in the progression to absolute spirit and that
progress-stopping risk is that of taking the animal or
unscientific attitude. Fortunately for Hegel (and for
Cherry!) his theory does not allow for unruly mobs to really
exist or for feelings actually to win out. (See Chapter
One, section one.)
i
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Where does Hegel get this notion of consensus? How can
"we" agree if we always already agree and why is there no
value in the risk of losing one's "mind," which might
reasonably be said to be one's "life" in the Hegelian
world? And how in that world could the roots of humanity be
explained as the desire or need to press onward to agreement
with others? To communicate only at the level of feeling is
to be 'animal." One feels pressured to conclude that
discord is synonymous with animal which in turn is
synonymous with feeling. when we arrive, if we do, at the
I-I of spirit is one side of that equation other people?
Is this what the passage suggests? No. The passage, I
think, suggests instead that the impulse to truth and
justification is human "agreement with others" where the
latter denotes the agreement about a proposition about
reality with others. To be animal instead of human means to
be unable to do science. To be unable to do science means
to "let oneself go." In Hegelian/Marxian thought "doing
science" is very important, since ultimately doing science
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IS making revolution, and science provides a platform for
consensus. One would suppose that for this tradition, then,
the materialization of dialectic through Marx would make of
revolution something that humans did with nature for all
material bodies; Marx's classification in this regard,
however, is not overtly different from Hegel's.
Marx draws the following distinction between the human
and the non-human in the Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts
:
He
The animal is immediately one with its life
activity. it is not distinct from that activityit is that activity. Man makes his life activityitself an object of his will and consciousness. fhas conscious life activity. it is not adetermination with which he directly merges.
! \fe c activity directly distinguishes manfrom animal life activity. Only because of that ishe a species-being. Or rather, he is a consciousbeing, i.e. his own life is an object for him onlybecause he is a species-being. Only because of thatis his activity free activity. (Marx {1975} p. 329)
Humans have life activity that is conscious and they
will act in the world, they will labor, even when they do
not need to do so to survive. "Man" is able "to contemplate
himself in a world he himself has created" (Marx {1975} p.
329)
.
Under capitalism such activity is not possible except
within the limits of the existing class structure. (The
individuals living under a state cannot create their
world—what would that mean in that discourse?) The
species-being which ought to bind us together, alienates us
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and turns what is our common end into a means for individual
vival. in short, capitalism dehumanizes by producing the
individuals it needs quite literally. "it" needs its
participants to be individuals in a specific sense. There
is no interest, for capital, in having persons understand
their commonality; there is no necessity for the
revolutionary theorist to allow free activity to be
perceived as possible in pre-revolutionary time. Indeed,
life under capitalism must structurally preclude
self-understanding
.
Capitalism dehumanizes, but so does the divorce of
rational" animals from "the rest of nature" in "artificial"
ways. As we just saw, doing so makes it possible for
classes and their theorists to postpone the feeling of
freedom until the "right" time in a way consistent with
Hegelian/Marxian thought. But this is morally repugnant.
What Capitalism, or any "ism," cannot do is take away the
possibility of carrying out demogenic strategies; these
strategies will depend on the actors being able to
communicate with each other in a world that they recognize.
In advanced capitalism this is possible (as it happens)
because individuals can form groups to refuse capitalism in
or out of strictly speaking revolutionary time. The refusal
requires continuous creation and recreation. This ability
crosses class-lines and conceptual imaginings of what counts
as world or body.
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Demogenic strategies are conceptually impossible under
Hegelian/Marxism except in an abstract and useless form.
The discourse excludes performance, struggle between selves
and selves is always essentially political struggle, and the
abstract transcendence of struggle is social for Marx,
spiritual for Hegel. Neither social nor political movement
has a coherent explanation. The beginning of struggle in
Hegel is an irresolvable fight between two men and for Marx
between two groups of men. When Marx tries to make this
Eight concrete he succeeds in pointing us towards a solution
m the form of democracy by turning individuals into
groups--but these are groups in which all social (and
political) differences have been already erased. Motivation
tends to enter the inherent pessimism of this reading of
history for individuals only by pasting on a theory of human
differences, borrowed from some "unscientific" theory:
mystical-religious, aesthetic, psychoanalytic
—whatever.
Some believe that one can analyse species-being and then use
that analysis to augment what is to be done with how to
motivate that. But one might have supposed that the
question of what constitutes a human qua species-being is
one that cannot be asked unless one supposes that there is
already something of the social in existence. Demogenic
strategies will utilize a notion of struggle to communicate,
which will be perceived as the real work of locating selves
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capable of the refusal of capitalism; that is, selves who
do not feel the coercion of abstract class trajectories.
Hegel no more thought that everyone in the Prussian
state was concretely free than Marx thought that one could
live in a free relation to one's product in capitalism.
Insofar as both are teleological, and it runs deep in both
them, they are teleological to the same structural
extent. Marx and Hegel can talk as they do because the
teleology that is central to them is based on certain
assumptions about the future. As such the disclaimer of
this paragraph, namely, that their systems are not
completely monolithic, does not discredit the need for novel
ways of describing the free relations that they call forth.
Marx may not have completely disallowed them; like Hegel's
"concrete freedom," the terms of the discourse do not allow
the expression of free conscious activity or purely social
activity as such. Attempts within the discourse to frame
these notions can only be viewed as hopelessly utopian
against the necessity of existent politics.
At root both Marx and Hegel must believe that science
requires the same of everyone. The communities envisioned
diff er in that Hegel's is one of mind and Marx's is one of
the relations of "men." Hegel speaks of science as the
space where one sacrifices what distinguishes one from
others in order to achieve consensus. Marx will retain this
Hegelian view. The last paragraph of Hegel's Preface can
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easily be seen as a possible solution one can give to a
potential but rational revolutionary contemplating the
problem of whether to join in political activity:
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Because of this, the individual
the more forget himself, as the nature ofScience implies and requires. Of course, he mustmake of himself and achieve what he can; but lessmust be demanded of him, just as he in turn canexpect iess of himself, and may demand less forhimself. (Hegel {1977} paragraph 72)
Marx associated individual differences with
anti-democratic ideologies, and in so doing provided a
definition of democracy that leaves no place for a
development of democracy qua democracy—hence the
uncharacteristic language used by Marx when discussing
democracy that we saw at the beginning of this chapter:
truth", "standard", the "Old Testament", etc.; democracy
can only be seen as a static endpoint. Difference seems
threatening because capitalism is shot through with
d i e f ence
:
"but we only want to negate that kind of
difference
.
"
The Linguistically Determined Valuation of Democracy
I can now make the argument of this section, namely that
even though Marx is pro-democracy and Hegel anti-democracy,
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the manner in which they are pro- and anti- makes perfect
sense following my reading. m the Critique of Hegel's
Doctrine of the State, Marx says that democracy, properly
so-called, finds its constitution in "real human beings and
the real people; not merely implicitly and in essence, but
in existence and in reality" (Marx {1975} pp. 87-89). He
follows Hegel in identifying the constitution of the just
state with the people for Hegel, state as political state
and for Marx state of affairs. I have argued that Marx does
not succeed in getting Hegel right side down. Here it is
evident that Hegel's theory of communication and self remain
an integral part of Marx's work. The constitution is the
product of dialectical activity through human thought for
both. Marx, as is well-known, did not view himself as
sharing views with Hegel in this respect.
When Marx was writing the preface to the Contribution to
the Critique of Political Economy
,
he was very concerned
with coming to grips with Hegel. For both Marx and Hegel
history is progress of a certain kind, namely a kind that
does not depend on individual difference but which consists
of the universal movement of humans. Political action, as a
consequence, is rational even if its appearance is
irrational; science (philosophical science) is what lets us
know that the appearance is wrong. In Hegel the appearance
is said to be material and in Marx ideal; nevertheless, the
strategies which are implied by the theories are not
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objectively distinguishable. Marx, in "Excerpts from James
Mill's Elements of Political Economy" says that under
capitalism "my individuality has been alienated to the point
where I loath this activity [labor], it is torture for me"
(Marx (1975) p. 275). The material reality that makes the
self’s activity loathsome is that the activity is "no more
than the appearance of activity and for that reason it is
only a forced labour imposed on me not through an inner
necessity but through an external arbitrary need" (Marx
{1975} p. 278). Hegel says that science requires the
individual to be forgotten in order to be celebrated as a
member of the community. Marx wanting the same end sees the
need to recapture a sort of individual identity which
requires noticing that one is not an individual.
The similarity between these two opposing minds appears
even more striking when they discuss freedom. In the
Philosophy of Right
,
Hegel says what Marx would never say,
viz., that "the state is the actuality of concrete freedom"
(Hegel {1952} p. 160). However, his explanation for the
same is similar to discussion of this topic in Marx's work:
...concrete freedom consists in this, that personalindividuality and its particular interests not only
achieve their complete development and gain explicit
recognition for their right... but, for one thing,
they also pass over of their own accord into the
interest of the universal, and, for another thing,
they know and will the universal; they even
recognize it as their own substantive mind. (Heqel
{1952} p. 160)
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In Marx's work that deals explicitly with the Philosophy
~ bS9inS hlS di— ssion with the para^
immediately following the paragraph just cited (Marx (1975}
PP. 58-59). it is not unusual that Marx concern himself
only with the portion of the work on Ethical Life. it is
strange, I think, that he not deal with the phrase "the
state is the actuality of concrete freedom," particularly
because he states that the two succeeding paragraphs are
those which contain "the entire mystery of the Philosophy of
Right and of Hegelian philosophy in general," and that those
two paragraphs are deeply connected to the former (Marx
(1975} p. 9 .) i think that Marx essentially agrees with
paragraph 260, sees that its central ideas imply a
structural and maybe even essential separation of social and
political he cannot account for and so fails to deal with it
at this point in time. it is unfortunate that we do not
have a commentary from Marx on the paragraph in question
because Marx, having appropriated the concept of the state
as the locus of freedom when it is the right state—as he
puts it "it goes without saying that all forms of the state
have democracy for their truth and that they are untrue to
the extent that they are not democracy" (Marx (1975} p.
89)—and believing that "individual freedom" is a
contradiction in terms, is left, like Hegel, with a tension
between spheres which tension is politically problematic
whether expressed in materialist or idealist terms.
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My Claim is that this tension in Marx, the tension he
himself pinpoints in Hegel, is there because he failed to
unmask Hegel's theories of self and communication with the
same stark force with which he later dismantles classical
political economic theories. Thus, I am claiming that Marx
would agree with paragraph 260 of Philosophy of Right as it
stands [9], Marx S aw that there were implications from this
view for the division of spheres of human life which
divisions he could not explain; nevertheless, he knew that
Hegel's explanations were wrong. During this stage of his
development Marx thought that total democracy could overcome
the contradictions which arise because of distinctions
between the social and political spheres of human existence.
My major claim is that Marx's young "idealism" and utopian
tendency are due to his failure to put to rest Hegel's
notions about language and self [10]
It is fortunate that we have a direct clash between the
minds on this point which clash helps to substantiate my
reading of Marx's alliance with paragraph 260. In the
remark to paragraph 273 Hegel says:
The development of the state to constitutional
monarchy is the achievement of the modern world, a
world in which the substantial Idea has won the
infinite form [of sub jectivi ty . . .The ancient
division of constitutions into monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy is based upon the notion
of substantial
,
still undivided, unity, a unity
which has not yet come to its inner
differentiation (to a matured, internal oganization)
and which therefore has not yet attained depth or
concrete rationality. (Hegel {1952} paragraph 273)
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bit further Hegel makes quite explicit what and
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In Marx's Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State he
says :
Hegel s argument only implies that a state in which
iA and 'character and development ofIf consciousness' are in conflict is no truestate. Of course, it would be petty to point outthat a constitution produced by a past consciousness
30 °PPressive shackle for a consciousness
which has progressed. Such views would only lead tothe demand for a constitution that had the property
and principle of advancing in step with
consciousness; i.e. advancing in step with realhuman be mgs--wh ich is only possible when 'man' hasbecome the principle of the constitution. HereHegel is a sophist
. (Marx {1975} p. 75)
But Marx just represses what must be an endpoint to his
system by refusing to comment on communism in detail. it is
not that we cannot imagine the stage after communism
(anymore than we can imagine primitive communism) it is
that nothing could follow from that stage of social
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development. I suggest that anyone who has even a hazy view
°£ What ifc ml9ht be that no development from it is
possible-or desirable. The choice, happily, is not that
between sophistry or silence. The problem of motivation in
of an end not our own has not been resolved; notable
attempts at solutions have been put forward.
The attempted solutions on which I focus result in the
loss of self even though they aim at making an internally
consistent Marxism. Making Marx consistent has often
included ridding the system of its latent Hegelianism; it
is interesting that with or without this idealism, the self
of consistent Marxism is absorbed by the system in a manner
that renders communication extremely problematic, and in
some cases, notably that concerning communication of
novelty
, impossible. Change becomes a happening without an
explanation and political action necessary but similarly
inexplicable. The two problem sets discussed below show
that although the notion of the self and the notion of
communication in this tradition go beyond those of the
tradition discussed in Chapter One, they do not completely
solve problems of political action.
Contemporary Problems
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Discourse Theory: Multiplying Selves From Without
Louis Althusser, the Marxist whose theories stand as a
paradigmatic antithesis to my Hegelian reading of Marx in
this chapter, offers an analysis of the self/subject which
nonetheless forces the total closure I have been
criticizing. For Althusser "individuals" are interpellated
as subjects within some already existing ideological context
whenever capitalism completes a cycle of reproduction. One
becomes a subject in the world by filling a space into which
one can be inserted. There is no way to read the
transformation of individual to subject that does not have
metaphysical overtones. in fact, there is no subject which
is not subjected to a Subject— that which calls to the
emerging subject to assume an already legitimated space. I
wish to show that a scientific Marx, one interpreted without
Hegelianism, also seems necessarily to repress the
possibilities of communication. Selves in the traditional
sense, do not exist (cannot exist) in any rigorously
scientific description of the world.
A criticism of relevant portions of Althusserian theory
exists which has forced the need for a reappraisal of that
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theory for many Marxists [11], The criticism is roughly
that Subjects cannot possibly relate to themselves as
Subjects. It is a structural impossibility to be pure
Subject; insofar as one is ever an individual, one must
have been an individual in the beginning and one passes
through life as a cipher in necessary order. The theory is
at best a scientific description of ideology; it cannot
explain how ideology is to be overturned save by a
mechanical application of the formula: class struggle. As
above, change breaks in as a revolutionary moment, it cannot
itself be theorized. This is the analogue to Hegel's notion
of necessity: it does not allow a mechanism for change that
can be theorized.
Pecheux's work illustrates an attempt to reconstruct
Althusser lan theory with a more adequate conception of
individuality. The problem with the Althusserian theory as
criticized is that the transition of the ideological subject
to the position of scientists, once again as a movement of
thought, remains a mystery. Pecheux wants to explain
science; he wants to explain interpellation in such a way
that the interpellated subject could engage in scientific
activity—science must be possible.
To trace the possibility of science through discourse
is an important aim of Pecheux's account of the
interpellation process. Pecheux acknowledge his debt to
Althusser and then goes beyond Althusser in an innovative
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and exciting manner. Althusser had noted that there is no
P ctice except by and in an ideology and that there is no
Ideology except by the subject and for the subjects (P^cheux
U982} p. 102). Pecheux turns the two theses into a puzzle
of causation. How can "the subject of discourse" be "the
origin of the subject of discourse" (pScheux {1982} p. 108)7
Only through the "Munchausen effect," i.e., only by lifting
oneself into the air by pulling on one's own hair [12]!
Pecheux's solution includes a discussion showing that any
solution in a subject form is precisely an impossible
"solution;" the point of departure of science, and hence of
emancipatory political activity, that is the true point of
departure "is exactly the same point of departure as the one
that has been our g uide
_
in developing our analysis of the
subject-form ^n which ideology has no outside " (Pecheux
{1982} p. 129). To avoid problems which come from forcing
all real conflict and action outside of ourselves, the true
point of departure cannot be "man," cannot be "human
activity," cannot be any of the old categories; instead
the point of departure must be "the ideological conditions
the reproduct ion/ transformation of the relations of
production " Pecheux {1982} p. 129).
Having made this break with previous theories, Pecheux
shows that if there is no outside to ideology from the
perspective which counts, then it is no longer important
(meaningful?) to speak of an epistemological break or
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discontinuity. Pecheux assigns two new categories to
account for paradoxes which arise from what might have been
an erasing of "break (s) . " First, there is Erfahrung which
is mere experience of a situation. Subjects coming to know
themselves are operating in an arena of guaranteed
continuity (Pecheux {1982} p. 139). The process without a
subject which makes up science capable of shifts (breaks) is
called Experiment
. The marker of advances here is seen only
retrospectively. At any given present one does not know if
one's subject is in Erfahrung or Experiment : "In speaking
of the spontaneous materialism of scientists, one is simply
describing the effects, in the subject-form of their being
in the truth' even if they are unable to 'speak the truth'"
(Pecheux {1982} p. 140).
This background is necessary to understand the point
Pecheux makes which concerns us most, namely, the political
prescriptions or descriptions which follow from the new
sense of self and communication he has so brilliantly put
forward—or which has spoken through him [13] . Pecheux
says
:
...proletarian political practice is not the act of
a subject (supposedly the proletariat); this
practice breaks with the spontaneous political
operation of the subject-form, and that is what
makes it Exper iment
,
and not Erfahrung
. This is not
to say... that the effect of the subject-form simply
disappears, but that it is transformed and
d isplaced--and it is here... that the point I have
been developing impinges on the question of
proletarian politics: as with every break, the
configuration in which the latter occurs is
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reorganised by it into elements operating
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Whenever what we are engaged in is science there will be
no sub jec t--no t even the group/subject/proletariat. Instead
science just happens through us. There are two forms of
work we should focus on: that against the state apparatus
and that against the ideological state apparatuses. This we
do as subjects--it is our obligation as subjects. But the
attempt at repair seems to entail a disconcerting return of
the Hegelian movement. We may make the transition from
working subject to subject by allowing the work to operate
through us. What we won't know is when, how or even whether
this transformation has occurred.
It is not just the self/subject search that is confusing
here. Even at the level of the possibly liberating
repetition of ideology and state critique there is the
confusion of what to do because one does not know whether it
is actually science that is talking. (This worry is
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structurally similar to that contained in the queries: « ls
thrs God or an evil demon?" or "is this experience a poem or
a programme?") Presumably one knows when one is fighting a
revolution in the complete sense. I am not wondering
whether we will know this. If we have to ask.
. . Available
strategies must be deliberated. One feels frustrated, is
one to fit oneself into a state apparatus— to get in there
and let science speak through one?
We cannot be content with an answer that asks us to just
have faith in the subjectless science. We must engage in
two forms of activity: activity against the state per se
and activity against the ideological complex which protects
the state [14] . Fighting the dominant ideology seems most
pressing for Pecheux and yet this activity can hardly be
comprehended as taking place through and not by subjects.
The only way to make this comprehensible is elitist and the
nature of the elitism shows that not just any human vessel
will do. The science of historical materialism could not
just come through any human vessel. That is, two kinds of
person can perform the function of vessel: those who can
insinuate themselves into the power complex and those who
are hyper-educated. To be either kind of self just
described is to be capable of standing outside of,
interpellation. To be capable of being a vessel for science
is to be a super-superscript Subject. Pecheux, like
Pizzorno, offers a re-interpretation of an old theory that
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leads in the direction of a decision procedure one could use
effectively and coherently. Like Bi ZZorno the problem that
remains is that there is still inadequate fleshing out of
the self called into action or purported to act. Both
thinkers show that it is here work is required.
Because of where theory breaks down, would-be
lutionar les are asked to risk being wrong with no way of
determining even in theory the epistemological status of
their actions. The locus of the actions cannot be found.
To be asked to take risks when the system guarantees nothing
until actions become codified as science is too much to ask
others. Most importantly the strategy which is democratic
is ruled out by definition because there is no meaning to
mediation in this framework. Everything that matters is out
there in the real conflict, when we have no selves with
which to communicate and from which to communicate democracy
does not even make sense. We have progressed from the
information theorists because here we can act; but our
action is based on faith and still cannot be coextensive
with deliberate demogenic strategies. Because I do not mean
to imply that the remaining choice is that between random
violence (terror) and uncertain political action, which it
is not, I offer the analysis of violence below. Violence is
usually given as one solution to the problems we are
discussing and as such should be addressed.
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Violence and Communication
In the course of these studies, I have
established something so simple that I di
not believe it had to be emphasized: men
w o participate in great social movements
represent their immediate action in the
of images of battles assuring the triumph
of their cause. [15]
d
form
A conditional I have assumed throughout the dissertation
is if there is only surface communication, that is, if
there is a lack of communication between creative selves,
then there is no moving past the various hierarchical
political forms." I have held this assumption in a specific
manner, namely, if individuals do not view themselves as
communicating members of some (of any ) community then a
for t ior
i
they cannot view themselves as members of a
heterodemot ic community. it is conceptually, and hence,
materially impossible. It is important that such a
conception is not merely a conception. if the conception is
believed then there are two possibilities for its believer.
They can believe it and it can be true or they can believe
it and it can be false. If it is true then they will look
to alternate forms of engagement; if it is false then they
will look to alternate forms of engagement. Because the aim
is now the building of strategies for and with he ter odemot ic
groups and communities, I will work explicitly in the
he ter odemot ic framework.
I have shown that it is not unreasonable to conclude
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that there is no hope for democratic action if one holds the
cluster of beliefs which I have called information theory or
if one holds the views of the Hegelian/Marxian tradition as
they have been described here. That either cluster may be
philosophically untenable is not pertinent; both clusters
are held by many rational persons. To not believe in the
possibility of democracy mediating between interests may
force a person to espouse some form of violence. It may
lead the person into complete political and social apathy
but insofar as this is a mediated form of the suicidal
impulse
,
apathy itself is an impulse towards violence; such
a person can be considered a candidate for spontaneous
violence of the sort we witness far too often. Violence, or
some distant or potential relation to it, may be seen to be
the best or only alternative form of engagement for the
person not convinced that democracy and action performed
within its confines might be efficacious. Of course,
sometimes the possibility that it is the best alternative is
reality
.
The incidence of and attitude toward violence has been
said to have changed in dramatic ways in "our times," that
is, in this and the last centuries. A recent study of
violence. Cotta's Why Violence? A Philosophical
Interpretation
,
notes a difference in violence after the
French Revolution. Cotta holds that violence, for the first
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time in world history, is valued positively. He asserts
that violence is exalted; that is, it is no longer viewed
as a necessary evil [16]. He blames this transformation on
what he calls the metaphysics of subjectivity. This is a
new way of viewing the subject in that the view devalues the
individual at the same time that it "exalts” the social
subject
:
The mass consciousness is the ultimate but necessaryconsequence of this reversal of values that? bydepriving the personal conscience of any meaning,
with Jh
S thS res P°nsible freedom of the individualn t e anonymous sovereignty of the 'whole.'Society thus becomes the new "subject" that*
measures the world positing itself as the
rule, and proclaims itself the foundation and theexclusive criterion of judgment of men's concretelife, scorning individuality as a mere transitorv
appearance. (Cotta {1985} p. 121)
What Cotta calls the metaphysics of subjectivity is
puzzling here as a motivator to action of any kind. The
choice Cotta sees for the person in the world who holds this
"new" doctrine of subjectivity is the following:
We are then faced by an alternative: either we
aPPly the qualifier of universalization
—and thus
everyone has a limited freedom—or we apply the
qualifier of absolut iza tion and thus all freedom is
allowed to a limited number of subjects : tertium
non datur
. (Cotta {1985} p. 123)
But of course, we want to say, there are more than these
two possibilities. The artificiality of the description
can be said to be both symbolic and perpetuating of the
My discussion of violence is forced byproblem at hand.
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thinking about more and less democratic practice in the
world. There are many more alternatives about the
relationship between Me and some Other than the violence of
universalization or the violence of absolut izat ion
. m each
of these cases, universalization or absolutization, the
resulting situation can only be seen as perpetual. Both
options lead to a kind of terror; and, they cannot be seen
as provisional options. Tertium non datur.
It is the provisional alternatives that need exposition.
We need to know how to confine violence, if and when it
becomes necessary. To do this we need to examine the root
cause of the problem—throughout I have argued that the root
cause is the manner in which we regard ourselves and the
ways in which we attempt communication. Cotta's analysis is
in important respects similar to mine; therefore it is
important to pinpoint why our conclusions diverge so
radically. The manner in which Cotta continues his argument
is worth nothing:
...the metaphysics of subjectivity is obliged to
choose the second solution: in fact, if the subject
(individual or collective) is the absolute principle
or the measure of value, its freedom cannot be
anything but absolute. The other individual or
community therefore cannot help but appear to him as
the obstacle to his freedom to his being himself.
(Cotta {1985} p, 123-4)
He has assumed that even the "radical" subject has a
self-interested conception of self. Altruism is not
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Possible as a motivating force here nor is cooperation nor
solidarity, when one's group is one's subject there is no
way to make comprehensible these notions. Any other
subject is necessarily the enemy and is such forever.
wever, does not notice this as a problem stemming
from people's holding false beliefs as is made obvious by
his solution, to solve the problem of violence one must be
charitable to one's enemies.
“p^^'m^rniii^rr-^no^e00^ 1^ this
in
n
r;^‘Ls:; istic : chacit ^ *>«» “tn.n roo ts
only the°s true tur a^r ationality m^^st^s^ butso aiso does the vital need (inseparable from it)at such a relation be willed and thereforeconfirmed and promoted in actuality in the ’varied experience of life. (cotta { 1985 } p. 140 )
If the conception of self is incorrect, and both Cotta
and i believe that it is, why is this a solution? The
analysis seems to force the conclusion that the "enemy" has
been improperly identified. I am heartened to see that the
break down of theory occurs at the same place for one whose
orientation is so different than mine. His analysis even
includes a critique of the liberal conception of self which
conception leads with equal ease to violence. The other
side of the dilemma (that which universalizes freedom) leads
to violence as follows. Respect is the necessary antecedent
for there not to be violence; therefore if the respect
breaks there is no reason to forego violence. In the
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Picture only charity allows us respect for one another.
How can charity overcome these two kinds of violence? isn’t
the problem how we could ever overcome the despair which
makes us think that charity might be a prerequisite for
peaceful co-existence among humans. Charity, in its
traditional guises, presupposes inequality of moral worth.
The structure of charitv differs fmmy a rr s trom that of, say sympathy,
in that in the former case the dispenser of charity gives
something to the recipient of charity for reasons external
to the charitable relationship. One has a duty to be
charitable to those who cannot help themselves, the least of
these persons, and so on. The structure of sympathy, by
contrast, stands outside of external obligations. There is
a reciprocity involved in sympathy not evident in
traditional discussions of charity. Charity is precisely
not an answer to violence because it partakes of the
structure that sustains violence. Isn't a part of the
problem that in either case selves are fixed by discourse
and so the only mediation is to kill the voice of the
opposition by killing the speaker? In some sense Cotta is
correct. Charity is better than violence; nevertheless, it
seems deeply cynical to suggest charity as the solution to
world violence.
The problem is either that there is no alternative to
violence or there is no alternative to violence
understandable to the interested parties now. Luckily the
140analysis, which I sharp in
not f
“ 8°“ si9nificant respects, acesorce his conclusions which I fina t kn 1 l d to be morally
sentimental at best; defeatist and cynical at worst. Also
significant is the fact that rot. ,Cotta's solution deals only
with the conclusion of his argument- i e
- . . violence is worse
when it is not seen as a necessarv » •;y evil—and not with the
P that lead him there. Cotta does not help us to thinkm more productive ways concerning
"sub gect ivi ty . » The re13 a strong implication that its analysis ought to be non-
metaphysical
. I agree with this. The strength of the Cotta
text is that he so eloguently ties the conceptions we hold
of our selves to the horror and violence we have created
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5. See, Marx, Capital, vol. 3., especially "Trinity
Formula," (Marx (1967b) pp. 814-831).
6. Nevertheless, two things are clear. First, that any
sign worth noting will be one that points out commonalities
and not differences. Second, any sign worth noting will be
necessary and not contingent. That these two are clear is
causally related to the opacity of the theory when applied.
Thus it is interesting to notice the contempt with which
Hegel holds any but an external classification of actual
individualities :
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8. Butler's analysis here, as elsewhere, isilluminating. She pinpoints the place that Foucault
embraces Hegelianism completely as that where life isaffirmed as struggle, or risk. "Life, however, is not
affirmed in a simple self-generated act; it requires
resistance and struggle, and so requires a domain of Others,
and a form of struggle. in conceding as much, Foucault
seems to be acknowledging that the very promotion of life
requires a way of life, and this way of life is a certainkind of struggle" (Butler {1987} p. 230). Foucault goesto choose which kind of struggle. On my view, Marx and
Hegel differ from him in that each person is fit into
necessary metaphysical space of a pre-existing struggle.
Note that the difference is NOT that Foucault's (sexual)
struggle can be construed as a self-generated act. It
cannot. Foucault can see the possibility of many anddiverse struggles. Marx and Hegel, while they may allow
such a possibility hardly conceive it as necessary.
9. The reader may want to read the paragraph in its
entirety
.
The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But
concrete freedom consists in this, that personal
individuality and its particular interests not only
achieve their complete development and gain explicit
recognition for their right (as they do in the
sphere of the family and civil society) but, for one
thing, they also pass over of their own accord into
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thlS respect that Kierkegaard's critiqueHegel will be shown to be equally forceful with respectto Marx. Until Kierkegaard's way out, the paradox remains.If the social overcomes the political then until people haveacquired a social conscience they would have to continue towork with the only conscience they have in the world, viz.,
e political one. So, there can be no movement. Political
emancipation can be seen not as a failure in the sublimation
of social over political; instead it can be seen as a stepm the direction of the creation of a society where social
emancipation is possible.
The important proposition that Marx and Hegel share isthat "freedom is not a property of individuals but of human
arrangements." To be concretely free according to Hegel:individuals do not live as private persons for their own
ends alone. .. their activity is consciously aimed at none but
the universal ends" (my emphasis, Hegel {1952} paragraph
269). Here is where Kierkegaard's critique becomes useful
for sorting out this dialectical issue.
11. The articulation of this criticism by Torode and
Silverman is succinct and clear:
To grasp an alternative to this ideology is to
produce an alternative speech to the ideological
speech to which the individual is subjected, thereby
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Whatever theory is ultimately accepted, some
component of reality must be saved. That it is not in
Derrida and others who follow him is due specifically to the
notion of a completely decentered self. I completelydisassociate myself from this particular theory of the self.
I will make my reasons for so distancing myself clear in
Chapter Three.
15.
George Sorrel in Reflections on Violence (Stanlev
{1976}, p. 200).
16.
Cotta says: "There is then novelty in current
violence ;... the exaltation of violence— a very recent
phenomenon, I repeat— is the result of very ambitious but
too often frustrating hopes" (Cotta {1985} p. 18).
CHAPTER III
GRAVE VOICES. GROUNDWORK FOR COMMUNICATION
Theorizing about political action without a theory of
how to communicate with each other is cynical, dangerous and
defeatist. But, as I have shown, the conception of selves
offered to us by the dominant ideologies cannot communicate.
The dominant ideologies, perhaps not surprisingly, lead to
political apathy. in this chapter, I examine some voices
that have tried to avoid the constraints of dominant
ideologies. These voices offer more than one (or two)
rigidly necessary paths to selfhood (or freedom, or
emancipation)
, opening up mostly unnoticed possibilities of
genuine communications [1], "Liberated" by voices like
these, many have been trying to find a way to communicate.
My task here is to locate a theoretical basis for their
sharing of interests. In section one I discuss Johannes
Climacus' critique of Hegel and the individuality free of
ideological constraint that it seems to promise. Many of
the philosophers and theorists I will discuss (or who would
fit appropriately in this discussion) have either made
deliberate breaks with important political parties or have
been what anyone within the major ideologies would have to
call apolitical. Thus in section one I will also discuss
an example of how a philosophy influenced by Kier kegaar dians
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might go wrong politically. I use some of the things Jaques
Derrida has said about political activity here. His link to
Kierkegaard is through Bataille, a link that seems to
obscure the source [2],
In section two I will argue that selves free from
ideological constraint are possible because they have
existed. Bataille talks through such selves, as we shall
see. The fascination surrounding Socrates and his other
self is manifest in the diverse selves of Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche with whom Bataille feels a strong identification.
That these selves are the possible groundwork for a theory
of communication that can ground an effective theory of
political action is argued in section three. The aim of
this chapter is ultimately to construct a
Marx-Hegel-Bataille (MHB) dialectic, a dialectic which will
allow us to formulate a theory of self and communication
that is adequate to a defensible theory of political action.
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A Cluster of Voices:
_
Radical Cr i tique of Hegel
Climacus Critique of Hegelian Necessity
in building the MHB dialectic we first notice Climacus'
critique of Hegel without which Bataille's laughter would
remain incomprehensible. The importance of Climacus'
critique to my project here is great; Climacus cannot be in
the dialectic for structural reasons. Nor can Kierkegaard
be assimilated into dialectics— there is no Kierkegaard to
be found [3]
.
The MHB dialectic is impossible without
Kierkegaard, but it does not consume his work.
Since the purpose of this chapter is to show that
Climacus' radical critique of Hegel leads to a communication
theory that is able to adequately represent the notion of
communication required by a theory of political action, it
is worth noting that many have not thought it possible to
derive a social theory from any individualistic philosophy.
That Kierkegaard's theories are radically individualistic
and subjective is well known. How then can material that
would aid social theory be derived from his work? The
answer lies in the connection with Hegel.
Because of his contributions to the liberal tradition,
Hegel's mark can be found in nearly all political theory
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that comes after him. One could argue that any reading of
Hegel is necessarily important to social theory. The
centrality of Hegel's work is glaring. Derrida says of
Hegel: "We will never be finished with the reading or the
rereading of Hegel, and, in a certain way, I do nothing
other than to attempt to explain myself on this point"
(Derrida, {1978} p. 77). He finds that the most important
area of the Hegelian work has to do with what he calls
spacing (Derrida {1978} p. 95). Spacing is a two-part
concept which includes these components. First, no identity
can ever be completely closed on "the inside of its proper
interiority" (Derrida {1978} p. 94). Second, spacing is
not only that which opens a concept to continuous
definition, it is the work of conceptual defining and
redefining. Derrida thus accords spacing both a spatial and
a productive facet. This concept of spacing is crucial to a
reading of Hegel but the place at which we must distance
ourselves from his system. The concept of "spacing" is
important to this discussion because it is here that
Climacus breaks with Hegel. We have discussed, in Chapter
Two, the tradition wherein the self is itself only when
outside of itself. It is Climacus who turns
Marxian/Hegelian dialectic on its head by giving productive
capacity to the space which is not outside of a self.
"Spacing" is not denied; nor is it accepted as a universal
condition
.
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This central relationship to Hegel within Derrida's work
is precisely the important area of contact for Climacus and
later for French philosopher and novelist George Bataille.
Both are primarily concerned with how the relations of
concepts to spacing effect the self and communication. As
such their work is of central importance to this discussion.
To remain consistent with past discussions in this
dissertation I will use the term inwardized exteriority to
refer to spacing with respect to the self [4],
Climacus* major reasons for closing the self against
Hegel's inwardized exteriority have to do with movement (the
possibility for action) and freedom (the denial of necessity
with respect to choice in the ethical realm). in examining
these reasons we will see precisely why a philosophy of the
interior has implications for democratic theory and
political action. Climacus' closure of the self is an
attempt to bring movement into what he saw as a stagnant
system--one which could not account for intensity. With no
movement there can be no practically significant democratic
theory; with no intensity no reason for its adoption at the
subjective level. Climacus believed that Hegel's system was
stagnant because actors had been subsumed by the social. No
actor could ever do anything in the Hegelian system because
none exist in the system. When Hegelians recognize the
partitive positions they hold in the system, that is, when
they recognize that they exist merely as a piece of a
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concept, they lose the poss
respect to action or work,
identifies that individuals
system in which they merely
them by world history, will
defeated
.
ibility for intensity with
I think that Climacus correctly
faced with this monolithic
Play out the role assigned to
feel powerless, frustrated and
Climacus rejects the role Hegel assigns him, thereby
affirming a role which is a Hegelian impossibility.
Climacus is not specifically an anti-Hegelian, he is an
anti-systemic philosopher who happens to stalk his Hegelian
double because Hegel's system is the proximate target of his
activity. His point of departure from Hegel is at the point
of inwardized exteriority. Climacus argues for a closed
self, a completely inwardized interior ity— to the point of a
consciously false exteriority. Once the inner is sealed
off, however, the self is torn by desire manifested as
anguish— the need to communicate with others. This desire
is anguished due to Climacus' recognition that he has, in a
sense, rendered significant communication transparently
impossible. What was opaque in Hegel is clear in the
messages of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript
. One can
infer that it is pointless for Hegelian actors to speak.
Climacus shows why this is so and in so doing shows the
anguish of the Hegelian realization.
Because of this anguished desire a community of persons
each referring to other voices, but unable to communicate
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With them, is created. Climacus recognizes himself in other
writers that cannot be him but must be him. By reacting
against Hegel in his "Hegelian" fashion, Climacus lays the
groundwork for a new reading of Hegel, namely Bataille's,
which allows for movement, intensity and meaningful
communication. That Climacus is to any extent Hegelian is
not universally accepted. Thus, a good place to begin is a
survey of some of the readings of this relationship to
Hegel
.
Henry Sussman remarks that "in order to mount this
multifaceted resistance to Hegel, Kierkegaard had to be a
Hegelian of the first order" (Sussman {1982} p. 63) [5]. it
is interesting then that in The Relation of Kierkegaard to
Hegel, an exhaustive work which covers all the major voices
of the Kie r kegaar dian texts, Niels Thulstrup concludes:
the two thinkers have nothing in common" (Thulstrup {1980}
p. 372). Thulstrup maintains that Kierkegaard's only
relation to Hegel is critical or polemical. He argues that
Kierkegaard rejects every important Hegelian doctrine and
that the rejection is so thorough in each case that no
assimilation between the original Hegelian doctrine and
Kierkegaard's assessment is possible. For my purpose the
most important differences mentioned by Thulstrup regard aim
and method:
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The result of the subjective thinker's procedurp i <=not, and was not supposed to be, 'scientific
i
eobjective and speculative, but precisely in 'opposition thereto: an unscientific Ixistentialcontribution, which corresponds exactly with manregarded as existing (on one of the
Chri^tiani^"™’
in
.
untl:uth ur>til the moment when
and fh communicates to man existence in truth, thereby both explains and judges the lowerstages of existence. (Thulstrup {1980} p. 372)
I think that one reason why Thulstrup sees no similarity
between the two thinkers is that he takes Hegel and Climacus
as correctly labeling the work in which they are engaged.
If we regard the methods and aims of the philosophers,
forgetting how Uiey label these aims, the similarities
become more apparent. Hegel’s theorising concerning history
is where one finds Climacus’ most virulent attacks on him.
Nevertheless his claim in Reason in History that
"consciousness alone is that which is open, that to which
God and anything else can reveal itself" is similar to
claims made by Climacus (Hegel {1953} p. 74). The sort of
consciousness which can be open to any kind of truth is that
which is aware of itself. To know is to already know one's
self. Consciousness generates and produces; it is openness
itself. Likewise Climacus maintains that each person is
open to God only in subjectivity. For Climacus, each person
begins with an element of subjectivity, the soul; the
striving towards subjectivity is nonetheless the most
difficult of all human tasks (Climacus {1968} p. 116).
Likewise, for Hegel, achieving subjectivity is an
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accomplishment. By contrast Climacus minimizes the need of
culture and knowledge for the process of finding one's
relation to God, yet the decisive moment, the decision to
become a Christian, can only occur after a long struggle for
self knowledge (Climacus {1968} p. 342). For both Hegel
and Climacus the self is a self (the me of everyday life)
which then assumes historical burden. Hegel's burden always
already consumes him; Climacus' is buried beyond
articulation at a moment of decision. The individual that
Climacus posits cannot be introduced to the articulation of
the decisive step through philosophy. Nor can the
individual be forced or necessitated into self-consciousness
(Climacus {1968} p. 343). Climacus' and Hegel's aims are
structurally similar; both thinkers wish to find an
absolute certainty. For Hegel this certainty is absolute
knowledge; for Climacus it is eternal happiness. Thus,
Climacus' criticisms of Hegel with respect to the unceasing
need to find yet more knowledge are puzzling [6]
.
Climacus says that Hegel loses movement in his system by
disregarding the interiority of the individual. The
individual is seen as having been subsumed by the
exteriority of world history working itself toward absolute
knowledge. Marx also notes that movement is lost in the
Hegelian system. Climacus' significant contribution is that
he explains how it is possible to escape the system and
create movement. That is, Climacus gives significance to
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the unique thoughts of each i
impacts required to force the
It is interesting to note
within his system. He says:
ndividual as the series of
system into movement,
how Hegel explains change
An individual as unity traverses various staqes andremains the same individual. So also a people? up
SDirit
st
^9 e which is the universal stage of its
necessitv of
C °nS1Sts the inner, the conceptualy its change. (Hegel {1953} p. 94 )
And, of course, in Kierkegaard the movement, which is
interior, produces a new person. The same person is not
aesthete and then ethicist and then religious. The
pseudonyms are not capr icious— they do not result from whim
or fancy. Kierkegaard is a deadly serious writer for whom
the use of pseudonyms must be seen as necessary [7]. in the
last chapter we found that we could not find a satisfactory
explanation for change in the system as presented in the
.Phenomenology because change is described as repetition, a
repetition that is empty until something is inexplicably
described as suddenly grasped! Climacus wants an
explanation of how movement is possible especially since it
is said to be necessary.
His solution involves completely closing off the
individual at the moment of decision. In the closure one
becomes someone else and this becoming someone else is a
necessary transformation—as it is for Hegel. Hegel,
however, does not only notice and exposit this structural
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necessity; he thinks that the kind of transformation is
also necessary. Therefore, because of the reliance on
reason
,
on rationality, Hegel misses what he might have
seen, namely, that transformations make new kinds of selves.
For Hegel, the same consciousness travels from one stage of
development to the next. it is not really possible for
Hegel to do otherwise. if absolute knowledge is a
possibility, it must always already be present to every
individual, even if individuals may not have it present to
them (yet) in an articulated form. The necessity of Hegel's
path requires that one individual be transformed into
someone who knows, through dialectical steps, not that a
succession of different individuals be possible.
Kierkegaard, who abandons necessity in Hegel's sense, can
describe a potential succession of quite different selves as
stages along the life's way of a vessel self. Kierkegaard
allows what is phenomenologically more palpable: that each
stage on life's way is the result of a new self which did
not have to be the self that it is. We can write texts for
our bodies; they do not have to follow old rules.
One way to look at this is through an analogy with
grammar. For instance, within the limits of certain rules
an infinite array of sentences is possible for us. There
are strings of words, however, that do not count as
sentences to anyone, and particular strings can be produced
as discourse only by the choice of a particular individual
.
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Hegel'S mistake is in supposing that the limiting condition
is that of rationality. For him only a rational path can
lead to absolute knowledge, but he describes all paths at
once, so to speak, as if that could constitute a philosophy,
insofar as the selves we write take a particular position,
they are already within the possible structure. There are
infinite possibilities for ourselves within this necessity.
Hegel cannot explain the instantiation of a particular
possibility, nor can he recognize "impossible" choices
.
In later works often incorrectly attributed to
Kierkegaard, the issue of subjectivity is developed in
contrast to Kierkegaard's earlier social self. Religiosity
IS a perspective which can acknowledge the limits of the
religious in earlier, more worldly modes. The question of
Socrates' possibilities for religiosity is a nearly absurd
manifestation of this style [8]. So, for instance, in the
same work in which Climacus tries to open up Socrates to
Christian subjectivity, he exposits in some detail the
difference between the Pagan and Christian outlooks. This
is done in such a way that a Pagan clearly could not achieve
a God-relation worthy of Climacus' title "Christian"
(Climacus {1968} p. 219). The necessity of change from one
historical point to another for Hegel occurs when the
society knows itself completely and then "dies" into another
age. Climacus' epochal changes are just like Hegel's until
the arrival of Christ. But the arrival of Christ has an
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analogue in Hegelian thought with respect to its structural
function. Namely, for Hegel subjectivity is that which
begins modern history-or ends history. For Kierkegaard
history begins with Christ-but so too does subjectivity
properly so-called.
In The Concept of Anxiety Vigilius Haufniensis argues
that “only with the moment does history begin" (Haufniensis
(1980} p. 89) echoing Hegel's notion of prehistory and world
history. (See Hegel {1953} pp. 75-78). The difference we
are looking for, then, when as many of the intentions as
possible have been cleared away, occurs at the individual
level. As previously stated, the structural possibility
(which is our real concern) is that selves not be forced
into any state of consciousness. That this was not Hegel's
concern explains the lack of movement in his system. For
him* there is but vector direction to selfhood, even if many
particular concrete paths are possible. This area of
conflict can be exploited to our advantage if we juxtapose
Climacus' views with Hegel's in the Phenomenology.
In facing another self-consciousness, a self-
consciousness has come out of itself. For Hegel, the coming
out of itself has two important features. In the first case
the self has lost itself because its self is in the other.
In addition to the loss of the self the self which is faced
is lost: "It has superceded the other, for it does not see
the other as an essential being" (Hegel {1977} paragraph
158
178). The self being suspended between two selves requires
a resolution. The resolution is two part. First the self
must supercede the other to gain certainty for itself.
Second
,
it must supercede its own self because its own self
is the other. To have a self, then, requires recognizing
another. For the other to be recognized, the one
recognizing must know that the other is capable of being
recognized: "Action by one side only would be useless
because what is to happen can only be brought about by both"
(Hegel {1977} paragraph 182). At the level of mere
consciousness, "each is indeed certain of its own self, but
not of the other, and therefore its own self-certainty still
has no truth" (Hegel {1977} paragraph 186). To become
self-conscious, the two must act through abstract negation
and it is this negation which allows the self to survive, in
some form, its being sublated.
This survival through negation is what Marx retains and
what Climacus cannot abide. I believe that this is where
Kierkegaard's voices make their most significant
contribution. The voices collectively demonstrate that
there is no necessary survival through negation.
Kierkegaard has offered himself to the personal
demonstration of consistency on this point by means of
self-sacrifice. Climacus' response to Hegel's conception of
the doubly reflected self might actually be Hegelian science
speaking through him. If so, given his vast sensitivity to
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the most minor nuances of language and his religious
outlook, it would be no wonder that he thought the
appropriate inner to be God. That Climacus keeps bumping
into the the wall which is God, could express the fact that
vessels for science have to continuously prepare themselves.
Climacus’ attempts at describing why he cannot describe what
he has experienced make Pecheux’s description of the
Munchausen effect, alluded to in Chapter Two, seem like
understatement
.
Kierkegaard prepared himself (more precisely,
Kierkegaard was prepared) to be a prophet for/of God. when
reality instead made its presence in him he could not see it
as anything but what he had been prepared to accept—
a
god-man with whom to talk. it is significant that it was
his own preparation which was crucial to his finding the
response that he did find. Society made him Protestant.
Society made him Romantic. Society made him Hegelian.
Hegel wanted to be God—Climacus wanted what would be much
more fulfilling and significant but what was also
newer --he wanted to talk with God. He was too lonely just
to fc)e God. Kierkegaard could not act out to the limit;
nonetheless, Kierkegaard desires beyond his acculturation.
On a personal level this was, of course and obviously,
disastrous
.
(That lie played a part in the preparation of his
experiences would be a mystery, since Kierkegaard, of all
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people, could not be in advance of himself, but if he
hadn't, i.e., if he had just had an idea that would also
raise a mystery. Do people writing believe it is they who
write? And yet could anyone else write exactly as they
write? Kierkegaard's corpus requires God, and it requires
particular individuals who can seal themselves off from the
world in a coherent frame of mind.)
Kierkegaard attempts to bring the whole process into one
self in an effort to save the primacy of subjectivity.
Climacus describes the inner process of reflection this way:
"the reflection of inwardness gives to the subjective
thinker a double reflection. in thinking he thinks the
universal; but as existing in this thought and as
assimilating it in his inwardness, he becomes more and more
subjectively isolated" (Climacus {1968} p. 68). The process
of becoming subjective never ends for Climacus—but it never
begins either. There is neither unity nor synthesis. The
subject gets thrown back on itself and becomes increasingly
isolated and subjective. Yet the increasing isolation that
the subjective thinker experiences does not preclude an
analysis of the relationship of the subjective thinker to
the other. For Climacus, this relation to the other has a
double meaning. There is ordinary relating via ordinary
communication which is immediate (Climacus {1968} p. 68).
In addition, however, there is the impossibility of any
communication from within the subjects' religiosity:
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"direct communication presupposes certainty; but certainty
is impossibie for anyone in the process of becoming, and
the semblance of certainty constitutes for such an
individual a deception" (Climacus {1968} p. 68, note).
If Anti-Cl imacus had not feared God so much, Climacus
might have been allowed to understand subjectivity and
Kierkegaard himself might have established non-graphematic
relationships. in the end the fear of "getting it wrong,"
made of all the voices closed entities. The student
Kierkegaard, the Kierkegaard whose Concept of irony shows
him capable of laughter, and not just "humor” or "comedy,"
could have done the work of Bataille if he could have broken
on through to the understanding with Socrates that his
desice required. Having failed in this relationship
—after
being so close—God offered the only acceptable risk of
final failure. Too bad for Regina!
It is certainly worth noting that the author of Fear and
Trembling was concerned whether God in any form is worth any
kind of sacrifice. And the answer implies that any
sacrifice is especially self-sacrifice. To have considered
sacrifice is to have already sacrificed oneself.
Kierkegaard rejects Regina, sacrifices her for his
spiritual gain. Henceforth, his self is already sacrificed.
Can Abraham be himself (his old self) after holding the
knife above the body of his son? This is the question posed
by Fear and Trembling
. An immediate answer is "no "
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Another answer is. "no one fails to hold the knife over some
body .
"
Because of the impossibility of direct communication,
agreement among individuals with respect to issues of
subjectivity is for Climacus
-'the grossest kind of
misunderstanding" (Climacus {1968} p. 69). One might argue
some of the alleged disagreements between Kierkegaard
and Hegel are due to a mi s-communicat ion
. Once Kierkegaard
finds the self missing in Hegelian thought, he erases
exteriority. This is a result forced by the space of
cultural and grammatical conditioning; nothing in the
structure of the leap forces such an erasure. That is,
since Climacus fills the structural place he has found as
the sacred space wherein one communes with God, he must
conclude that the significance of anything outside of that
space is as nothing. No one can fault him for this erasure
of the outside [9]
.
More interestingly each person is freed
from a self-examined life which leads necessarily to some
variant of already available options. We must seize from
Kierkegaard's closet a sense of what is possible. From this
possibility, a solution to the problem of communication and
perhaps, to that of democratic theory addresses us. That
is, we know from Kierkegaard's example that one does not
necessarily survive as the same self from stage to stage;
in fact, one is transformed (and one transforms one's
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selves) from self to self as one acts and thinks in the
world
.
What "privileges" S^ren Kierkegaard over the authors?
Who is the one transformed (or transforming)? There is
such a self that might be called the vessel self, a self
that may carry the same name even if it is completely
rebuilt on the open seas. We cannot know this self. it is
necessary that it exist but we do not know it as it is
unobservable. it is not the self that might do science as
the critique of Pecheux showed. A transcendental argument
based on memory gives us proximate knowledge that there is
such a self—one remembers that one has done things that one
could not have done (as the self one now is). Kierkegaard's
grasps at this realization in his concept of repetition; he
thought an act could be repeated but not necessarily by the
same person. Only the certain knowledge that this is my
self acting now matters politically, because this knowledge
impels us to communicate and act. The proximate knowledge
of the vessel self results in self analysis which will
always end in confusion. (it is not there to analyse— its
vestigial trace makes us want such an analysis and the
theories based on this misguided desire reinforce an
insatiable need to know oneself in this sense. It is
interesting that if one wanted to make others apolitical,
fostering self-absorption in them would probably rank second
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only to violence and its continual threat as means to
achieving that end
.
)
The vessel selves do not act. They cannot act because
they are not real selves; they are ideological
constructions. We may take Kierkegaard to have established
this point. He sees that only particular selves, at
particular moments, could act. Hegel's selves are really
vessel selves who can only arrive at Hegelian selfhood at
the end of an impossible journey. From the present point of
view, the democratic theories surveyed in the first two
chapters are theories of vessel selves. That is why they do
not succeed. Their selves cannot communicate, and hence
they cannot act.
In spite of the difference between Hegel and Climacus
with respect to interiority and exteriority, it is important
to add that Climacus either adopts or re-invents certain key
concepts and interpretations of history which we can trace
to Hegel. These concepts of inwardized spatial locations
are very important to both philosophers' conceptions of
history. I have argued that on many key points Climacus is
Hegelian. He shares Hegel's theory of history and he
appropriates the dialectic when the dialectic is restricted
to the outer world. Importantly, he also shares the notion
of the individual striving for knowledge or truth and the
notion that communication is doubly reflected. Thus far the
major difference between the philosophers under discussion.
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is the extent to which the self is susceptible to inwardized
exteriority [10] .
Mark Taylor’s early work on Kierkegaard can be seen as
corroborating my analysis of Thulstrup. Taylor views Hegel
and Kierkegaard as not only sharing important
"methodological procedures" but also as sharing the same
aim, viz., "how can spiritlessness be cured?" (Taylor {1980}
P. 13). For Taylor, the major break between the two is the
place where Kierkegaard refuses to allow the dispersion of
the self into abstraction or into the community: "it is
apparent that Kierkegaard must reject Hegel's contention
that authentic selfhood presupposed membership in spiritual
community. Instead of being the fulfillment of selfhood,
life in community with others is a concession to the human
weakness of being unable to bear the isolation of spiritual
individuality" (Taylor {1980} pp. 189-90).
The contrary readings of Thulstrup and Taylor give one
pause. Taylor's analysis is so different from Thulstrup's
that one cannot help but think something serious has gone
wrong in at least one of the readings. George Connell is of
this view. He calls for a new reading that will examine the
thoroughly dialectical relationship of Kierkegaard to Hegel"
because readers, on his view, should be freed from "both
Thulstrup's overemphasis of Kierkegaard's independence from
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Hegel and Taylor's occasional exaggeration of the Dane's
debt" (Connell {1985} p. 193).
Henry Sussman's reading may answer Connell's plea for a
more dialectical one. For Sussman, Kierkegaard's attacks on
Hegel serve as a "general disruption or paralysis of the
Hegelian pretensions to consummation and continuity"
(Sussman {1982} p. 69). Sussman argues that several tools
are used to effect this paralysis, among them the use of
aphorism and what he calls logical deadlock. He notes that
the widespread use of aphorism makes a mockery of the
Hegelian claims of resolution and progress" (Sussman {1982}
P- 77). Sussman's reading is significant in that it takes
the indirect methods of Kierkegaardian communication
seriously. The use of the aphorism as indirect
communication is by itself a dialectical criticism of
Hegel's optimistic exposition. The aphorism can be seen as
a metaphor of solitude. By its isolated nature, its compact
potential devoid of the explicit structure of system, it is
almost certain to be understood differently by each reader.
Nietzsche, the greatest writer of the aphorism says in Ecce
Homo, "Ultimately nobody can get more out of things,
including books than he already knows" (Nietzsche {1967} p.
261). This is especially true of the aphorism. The readers
meet the writer in the space of the aphorism and are forced
to make of it what they will. There is no help from a
system, no help from a narrating backdrop. And yet, writers
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Of aphorisms cannot help but take a position with respect to
an authorship uniquely their own, i.e., towards their own
aphorisms. Kierkegaard works at this in the revealing of
his authorship; Nietzsche in Ecce Homo.
Indirect communication carries within itself the desire
for a full communication. Kierkegaard claims not to
understand his work nor to have any privileged knowledge of
interpretation respecting it. The work of the pseudonymous
authoro is one of doubly reflected communication. As such,
Kierkegaard's interpretation is no more privileged than
anyone's (Climacus {1968} p. 551). The possibility of an
aphorism whose interpretation would unfold with necessity
seems to be forbidden by Hegel's systematizing and
non-aphor istic philosophy. Hegel uses aphoristic sentences
only to illustrate discursive positions. Kierkegaard's use
of aphorisms is a more certain sign of disagreement with
Hegel than any dialectical (or even prosaically
anti-dialectical) protest. This form of writing denies
system more forcefully and more credibly than do direct
attacks [11] .
Sussman discusses the logical deadlock, the logic of the
either/or which "suspends dialectical progression in a
single cell" (Sussman {1982} p. 92). According to Sussman's
Kierkegaard, the individual is faced with situations of
"either/or" in which no logic or rationale can force the
individual to choose one possibility over another. The
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ostensible movement of the Hegelian system does not allow
the individual any freedom to determine the course of his
existing possibilities. By stopping this supposed movement
with an "either/or" choice and freedom are able to erase
the necessity of taking one course on the journey to
selfhood. The moment of dead lock will be developed
into a strategy of political action in Chapter Four.
We have noticed only two of many techniques that are
possible for indirect communications--the aphorism and the
logical deadlock. Both are important. in each case a self
that exists apart from a system is affirmed and valued
positively. As such these forms communicate a sense of
s tr ength--a sense that there is the possibility of resisting
system. They also bring back to history the importance of a
particularized or concrete subject as a thoughtfully acting
subject, but a subject whose thoughts do not follow the
rails of a stepwise logical development. "Subject" is no
longer seen as an impersonal catalyst for world historical
events but as a self who has "unique" or extra-systemic
desire. Bataille's work can be manipulated in such a way
that the subject can derive a political desire— the desire
to join a new "group." Taking the route through Kierkegaard
to Bataille allows the possibility of grouping, but without
returning the self to the submissive position with respect
to world history. The point, to be developed below, is that
the groups cannot be made jointly subservient to a
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totalizing system. The contribution of these serious voices
is in making it possible for people, to view themselves as
actors (and not just reactors).
Sussman claims that because of the techniques which
Kierkegaard uses against Hegel he can open up the space
between philosophy and literature (Sussman {1982} p.
156-58). Kierkegaard forces his readers to fictionalize
themselves, this taking place in a theater where they become
as important, consciously
, as the authors for whom
Kierkegaard served as vessel and the author who is
Kierkegaard. Fiction thus forces philosophy, after its
fact. Kierkegaard's bravery is shown in his assumption of
the risks previously taken only by mythical caricatures.
His interest in representative characters is grounded in
this risk-taking, an action avoided by most "real"
people or, vessel selves. The mythical figures in his work
outnumber real persons and fictional representatives of
ordinary people significantly. He played symbolic roles
without guarantees of success and with no community backing
his efforts. He forced a community to exist wherein all
participants are equally creative even though those
participants are the authors whom he simultaneously is and
is not. Literally. The main point here is that to read
Kierkegaard's texts is to read a utopia whose main
imperfection is that it does not exist. To note this,
however, is to be an active participant in the dialogue and
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not merely a passive recipient of information,
importantly, it is to be a self who wants to i
someone in the paper village. The main point
the reader is no mere reader.
More
nstantiate
here is that
To conclude
, Climacus is largely Hegelian. His work
centers around the crucial concept of inwardized
exteriority. That is, the major thesis of his work is that
there are selves that are complete and in some instants
(moments) free. Selves are not free to create their own
essences. Selves are free to identify with some group, or
to measure themselves against God. in a moment of freedom
Climacus identifies with, but never merges with
Christianity; Kierkegaard finds this in Climacus despite
Kierkegaard's own need to identify with a different other:
his real father, the silent mother, a real "lady-love." The
passage where Climacus claims not be a Christian is followed
by a passage that covers every topic of this dissertation:
...he who has a real ladylove is prohibited by
fidelity and morality from dangling after an
imaginary one, even if he does it ever so quietly.
But he who has none
—
yea, he is at liberty to do
it—and the author who has no real reader is at
liberty to have a fancied one, he is even at liberty
to admit it, for there is no one whom he offends.
All praise to the well-ordered state! How can
anybody be so busy wanting to reform the state and
to get the government changed! Of all forms of
government the monarchical is the best, more than
any other it favors and protects the private
gentleman's quiet conceits and innocent pranks.
Only democracy, the most tyrannical form of
government, obliges everyone to take a positive
part, as the societies and general assemblies of our
time often enough remind one. Is this tyranny, that
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one man wants to rule and sofree? No
,
but it is tyranny
and in addition to that would
take part in the government,
insistently declines to have(Climacus {1968} p. 547-8)
leave the rest of us
that all want to rule
oblige everybody to
even the man who most
a share in governing.
r
We cannot overlook the confusion of this passage: it is
paradigmatically anti-systemic. That there is no break
between lover and reader is not puzzling: if a problem of
interpretation exists it is that there are so many
solutions. All of Kierkegaard's books are for the one
reader who is his imaginary lover, Regina. Kierkegaard has
no lover who is not a reader; and as Kierkegaard has no
lover, he has no real reader. When we read Kierkegaard in
the ordinary sense we are less real that the reader he
envisions in his mind. This reader is the lover is
universal is nothing ... and in all of this there stands the
state, well-ordered, menacing, keeping us from our loves,
our dreams, our work. There is only one Monarchy that
Kierkegaard believes can save us for work—and this Monarchy
always consists of two persons only.
But to go from here to there! From lover qua reader qua
lover to: "All praise to the well-ordered State!" Is the
well-ordered state, like the imaginary lover and reader
perfect and non-existent or existing and imperfect. We had
wanted love, recognition, freedom; and, there was nothing.
If these things existed, we would have no need to create.
But they do not exist so we must create. Kierkegaard
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attempts to deflect responsibility by saying: "You choose
who is Kierkegaard
, who Climacus, who the deserter of
Regina. I will not do it because I do not know who I am."
In these moments Kierkegaard's connection to the world
may be pathological. Political actors should have
connections to the world which are not pathological: this
is not always possible. The most idealist utopia may be
that of proscribing sanity for the entire polis. m the
minimal connection to the world which is so essential for
Kierkegaard, we find the place where we must leave
Kierkegaard [12] . Kierkegaard is frozen in the fits and
starts of a despairing indirect communication because he
cannot see a way to communicate directly, to be in the
world. in this, he is sensitive to the real consequences of
the political theories we examined in the first two
chapters. One could adopt his relation to text and
Climacus' critique of abstract negation but still not
surmount political paralysis as the following case study
shows. I offer the example to show that the first two
critiques and the help from Kierkegaard and his array of
selves must work together in grounding a theory of political
action else the results are less than satisfactory.
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Paper Village, Paper Selves
For Derrida, Bataille errs politically in that he has no
strategy—he is just in a game. (One would imagine that
Derrida could make the same criticism of Kierkegaard.)
Because Bataille does not recognize how binding the rules of
Hegel, Bataille seems to Derrida to be somewhat more than an
insightful funster. The joke for Derrida is that Bataille
thinks that poetic ecstatic discourse can be opposed to
significative discourse. Derrida's point is that this
discourse' is linked to the other from before the
beginning— it cannot be another chain unwound aside it"
(Derrida {1978} p. 261). Derrida is perfectly correct in
this criticism; however, the criticism may be used against
some of his own political discussion. The image of a single
text can no longer be rent by decisive concrete actions,
since action cannot be outside the text. There is only one
discourse and ultimately only one right strategy: "One
understands nothing about general strategy if one absolutely
renounces any regulation of ascertaining non-pertinence. If
one loans it, abandons it, puts it into any hands: the
right or the left." (Derrida {1978} p. 276).
In concrete terms what this means is that even though we
renounce meaning we cannot free ourselves of textual
ambiguities. We do not do critique (we do not take
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positions) but we take double positions which restrict
possibilities by a determination. m "But Beyond"...
Derrida says: apartheid denotes "a monstrous unique and
unambiguous thing" (Derrida {1986} p. 159). Facts unlike
words are stubborn (Derrida {1986} p. 163) and strategy is
unequivocally a call to action. "Text as I use the word is
not the book. It is precisely for strategic reasons that I
found it necessary to recast the concept of text by
generalizing it almost without 1 imi t . . . wi thou t any limit
that is" (Derrida {1986} p. 167).
For strategic purposes, Derrida finds it necessary to
recast the concept of text as encompassing everything. But
how are his readers to act? "Apartheid, the more it's
talked about, the better. But who will do the talking? And
how? These are the questions. Because talking about it is
not enough. On such a grave subject, one must be serious
and not say just anything" (Derrida {1986} p. 156). Here
acting is talking carefully. "A serious response here would
take hundreds of pages,.." (Derrida {1986} p. 167). Here
acting is writing enough. Derrida may be attacking people
who rely on too crude a distinction between text and act,
but his subsumption of action to text seems to rely on the
efficacy of established channels of communication. This is
why refining Bataillian strategies requires critiques of
existing theories of political action.
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in this case, Derrida's strategy-there can only be the
one-deconstructs itself in the world. For instance, in the
de Han case, where writing is, after all, partly what is at
issue, the same plea is made by Derrida as for understanding
partheid. After an eloquent and moving defense of de Man's
career and defense of text in itself Derrida engages in
"action"
:
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I have no criticism of Derrida except that he does not go
far enough. It is better to reread than not to reread; the
rereading should come to an end in action, when we write
about situations requiring action, or talk about them, the
discourse should match the temporal exigencies involved.
Political writing has been too careful.
Bataille explodes this problem by giving up the notion
of rational, fully controlled communication—opening a
space. One could say that Bataille’s advance is in knowing
not only that he exists in the world, but that he exists
excessively as many in the world. We laid no dialectical
hand on Climacus; there is no such restriction on Bataille.
Bataille may be too careless; he reminds us that we are
alive
.
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Bata i lie 1 s Addition to the Dialectic
That freedom cannot be contained in Hegelian dialectics
is Cl imacus ' important reaction against the Hegelian notion
of the self. I insist that Climacus' resistance to Hegel is
in having brought the double reflection into inward
actuality. What is mere consciousness for Hegel becomes
self-consciousness for Climacus. In Chapter Two, we
discussed the end and the beginning of the journey of the
Phenomenology as immediate sense-certainty. Climacus'
critique shows why this must be so. The Hegelian self can
never be self-conscious because it is never where it could
complete reflection on or with itself. Having achieved
significance and intensity for the individual in the face of
world history, Climacus realizes that he is asking his
readers to sacrifice a great deal. He has an attitude of
bravery in view of his isolation and sacrifice, but much of
his work can be seen as his attempt to overcome his
isolation. I believe that the philosophy of inferiority
forced the beginning of Bataille's theory of communication
because Bataille found that at the deepest level of
inferiority there is still always the human Other, but that
this otherness does not take away inferiority in Hegel's
easy move. Bataille was very much aware that a radical
critique of Hegel occurs at the Kier kegaardian point we have
177
been discussing: a closure of self from which any point of
contact from outside of the self seemed impossible
[ 13 ],
Bataille can understand the message about the other in
Hegel because he sees the self in both the Hegelian and the
completely closed senses. Bataille relates to the closed
notion of self but knows too that there is something like
the self outside of itself in any political struggle.
Bataille' s remark that "it is from a feeling of community
which links me to Nietzsche that the desire for
communication arises, and not from an isolated originality"
may seem strange in this context (Bataille {1954}, p. 128,
note). Derrida says possibly as a gloss of this remark that
Bataille considered himself "closer to Nietzsche than anyone
else... to the point of identification with him" (Derrida
{1978} p. 251) . Bataille's feeling of community has been
transformed by Derrida into an identity, possibly because
Derrida has lost the notion of self that underpins
Bataille s comment. To grasp what Bataille is driving at,
we must stop restricting ourselves to the either/or of the
major discourses [14).
We have our first instance of a successful communication
that is not the transmission of informat ion--the
communication between Bataille and Nietzsche. When Climacus
found himself cis God's potential interlocutor, he could not
continue the work he had begun. When Bataille finds
himself as Nietzsche, he realizes that he can be religious
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and then fail to be religious. Perhaps because he had a
mystical experience that he could reject, he believed that
closure did not have to be permanent. Bataille consciously
pushed forward into communication. Climacus wrote knowing
that he had never communicated
[ 15 ]
The connection to political work is central here. A
model is needed that transforms writing into communication.
Bataille leads the way by explicitly introducing an excess
that is at once non-myst ical
, non-r at ional
,
and amoral.
Kierkegaard is to discourse theory what Bataille is to
creative grapheme tizing of the body: namely, both are
hidden founders. if revolution occurs because of a reaction
by a great number of people to conditions under which they
can no longer live, and if the manner that these people
communicate their need to revolt is immediate but also
indirect (as reflection shows it must be)
,
then a theory is
required to frame the importance (or truth value) of the
possible contents of revolutionary discourse. Kierkegaard
precludes revolutionary communication because of the
parameters that enclose his traditional notion of discourse.
Either one speaks directly, precluding a revolution from
inferiority (the only kind that could have value for him) or
one speaks indirectly, in which case communication is
completely problematic. Bataille, not afraid of losing the
Christian soul which comes from a fragmented "self," or
indeed any closed self, is able to affirm the closure of
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self, because it can be exploded. m the sacrifice of the
soul, and then the unified self, Bataille erases a limit
Kierkegaard had imposed on himself. That Bataille can take
himself to communicate with his major influences (whereas
Kierkegaard could not) is due to the major difference
between the two, namely, for Bataille the closed self is
something that one can enter and then exit (although not
always at will). The exiting of the completely closed self
first makes its appearance in a writing of excess. it is
not an orderly transmission of information, and it is direct
only in a way that bursts the bounds of the rational
presentation of information.
Bataille is committed to his writing as a work of
excess
,
of the playful outrush of barely credible new
notions. in L 1 Experience Interieure
, he says that in order
to work, which includes being oneself
,
one "must cease
wanting to be everything" (Bataille {1954} p. 34). Ceasing
to so desire, however, he deems to be "most strange"
(Bataille {1954} p. 38). To cease in the desire of being
everything is requisite for work. The concepts of work,
sovereignty" and desire are related in interesting
ways—ways which have led some to wonder how Bataille can be
positioned among the political perspectives. (Such
positioning is far from idle speculation as some have put
Bataille right of center in fascist camp.) Marguerite Duras
asks questions in a 1957 interview which lead Bataille to
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discuss
explain
these concepts in their connectedness and to
indirectly, why he refuses to be positioned
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To be God, Bataille says, is to have wished the
worst "Etre Dieu c'est avoir voulu le pire" (Duras {1981}
p. 30)
.
He goes on to say that he no longer engages himself
politically for two reasons. The first is that he does not
feel responsible for the world; the second is that he has
no hope in this world: "Comme je n'ai aucun espoir dans ce
monde et que je vis dans le present je ne peux m'occuper de
ce qui commencera plus tard" (Duras {1981} p. 32). One
could say that Bataille is not a communist because of
sovereignty just like those theorists we had critiqued in
the first chapter! This would make of Bataille a fascist
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only if the sovereignty required a two-place relation:
either a person sovereign over person or a person sovereign
over body. These truncated notions of sovereignty force
Bataille onto the impossible political terrain of the
political theories canvassed in the first two chapters. But
his is a new sovereignty—one that accepts the critique of
capitalism, one that accepts class analysis, one that will
not force or even allow servitude and hence will not force
or even allow any "lordship." it is important to note that
the theory of communication that Bataille presents while
stepping beyond that of Kierkegaard does not completely
solve our problem.
Bataille notices that sovereign communications will
always be completely honest and as such refusing and making
nonsense of any "rights." Bataille notes that "in the
instant in which it occurs, communication presupposes the
sovereignty of the individuals communicating with each
other" (Bataille {1973} p. 171). Kierkegaard could only
communicate this way with God. Bataille can only be God
explicitly or make "the worst" into God. "A propos de
George Bataille," Duras says "Edwarda et Dirty sont Dieu.
Bataille nous le dit" (Duras {1981} p. 35). The worst, in
some sense, is Death but if humans are death (in
sovereignty) which lives a human life then the negativity of
man gives death a sense of being voluntary— that is death
would come from risks assumed without necessi ty--wi thout
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biological reason. And it would follow that if humans were
death then every thing done by humans, not just their dying,
would also be free and sovereign. But people fight and
work— they make a world that was not there before. if there
is freedom, there is only freedom in moments. if there is
death there is only death in moments. if there is
communication it can only occur in moments and between those
who are equal in sovereignty—unequal (read different) in
all else. in the end Bataille's philosophy has to include
not just death but class conflict and work. And the latter
two are necessary from time to time; the former necessary
only once. Another way to put this is that there is a
generative self found in the closure of inferiority and from
which communication comes but which does not speak itself in
any form recognizable in received language. There is a
necessity to the struggle over the means of production which
calls various of our selves to take part. "Winning" this
struggle is a victory; nevertheless winning this struggle
does not solve the problem of overcoming oppression. To
overcome oppression we must reclaim the human body and the
selves it either covers or elucidates.
Confiscated sovereignty, and bourgeois sovereignty, code
power into political structure. The sovereignty of
communication implodes and explodes this coding thereby
exhibiting itself as internally and externally subversive.
We must be able to communicate in order to be free—being
free win not show us communication because being f ree
cannot happen first. The temporal component tQ ,. spacing „ is
never chronologicai
. one cannot be free alone; one cannot
be free in relationships tainted by old sovereignties; one
cannot maintain the same communication over time and space.
One can, however, separate one's selves from the system
which binds. The creation and recreation of selves is thus
seen to be absolutely necessary to the process of
communication which process cannot be entirely textual for
reasons which must be apparent now or forever opaque.
Francis Marmande expresses it:
attitude de Bataille deborde toute analyse de type
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In short utterances that are totally honest, totally blank,
and totally impossible to paraphrase come about in excess
and can be received and understood only in a space free of
hierarchy a space that needs to be created and recreated
continuously even in the face of probable failure.
Bataille feels a compulsion to write, but like Climacus
refuses to comment on the source of the compulsion save
indirectly. He merely notes: "I cannot for an instant make
a difference between myself and those others with whom I
desire to communicate (Bataille {1954} p. 55). Bataille
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here dissolves the tension in Climacus between communication
and its impossibility with respect to those things which
most. Going to the extreme is not possible without
others: "each entity is incapable, I believe, of going
alone to the limit of existence. if he does, he drowns in a
'particular' which has no sense but for that person"
(Bataille {1954} p. 55). when the writer wants only to
succeed with the work, to make of the fiction a mere use
value, the results are revolting to the writer: "I had had
the desire, when writing, of being read, esteemed: this
memory has the same foul tint of comedy as does my whole
life (Bataille {1954} p. 82). One must transcend one's
authorship to communicate, as Kierkegaard already knew.
When we look at Kierkegaard's "own" words, as opposed to
those of the pseudonyms, the relationship between Bataille
and Kierkegaard becomes closer than we had previously
determined. Kierkegaard admits that the self is
encapsulated in the manner of the pseudonymous works. He
claims that a communication from an author must be "rendered
impossible and unendurable if the lines must be the very
words of the the producer, literally understood" (Climacus
{1968} p. 552)
.
Bataille explodes the "myth" of producer in
this sense. In "The Sorcerer's Apprentice" Bataille says
of art and science— "the two essential elements of
life" that their practitioners find "themselves rigorously
dissociated. The truth pursued by science is true provided
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that it be without meaning, and nothing has meaning unless
it be fiction" (Bataille (1985} p. 225). Turning either of
the two pursuits to action is politics. Many people, says
Bataille, only engage in these three aspects of life. Such
a life ceases to be a life, he continues, because "it is
nothing more than art, science or politics" (Bataille (1985}
p. 227),. TO go beyond this, communities need to keep their
myths alive throuqh rituals iinji,.,! , , . .y muais. Ritually lived myth reveals
nothing less than true being" (Bataille (1985) p. 232).
Writing requires selves that are not just our vessel
selves. Communicating requires loving our communities
enough to keep them alive through ritual. "A community that
does not carry out the ritual possession of its myths
possesses only a truth in decline" (Bataille {1985} p. 232).
Bataille
' s notion here is important to the work at hand
because it shows that groups constitute but also
reconstitute our selves. I differ from Bataille in that I
do not draw the distinction between myth and fiction in
terms of the kind or number of "author" but in terms of the
respective placing in the world of each event. I will use
this notion of myth--al though I gladly let go of the
word— to show how the "rewriting" of bodies through concrete
strategies is the work of communities. when this rewriting
is performed heteredemotically it is significant political
wor k .
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would think that work is that which causes sublatlon
of complete closure. But instead it is the desire for
significant communication (in various forms) with one or
more others that allows work to have any meaning. This
desire for communication makes us laugh. The laugh is the
explosion of boundary indicating that one no longer cares a
fig for the established conventional proprieties of
discourse behavior. it is the laughter that carries us
outward and allows the possibility of work in the
ext r asys temi c manner.
Bataille's work is a risk— a rush into extremity. The
eagerness for work, the impossibility of not working, can
seemingly be expressed in Hegelian categories. Nonetheless
there is a break with Hegel in the way that individuals are
said to relate to their work. Bataille cites two authors
who have gone to the extreme: Kierkegaard with respect to
Christianity; Dostoyevsky with respect to shame. He notes
that Hegel touched the extreme and then turned himself back
into "modern man" (Bataille {1954} p. 56). Hegel, in the
end, has a completely different attitude toward his work.
The point at which Hegel, philosophically, loses the deep
self is reached when he refuses a radical negativity [16]
.
Kierkegaard has the right attitude but the wrong subjects.
Bataille says: "The entire morality of laughter, of risk,
of the exaltation of virtues and strength is the spirit of
decision" (Bataille {1954}, p. 38). He shares Climacus'
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merriment over Hegel by laughing with him. Derrida remarks
this laughter: To laugh at philosophy (at Hegelianism)
henceforth calls for an entire 'discipline,' an entire
'method of mediation' that acknowledges the philosopher's
byways, understands his techniques, makes use of his
ruses,.. appropriates his texts" (Derrida (1978) p. 252).
Bataille is to Hegel as Climacus is to Hegel: they laugh
as they appropriate. But, Bataille is also laughing while
he appropriates from Climacus (17). But to laugh is itself
a form of self-sacrifice and other-sacrifice. Sarah had
already given up on herself and her possible child, through
laughter. After giving up and sacrificing her
possibilities, she is "blessed" with her son. Abraham
never gives up he is the man of faith— so his sacrifice has
to be in the world, and he never comprehends what happens to
him.
Laughter alone cannot move history. Multiple selves are
found by successively adding to Hegelian inwardized
exteriority a full although temporary closure. Still needed
is a way to produce movement from inside the closure since
it is inside closure that new selves are found. Laughter
alone cannot move world history— it cannot move even the
dialectic. It jars history, world history and the dialectic
as an examination of Bataille's addition to dialectics show.
What it achieves is a distance from the serious consequences
of system.
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Bataille discusses negativity as the sacrifice of the
self: "Sacrifice is the negation of the human through the
negation of objects" (Bataille (1955) p. 32). Hegel's
negativity is thus too strong since it sacrifices the most
sacred thing, communication (Bataille {1954} p. 96).
Bataille, thus agrees with Kierkegaard that the negation of
the negation is not a movement producing category but
instead an overly destructive one which can only result in
the death of what is significant. Climacus displaces the
negation of the negation with repetition. Repetition is the
living of eternity in moments of time. Hegel had repetition
up to a point but he had no explanation for how the
repeating of a thing could produce "change." Aufhebung is
too powerful to permit of repetition. Kierkegaard sees the
possibility of repetition. Bataille refines it further. He
brings the notion of paradox or logical deadlock into the
category of repetition. It is the moment of liberation when
the "I" is outside of me (Bataille {1954} p. 83). The
manner in which we get outside of ourselves is by
dramatizing the many selves we are. Bataille prescribes
acting out the selves that we are in the real world. By
contrast, Kierkegaard writes his selves and lives them only
vicariously. If text includes the world, once again, both
strategies would be incoherent [18]
.
Bataille tries to bring us out of the text by forcing
real life dramatization. Such dramatization is an excess in
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that it does not conform to a text that already makes sense.
Kierkegaard's pseudonyms are not excessive; they
instantiate texts that could be played out if the world were
different. The world is not different. Climacus finds
solace of a kind in repetition which is for him "at bottom
an expression of immanence, so that persistence in despair
gives possession of the self" (Climacus {1968} p. 235).
Likewise for Bataille anguish relates to ourselves. Anguish
is said to be caused by the non-sens of human experience
which has no cure. This anguish, however, is that which
shows us ourselves. When we pass from knowledge to
non-savoir we come to possess new truths through increasing
intensity. And the world is to be made different.
To increase the intensity of pure experience, one goes
through the following procedure. First one glimpses the
extreme of knowledge by mimicking the stance of having
attained absolute knowledge. At this point one learns that
one knows nothing by knowing that one has deceived oneself
with this desire. This predicament leads to the anguish
discussed by Bataille (and which had been noted earlier by
Ant i-Cl imacus and Haufniensis)
. The anguish presupposes the
desire to communicate--that is, one desires to lose the self
for, to and with another. One wishes to work in the sense
described above, one want to communicate with one's
community or group; and, one sees that this desire is
greater than the shadow desires of rationality. Now one may
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begin the process finding again the desire to be everything.
one can fall prey once more to Rationality.
Alternatively one may fall into sickness. For Bataille
sickness consists in making of one's experience a project
(Bataille (1954), pp. 66-69). The interior experience
becomes the contrary of action and nothing more. interior
experience is but thought (Bataille (1954), p. 59
,
.
Nonetheless, despite leaving the interior experience, the
principle of interior experience is "to leave through a
project the domain of the project" (Bataille, {1954), p.
60) . Freedom for the self comes only when one has left the
free discourse of thought for thinking action.
Communication is thus possible only when one leaves oneself
(Bataille, {1954}, p. 88 ). And to leave oneself one had
first to know that one could leave oneself by having a self
to leave—by being a self that was closed. Communication is
not to be found in the projects by which one leaves closure
but in the explosion out of system that reinforces what one
has dared to posit: that life need not be anything like it
IS. Experience can be impossible experience. Bataille
makes of all the ways to "fill" the closure by exiting the
same equally hypothetical therefore equally real. The
desire to communicate, once recognized as a human desire can
be put to work in the world as subject.
This particular rupture from system is important for two
reasons. First, the encapsulated inwardized exteriority
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Which is self-consciousness in Hegel is thus seen to have a
non- theological solution. Kierkegaard's solution reaches a
stasis not unlike Hegel's. Bataille's laughter bursts the
bounds of the metaphysical cage of both the problem and the
solutions
. The voices that are outside of the inward
struggle are no longer seen as necessarily silent or extra.
The voices which have not been taken seriously because they
have not been believed in, because they are fantasy voices,
can now enter real discourse—not by changing themselves but
by showing that they never were hypothetical. Bataille does
not merely recognize others; he hears them.
Climacus and Bataille both expose flaws in Hegel's
search for selfhood. They show that Hegel allows no space
for individuals due to his negation of the self's autonomous
existence. Bataille in turn shows the flaw in Kierkegaard's
search for selfhood by showing the basis of Kierkegaard's
failure to account for the social nature of the self.
Hegel expands the self to include everything, losing
individuality. Kierkegaard empties the self of everything
but the self, losing the world. Bataille gives us an
economy that saves both extremes. Because his is a more
complete world, Bataille can say and act on what
Kierkegaard and Hegel can only say; "War is worse than the
private journey" (Bataille, {1954}, p. 58).
We can now evaluate various strategies for finding
selves. Hegel tries to find self through the double
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reflection of self to self. One only knows oneself by
recognizing oneself in an other. One is oneself only by
assimilating the self that is outside of oneself. However,
the negation of the negation destroys the inwardness that
Climacus regards as necessary to achieving selfhood. For
Climacus, the writer is the indirect expositor of doubly
reflected thought. The reader is the possible but
improbable recipient of the doubly reflected communication.
Climacus believes that conflicts can never be transcended or
negated in any manner than can be shared (see Climacus
{1968} pp. 246-7 and 235). Thus the self is closed off.
There can be no direct communication between spiritual
beings (Climacus {1968} pp. 218-19).
Bataille finds selves in a dialectic of self and other.
A self may close to the exterior, and find an awareness that
this closure allows. This stage is reminiscent of
Kierkegaard's inwardness. But the self can transform itself
in its isolation and then reverse its closure, revealing
what it has become. It must burst forth, shattering its
closure, and attempting to overwhelm other open selves.
One projects and appropriates the surround with a novel
strategy. Hegel's self is already in tune with its
surround; it only needs to recognize that. Bataille's
joyful self desires to overflow, to overwhelm; it needs to
transform its surround. I have interpreted Climacus as a
Hegelian who disagrees with Hegel only in that he wants
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autonomy for the self. I have interpreted Bataille as a
Hegel ian/Kier kegaardi an who endorses Climacus' disagreement
with Hegel, but is not content to accept interiorized
inwardness as a final, stable state. Bataille is desirous
of bringing back a space for communication between selves
and a possibility for action in the outer world. Thus I see
these writers as having engaged in a dialectical discourse
toward a world view which allows a total range of human
experience. in fact, they have made possible a groundwork
for novel communication by giving us subjects who are
capable of finding possible voices from the interior.
The MHB Dialectic
My aim has been to find a conception of self which
conforms to a possible human experience and which is
consistent with real communication within many discourses.
I have suggested that once found, the communicating self can
be the groundwork for a democratic theory that implies an
actual practice. Such a practice will involve both a
strategy and an identification process which are jointly
necessary yet separate strands of coherent political
practice. Before turning to Chapter Four where the new self
will be made more concrete as a ground for political theory
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and action, a systematic account of our conception of self
at this point seems appropriate.
I began by accepting the philosophical tension that the
self is derived from others. This self is not necessarily
defined exclusively in terms of the obvious others of our
civilization. That is, the self is not defined in terms of
the others who make up the conventional network of the
state, and is not defined exclusively in terms of such
struggles as that between Bourgeoisie and Proletariat. The
vessel self will be related to many different groups (in
typical cases)
,
and each of these relations may involve a
self. Theory should not suppose that all of these
relationships are consistent, or that there is ultimately
only one self (say a Bourgeois self) which constitutes the
individual in a fixed social network. The consequence of
this approach is that self-interest is group-interest
although one's groups' interests need not necessarily reduce
to class interest. Group interest may on occasion be class
interest. Group interest is primary for analysis but not
necessarily more important in terms of political strategy or
social identification. That self-interest is group interest
seems to expose a deeper level of analysis: the self formed
through others remains a self only insofar as it
continues to be experienced through others. The variety
of these experiences can in principle cause new
selves to form. The vessel selves represents the
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Physical location of self in possible transformation but the
vessel self has no significant content. From time to time,
the formation of a new self may involve the sacrifice of an
self, its deliberate, although sometimes unavoidable,
destruction. That the vessel self always remains is a
reminder of its vacuity.
It is in the interest of the bureaucrats of the state
for the self to be unable to recognize itself as matter
waiting to be reformed as a part of another group. State
interest is best served by ready-made, stable, controllable
and predictable selves that fit neatly into groups or
classes. Theories that posit one self, or no self at all,
play into the ideological hands of authoritarian structures.
Kierkegaard had no interest in the state; and no interest
in community after the one thwarted desire. One finds
Descartes earlier in time trying to concentrate, shivering
m an oven gone cold. Isolated extra-systemic selves seem
to offer revolutionary and revolutionizing possibilities.
Descartes tries to reassimilate self to system, but needs
his Demon to do so; and, Kierkegaard lives through his
isolation by parading a closetful of selves. An
e x t r a—sy s t emi c self and its array of selves has peculiar
psychology and peculiar development— this is the content of
this paragraph. The isolated selves of philosophical
history have held out a revolutionary potential that their
commentators have usually ruthlessly pruned away. Descartes
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is a convenient reminder that Kierkegaard does not stand
alone in this respect.
The self as information is no self. The task is to
p eserve the revolutionary moment, the moment that flashes
through isolation. Descartes' collection of ideas must keep
reassuring itself that it is there. Kierkegaard redeemed the
self as oneself, but once having found it lost it again;
the self could not exit as itself. One could leap into a
different self in one's interior but once the inner is
established one is trapped. Bataille allows us to exit the
interior because he has no teleology toward the "best" kind
of self and because he is not constrained by a prudential
conception of communication. Bataille finds the inner self
explicitly only in moments of madness or in death. My
arguments in Chapter Four show that madness and death are
not the only possible departure points from the interior and
that Bataille's release can be completed in a coherent
notion of political action [19]
.
The "self" I will use, and to which I will be referring
henceforth when I write "self," has two moments. The first
is that the self is defined in terms of others not merely in
the Hegelian sense of recognizing ourselves in others, but
in the sense that genuine others communicate with us,
helping some one of our selves to self consciousness. The
second is that the self formed in terms of others is not the
entire self. The self can close in self-development and
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decision— the decision equivalent with freedom and madness.
The self is Hegelian/Marxian in that it is necessarily
social; it is Kierkegaardian in that moments of individual
closure are not overlooked; and, it is Bataillian in that
it allows madness and death as valid forms of human
express ion—no t as something extra-human. it is the self of
the MHB dialectic in that it is the most comprehensive
conception of self possible. Nothing in the account thus
far excludes laughter, madness, death, desire; and this
conception is possible because it is contained in an
intelligible MHB dialectic. The definition of self here
makes it impossible for anyone to ask of it "What is its
identity through time?"
If we are to have a self capable of communication we
must reject the dominant ideologies; the self cannot be
seen as sovereign with respect to itself, nor can it be seen
only as its information. For communication to be possible
the selves must be selves that are constructed towards
action and communication in concrete situations. There are
many types of self, some of which will be seen to be
se lf~9ener ating
. Vessel selves are not self-gener at ing
;
they are the site of the generation of communicating selves
through the dialectic of closure and dialectic release.
Ant i-Cl imacus and Bataille saw that there was pain
(anguish) at the moment of decision—Bataille describes the
anguish as sacrificial and always mad. The structural
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reason for the pain, the madness and the sacrificial nature
of this moment is that in decision one has given up
membership in some group before allowing oneself to be
formed by another group. The moment of decision is
solitary, and this is the basis for its literal insanity.
The reformation process can be solitary, but it suggests the
possibility of communication with others. Climacus and
Bataille failed to see this logical extension of their
views. We do not find in their work the full explanation
for movement [20]
.
Bataille threatens a reversion to essentialism in the
explanation of action by vacuously tying movement to the
desire to be with others. This desire, for Bataille, is the
thing which makes us human. The desire, however, should be
correctly identified as only a structural marker—each
desiring as distinct and possibly as "unknowable" as each
unconscious. The structural marker, that which enables us
to find the two complete strands of a dialectic that
includes inner and outer, is the desire to communicate which
comes to us from attempts at descriptions of self. The
desire to coalesce as a group is so strong that it carries
over into indirect discourses and major communications as
sovereignty but its translation as sovereignty is false.
The isolation of decision cannot be spoken anymore than the
unconscious can be spoken. It can be sovereign no more than
the unconscious can be sovereign. What Bataille calls
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"sovereign" I would call simply extra-systemic. To mount a
critique of the moment of decision as a sovereign moment, we
must first outline the theory of sovereignty as
communication
.
We have seen Bataille criticizing Hegel's supposition
that negation "move" every operation in the system. This
requirement seems to guarantee that there will always be
another negation. Breaking the chain of negation is
accomplished by the sovereign autonomous refusal of the next
step. if the refusal is autonomous, out of the desire to be
with others and not out of the desire to be alone in
interiority, the result will be a major communication. This
exit had not been seen by Hegel or Kierkegaard. Bataille's
laughter at Hegel is sovereign (anti-systemic) precisely
because it bursts the bounds of the master/slave dialectic.
Laughing at Hegel is complicated. Genuine laughter
presupposes that one has taken Hegel seriously and that one
knows what one is laughing at. Hegelian discourse is
dislocated by laughter because impossibility enters into
mediation. So laughter mediates the necessity of
impossibility, and forces the second laughter, which laughs
at itself. Laughter is not a Hegelian negation because the
preservation involved in sublation is absent: laughter is
an exit from the chain of negations. We find what Bataille
would laugh at in these passages:
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And it is only through staking one's life thatfreedom is won; only thus is it proved that forelf consciousness, its essential being is not(Dus ) being;.. The individual who has not risked his
wel 1 be recognized as a person but he has
the truth of this recognition as anndependent self-consciousness.
. .This trial by death
from ?f
aY
K
lth thS truth which was supposed to issueit... having a mind of one's own is a freedomwhich is still enmeshed in servitude. (Hegel (1977}paragraphs 187, 188, 196)
Communication" here requires beings who have put their
being at stake have placed it at death. Here is a joyless
sacrifice," a slavish dependency on structure a failure to
communicate. Death is not the negation of negation— it is
nothing—and so nothing is preserved [21]. Communication,
in this new sense, is to talking what dreaming is to the
dreamwork. Every communication will be a projection to one
or more others of the sacrifice of one self to the selves of
expression. One can communicate politics to others in
moments in the world but one can only say as part of a
rational narrative something like "then we decided to adopt
the second plan." One almost wants to say that if a
political strategy can be explicated in a clear fashion, it
is because it has failed. It is tempting to agree with
Bataille that "the chances for a working class revolution, a
liberating subversion of society, disappear to the extent
that revolutionary possibilities are affirmed" [22]
.
This
could be explained by the psychoanalytic theory that
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negation is affirmation when the subject in analysis speaks.
Even in analysis the third term is the trouble-giving
one. Negation in the subject's discourse signals a
repression by the subject to the analyst. The negated
content is what is really being expressed. However,
defeating the negation by showing the subject that the
content of the repression can be accepted, does not result
in ridding the subject of the repression. In "Negation"
Freud says "we succeed in defeating the negation too and in
establishing a complete intellectual acceptance of what is
repressed—but the repression itself is still not removed"
(Freud { 1925} p. 182) [23]
.
When we are free from the chain of negations of world
history but not simultaneously thrown into senselessness,
communication is possible. When actualized this
communication is potentially "scientific" because it can be
outside the realm of stable discourses and predictable
oppressions. Nothing is guaranteed at this point—as the
intrusion of psychoanalytic theory above shows. The
communication which will result from an exiting of this
interior is made possible by the conceptions of selves we
found in unraveling the MHB dialectic. This possible
communication will be one of selves grouping together
outside the major either/or of already existing imperial
discourse. Only these selves and this communication
facilitate democracy.
Notes to Chapter Three
1* Th at Kierkegaard may be the first discourse theoristwas suggested to me by Bob Ackermann.
.JVt farther (structural) link is that like Kierkegaard
l ^
aill
!f ?Grrida is obsessed with the third term
r.,- „^
egGllai
?.
dlalectlc * At one point Aufhebung is calledDiscourse itself (Derrida {1978} p. 259) .“"Aufhebung meanssublimation and suppression, it is the process whereby
something is simultaneously destroyed and preserved.Negation is the movement producing category within
Aufhebung
. Hegelian negation is used in every operation of
every dialeetical progression. The operation which obsesses
our philosophers is the abstract negation of the negation
which is death
,
and which, according to some, makes thoughtitself possible. To think involves separation and death andto live is to think. A confusion of thought and action is apermanent consequence.
3. One cannot find Kierkegaard's voice— in this sense
he "out-Nietzsches Nietzsche." Climacus' is but one
relationship between texts: the written text and the texts
®f Climacian Christianity. There is a Climacian voice and
it is one that cannot be taken up into dialectics precisely
because it is its own dialectic. "Kierkegaard" orchestrates
but it is an orchestration so mechanical and passive it
cannot be recaptured by the reader except to note that
Kierkegaard as vessel allowed his Climacian self to take
over the old self.
Arguments exist in the literature (nicely exposited by
Jon Els te r recently (see Elster {1987} pp. 1-34) that
sentences like the last one I've written prove that there is
but one self—why else would I refer to the Kierkegaard who
orchestrates Climacus (supposed to be a new self) or the
Kierkegaard who allows old selves to die. My response is
that these arguments take place within the two discourses I
have critiqued in previous pages and cannot take into
account the material force of the Kierkegaardian experiment
due to the limitations those discourses impose. The
Kierkegaard we hold in existence to point to as unity in the
world is the most insignificant portion of his existence:
the conceptual shell that allows us to talk of him. His
works, their autonomy, attest to this. A work (or action)
that comes from a new self will not be subject to dialectics
from outside of itself which again does not mean that it has
no creator (or agent).
k
i
Taylor has a sked why I focus so much on spacewhen Derrida s concept clearly encompasses space andtime- indeed, the historical aspect of "spacing" is erased
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if the component of temporality is ovprlnnko^ •
concept of spacing involves both a temporal fnd a ?
appropriated*
ltS name
:
The name ^ undoubtedly
“
ropriate because spacing, as noticed by Kierkeqaard isprimarily spatial, and in this sense Derrida’s enfh
Derrida"s
be
^
qarded as the completion of a concept.
(historir.n^h315 on temporality is related to his
oriafnQ 1 observations about the inaccessibility ofgi s m my view, Kierkegaard saw these problems butcould not articulate them, because he was obsessed by the
cannot
1
occir
Y
m°
f
k
dlreCt comraunication—tha t communication
here caotSrPd h
30 lnaccessible origin. Kierkegaard is
thp -
bY a conventional notion of communication ase transmission of information. Derrida, who has noproblem with a notion of communication, and writes in hisown name signing and copyrighting his texts, can expresstemporaiiby and articulate a more complex notion of spacing.
an./comm
5
"^ sJ and Bataille's) difficulties with temporalityd unication are also coded in "repetition" and themoment."
„. 11
Spacin9 is always in the text for Derrida (see "PaperUlLage, Paper Selves" ) . Spacing is a spatial blockage inthe text for Kierkegaard and Bataille, a blockage that
requires either an irrational leap or an explosion for itstemporal resolution. My democratic project is dependent onthe apparently "arrested" notion of Kierkegaard.
5.
It is unclear whether Climacus or Kierkegaard is he
who must be anti-Hegelian— if the choice must be made. To
make sense of many commentators one has to make numerous
equations which from the outset are false: Climacus equals
Kierkegaard; Anti-Cl imacus equals Climacus; Kierkegaard
equals Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard makes the Hegelian
observation that Kierkegaard never really equals
Kierkegaard. Would it not be much better for us if we had
one name for the Hegel who wrote the Phenomenology and
another one for the Hegel who wrote the Philosophy of Right?
Don't we say in any case "According to that Hegel..
T
1’5'?
6. Bataille reformulates the proper criticism of Hegel.
Hegel is wrong to want to ]ae everything; he is not wrong in
wanting to know everything. See the analysis of Bataille
which follows.
7. Some might call the need to create personae while
maintaining a "shut-up" secret and "real" self, a symptom of
insanity. R. D. Laing informs his readers that he solicited
diagnoses of schizophrenic from his psychoanalyzing
colleagues with respect to Hegel and Kierkegaard. Of
Kierkegaard it was said that he was: "A very good example
of early nineteenth-century schizoid psychopathology;" and,
an analyst said that he "certainly would" diagnose "Hegel as
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schizophrenic" (Lainq flQRR) r-,^ i o j , _
Laing concurs somewhat in the^p’rii
2 a °d 13 * Inter es t ingly
sSriia^ sLsr-s1iiH
oossihiT^rf; •?„ thls/ ct ' he draws on his own psychoticp ibilities without forgoing his sanity" (Laing (I960! d
Kierkegaard^” "Schi-oh^" 6 SUCh P^stici ty-4y r eadlng'
'
j\i x
. Schizophrenia cannot be understood without-understanding despair. See especially Kierkegaard £he
Illness Unt^ D^th (1954); Binswange?. 'The Tase of^fllen
nlloA ,ri8). 7 Farber ' "The therapeutic despair'
q h n f —
(L
?
9
.
{I960} p. 39). The category of
to Tntf It Kier kegaar dian and is one that leads Lainghis otion that schizophrenics should be treated
j^l OUS^ < Lain9 {19 54} p. 76). That Laing valuesschizophrenia in some forms is well known. The notion ofbeing able to take on" plasticity without foregoing sanityis very important to what follows. y Y
8.
See Climacus {1968} p. 329. Here it must beKierkegaard who admits the possibility that Socrates'
experiment in subjectivity be Christian and therebyindicative of a real subject. There is no question butthat Kierkegaard's cultural chauvinism is repulsive Ithink it would be wrong to let this provincial aspect of his
work keep us from appreciating Climacus' attempt to overcome
what is unacceptable in the external.
9. Two pictures of Kierkegaard help us understand the
completeness with which he turns himself away from the outer
world. One is that of Soren as a young boy with his father.They are pacing (again) up and down on a living room rug as
1 ^ they were strolling outside. They comment on the
weather and the goods displayed in shop windows. And theloneliness of his life after the break with Regina, an
intensified loneliness which is a repetition of the earlier.
10. It is significant to note the relationship between
Hegel, Kierkegaard and Marx here. I argued in the previous
chapter that Marx shared key concepts with Hegel and that
his dialectics does not turn material at the level of
self/communication. Kierkegaard goes beyond a Marxian
critique because he goes the "other way" with the self and
communication. So what we have as positive is a Hegelianism
turned right side up with respect to State and history in
Marx and a self actually internalized in Kierkegaard.
11. See the kangaroo aphorism in Either/Or
,
vol. I,
ed., Victor Eremita, trans.
,
Swenson and Swenson (Princeton
University Press: Princeton, 1959), p. 37.
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pathological
provoking
.
aposes the
a way that theecadent is not immediately o 1 l u Wther.) Westphal says: Y P esumed to be superior to the
superior
n
to
S
a
C
barbaric
1
s
lneV
i
tablY think ifc self
orderliness that contrasK^^i f° r ^ enj°ys an
tumultuous anarchv • *. PP y with the latter's
Socratic gadfly Kitrtal' olence * Ever the
self-evidence of"ard challenges the
insists
, the barbaMr
superiority. After all, he
a partial relation to th^v^ has , at leas t retained
society, beneath its
wh
!
le the decadent
lost contact with' tL * \° f clvilization, has
but
Khomeini. (Westphal {1987} p. 48)
Y llah
13. See Bataille {1954 } D t<- ic •
K
communication"!! t"the
C
po in ^fprobLm ofRa). . n 7 n ac n t of Kier kegaardian desoairBataille s awareness can be coupled with the flVt Ill*, u
is
14.
that
An example of work that stands outside of either/or
selves at'
°e eU2e *"d Guattari. m considering the
said to attHhnt°
C
t
lettec -wr iting of Kafka who is
Dhanf-nm" h
b
•
° the P°St " the vampirish revenge of thep nto because it reintroduces "the ghostly elementbetween people" (Deleuze and Guattari {1986}
Y
p. 30)Deleuze and Guattari ask:
But how do the letters function? Without a doubt,because of their genre, they maintain the duality ofthe two subjects: for the moment, let usdistinguish a subject of enunciation as the form ofexpression that writes the letter, and a
subject of the statement that is the form of
content that the letter is speaking about(even if i speak about me). it is this duality that
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Kafka wants to put to a perverse or diabolical uspinstead ° f the subject of enunciation usingtter to recount his own situation, it is thesubject of the statement that will take on a whni
superficial" r?
S
^°me fi ° tive ° r n ° more thSnrficial.
.. [m "The Verdict"], which resolvesentirely around the theme of letters, portrays theu ject of enunciation who remains in the paternalstore and the Russian friend who is not only an
n
d
u
dre
,
sse ® but a potential subject of the statementa d who does not exist perhaps outside the letters.(Deleuze and Guattari {1986} pp. 30, 31)
15. Like the objects of Kafka's letters, Climacus thecommunicator takes a literary form. He becomesypo etical. Consequently it became easy to think that the
an°exper iencpHf "W ^any-that is, that it wasience for the domain of fictional and/or dead
che
r
u
C
5
er/geniU
u
eS * Grave voices. The avant-garde as false
The
C
nnW°PSr e W° rkingS out of Jesus/Lenin complexes.Point, of course, is that it is imperative that there bean objective and a subjective difference between being aconceptual artist and a revolutionary which difference isnot only ontological but also epistemologically verifiable.
In order to have a theory which will serve as a
springboard for political action we will have to be able todistinguish real real from fictive real.
16. Derrida expresses the point of contact as follows:
The blind spot of Hegelianism, around which can be
organized the representation of meaning, is the
P° int at which destruction, suppression, death and
sacrifice constitute so irreversible an expenditure,
so radical a negativity —here we would have to say
an expenditure and a negativity without
reser ve--that they can no longer be determined as
negativity in a process or system... Now Bataille
does not take the negative ser iously
. . . In
his discourse he must mark the point of no return of
destruction, the instance of an expenditure without
reserve which no longer leaves us the resources with
which to think of this expenditure as negativity.
(Derrida {1978} p. 259)
My reading shows
expenditure very
for being grave.
Bataille and Kierkegaard
seriously. The laughter
to take the
is no less riotous
17.
Bataille offers an explanation for accepting the
laughable. He cites Nietzsche: "Regard as false whatever
has never been laughed at!" (Bataille {1954} p. 96).
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1S important to note here that theBataille/Kier kegaar d point is not structurally similNietzsche s notion of discipline and making oneself
revaluation of values. Nietzsche seems to desire un
some kind particularly in The Will to Power. This dgone in Bataille/Kierkegaard. Bataille thought thatNietzsche had already given up on unity of this kind
counts here is that selves, whether by Bataille, NieKierkegaard or some combination of the three's work,freed from the confining aim of coincidence with the
a vessel human.
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"16 relationsh ip between our ability to communicatepolitically and our ability to know are intricately related.Foucault tries to enter politics via epistemology. in some
sense this entrance is more Kie r kegaar dian than what I amdoing. Which ever way we go: discourse or knowledge, the
self is primary: "Perhaps ours is an era of a politics ofdocumentation, secrecy, and individuality which has made
subjectivity our basic problem--our modern problem as
political intellectuals" (Rajchman {1985} p. 12).
20. See an attempt in "Popular Front in the Street,"(Bataille {1985} pp. 161-168). Here several points are
made; the most important for us being that political action
must be fluid in every aspect but its anti-fascist one.
21* Is whispering nothing?
Is leaning cheek to cheek? is meeting noses?
Kissing with inside lip? stopping the career
Of laughter with a sigh?— a note infallible
Of breaking honesty—horsing foot on foot?
Skulking in corners? wishing clocks more swift?
Hours, minutes? noon, midnight? and all eyes
Blind with pain and web but theirs, theirs only,
That would unseen be wicked? Is this nothing?
Why, then the world
The covering sky is
My wife is nothing;
nothings
,
If this be nothing.
I, ii, 285-97)
and all that's in't is nothing;
nothing; Bohemia nothing;
nor nothing have these
(The Winter's Tale,
22. "The Psychological Structure of Fascism," in
Bataille {1985} p. 159.
23. An interesting use of negation on Freud's part
occurs at the end of the essay where he says: There is no
stronger evidence that we have been successful in uncovering
the unconscious than when the patient reacts with the words
'I didn't think that' or 'I never thought of that'" (Freud
{1925} p. 185) . "The same process
at the root of the familiar supersdangerous. 'How lovely that I've
headaches for such a long time!'
first announcement of a new attack
patient is already aware
, though hbelieve it" (Freud {1925} p. 182)
f
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CHAPTER IV
MAKING HETERODEMOTIC GROUPS THROUGH
CONCRETE DEMOGENIC STRATEGIES
I have attempted to articulate a self which is not the
self of the traditional democratic theories, and I have
projected a potential for communication which is not the
mere power-brokering of pre-fixed selves. My aim has been
to develop an account of communication which helps explain
democratic strategies and which might serve as groundwork
for a new theory of socio-political strategy. Our
discussion in Chapter Three shows that to act demogenically
is to be external to existing theoretical discussion. To
notice and understand something not constrained by the
channels of existing conversational or theoretical
communication is to break away from one's vessel self.
Because democracy and communication are so inextricably
linked in theorizing through the notion of the self that is
presupposed, many theorists have focused on political models
that are language oriented. Some theorists refer back to
other times for a more pure or innocent form of speech or
writing. Others attempt theoretical restriction of
potential communication: to graphematic structures, to
laughter, to "female" or to "male" voices, and others. The
critiques which force the various theoretical reactions
claim to be liberating and anti-reductionist, and yet, the
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proposed "solutions" find monolithic: groups, reducing
critique once again to the implicit authoritarianism of
established democratic theories.
Solutions to problems should be more metaphysically
adequate to the problems that gave rise to them. Broadly
speaking, the problem for potential demogenic actors is to
exit from existing systems or monolithic groups. Every
strategy in exiting a system is a political strategy and a
form of communication. Persons who are trapped in vessel
selves or firmly established strategies will not notice the
communications of these groups. it is not a case of many
being called but few chosen— it is a case wherein only some
can hear certain calls. Not every exit from system will be
a political strategy that demogenic actors would want to
affirm either politically or theoretically, but the
demogenic actor is attempting to listen with a third ear for
emerging demogenic discourse. Although the strategies
suggested by our new theory of self are diverse, they are
also open in that they are not reducible to fixed types that
can be specified in advance. The demogenic actor renounces
the notion that theory can encompass beforehand the possible
range of social changes and strategic responses.
The strategy of communication is a prescription to lose
faith in most existing categories and classifications of
selves, and to attempt the creation of new groups to handle
emergent new problems in the political environment. One
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cannot change categories at will. One can foster
environments wherein it becomes possible to articulate new
selves. New categories will replace those that one refuses:
there will be some measure of creativity in these
communications
.
That not all groups are authoritarian is a concrete
reason for exploring new possibilities. The selves that
make up new g r oups--gr oups that are not authoritarian—are
not freely chosen in any ordinary sense of "freely chosen."
To begin with, they do not exist as the agents of choice.
Material, social and political conditions all come into play
m calling forth demogenic activity. Selves are called
forth as new selves from a necessity that is triggered by
random movements in the political environment. This
necessity, however, is not analogous to the Kier kegaardian
leap although the structure of that leap helps our
explanation. The new selves come into being by incipient
communication—and not from any already existing need for
power or for realizing self-interest [1]. Another way to
put this is in the moment that the old self understands its
limitations with respect to what needs to be done in some
context, it begins to change into the new self. This
understanding can only come through a communication with
similarly changing selves whose activities at that moment
involve more than transferring information. There is no
paradox here because none of these selves need to be the
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originating center. Responding to an environmental change,
the changes in each individual would be at first too minute
to measure. It is the collective interchange that can raise
all the members of a group into awareness of new selves, and
new possibilities of action. Nor is this a miniature case
of achieving "class" consciousness because there is no
authority sending out necessary catalysts to the
understanding. it is the rejection of the old self through
an implicit and shared understanding that the old self must
be let go. The vessel self camouflages this event by
asserting the ideological discourse that formed it, and
trying to deceive the new self that it (the new self) does
not really exist. The vessel self can succeed in this on
occasion because the vessel self has no content, freeing it
to play endlessly with permutations in the already existent
discourse of power. The appeal of the vessel self is simply
to allow the old language of communication to retain its
authority, covering a revolutionary break by attempting to
assimilate it within the old grammar.
With a general understanding of communication and the
formation of new selves at our disposal, we can turn to some
general comments about kinds of strategies provoked by this
theory of the self and communication. The three general
strategic options I discuss in this chapter do not seem
reducible to one another, nor do they seem not to yield an
exhaustive list of possible strategic options. The
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incompleteness itself is a sign of possible theoretical
adequacy
.
The first two strategies, overcoming self-deception and
overcoming self-interests, seem to be involved in all
movements leading to the formation of new selves and new
groups. There are many groups that follow these first two
strategies, most of them small and all of them concerned
with new modes of expression. it is difficult to give
examples of these groups because many of them do not
endure--in fact, in the normal sense of the word "group"
they are not really groups. Evidence of them is found in the
explosion of group mass art in recent decades. That the
body has been rejected as the locus of individuation can be
deduced from observing new modes of dance, music, poster art
and even some performance art. Many of the new genres
require group interpretation to be genres—even works. The
locus of the art work is not in the activity of a single
working artist or in the properties of the work of art but
in the dialectical response of the group present. The
artwork and the artist lose their "bodies;" the process is
made completely material. The third strategy, overcoming
self-representation, does not seem to be necessary to group
f orma tion--in this it differs from the first two. Because
this last movement involves histories of vessel selves, it
can be continuous for some, unconscious or sporadic for
others
.
The discussion of
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self strategies" concerns politics
and not just tangentially. There are different kinds of
activities such that in some halls determining who is
performing is impossible while in others people watch other
people do exactly the same thing that they did for other
people in other halls the night before. Presses roll off
page after page of the same magazine and the same news
stories. Some activities such as these speak only to the
vessel self. Others allow selves to emerge as actors.
Vessel selves will not change systems because they cannot;
they facilitate the language into which they were originally
inserted. Vessel selves are created by the systemic
thinking embodied in the language of an originating
(unconscious) indoctrination. Groups of people constantly
break with the presuppositions of their vessel selves,
acting politically and spontaneously outside the constraints
of the language of power. This is an observable datum [2],
General Pr inciples Governing Group Formation
Two general principles govern the formation of
heterodemotic groups, but these principles aim at a
non-r educ t ionistic array of practices, or, as I have
referred to them, at new groups. The general principles
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that govern demogenic actors in the formation of
heterodemo tic groups and the carrying out of strategies are
these. First, no group can be formed that is based or
dependent on any form of hierarchy. The second principle is
that no strategy be chosen that is not an available
strategy. All strategies will depend on our ability to lose
reliance on existing categories and classifications as
exhausting the possibilities for political action. This
latter is not a principle because it is, so to speak, the
foundation of the non-universalizing principles I suggest.
That is, only in exercising the ability to lose reliance on
the old categories, can one set up a self-other relation
that seeks neither to dominate nor to be dominated. Put
this way one sees that one needs to develop one's
communications but that in so doing one needs neither to
invent them nor to r ediscover them--" tasks" that are
impossible. Rather, one needs to free oneself of the
contexts that recycle existing modes of authoritarian
behavior
.
As noted above, system-exiting strategies will always
be political strategies. One is trained, as the first three
chapters of this dissertation argue, to assimilate oneself
to given roles in precise and society-specific ways; one is
not trained to be external either to oneself or to one's
arrangements. To act demogenically in heterodemotic groups,
then, is to be (initially) fearful because the choice
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entails rejecting the given rails of social and ideological
self-definition. Dialectically, coherent political action
depends on escaping the rails of existing social action.
Societies free from rails of social definition do not exist,
nor will they ever exist. The strategies I will discuss in
sections two through four below involve overcoming and not
acceptance; the overcoming, however, is a continuous one.
Revolutionary theorists who hold the view that the
working class will revolt when it is aware of certain
contradictions forget that their own political choices have
a privileged status within that theory. That is, the
theorists' choices are not bound by necessity, since the
theorists' choices precede the time during which such a
choice would be a necessary one. The working class or
"underclass" population in this picture is not accorded
similar autonomy. Underclass choices are relegated to the
old Hegelian category of necessity. I am not advocating that
a false sense of autonomy be communicated to the
revolutionary class. I am arguing that communications be
offered within the framework of each individual's actual
autonomy
.
An explanation for our capacity in this respect is found
in psychoanalytical description of our rejection of some
aspect of the ideology formed by our primary grouping. That
a rejection of portions of the dominant ideology of one's
primary grouping is a basis for future psychological
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development is crucial in the psycho-politics I am putting
forward. The psychological possibilities for political
action begin to open or close in one's initial social
grouping—often in a family. The phenomenological marker
that shows us that we are capable of demogenics is the
reality that problems in groups are often solved
immediately—without long deliberations. This is not to say
that the immediacy does not come after some kind of work or
process. The immediacy, however, ought not be analysed as
stemming only from the work of the group, anymore than
psychoanalytic theory should remain within the domestic
walls. Psychoanalytic theory fails to become a political
theory when it is fixated on the family. Cooperation in
catastrophe is possible because of work which precedes the
immediate solution. Many theories analyse but the
groundwork and not that moment of immediacy in which new
selves are formed, solutions understood and groups either
dissolved or more strongly united. Not all political groups
are immediate in this sense but the foundation that makes
political grouping possible is the learned ability to
regroup as new selves.
Proof that we change from one self to another can be
found in the startling realization that the self we find
ourselves to be in while attending, for example, family
reunions may not be compatible with our current selves,
undercutting the presumed solidity and compass of the vessel
self
.
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Instead, we may slip into an old self as the old
constraints call to the self we no longer are. We even have
different bodies in these "returning" contexts—craving food
we no longer eat, feeling shorter or younger because in the
old context, that is what we were. Our voices may surprise
us by sounding out words we have neither heard nor thought
for years.
We can imagine the old self and its body as a form of
imprisonment. This image will have more or less force
depending on the initial strategy of the relevant
individual. By "initial strategy" I mean the first giving
up or sacrifice of an old self. A first fear of
politicizing inner experience might be that of being alone.
It is the old self however that mimics solitary confinement.
The old self is always "alone with its intricate image." To
overcome the fear accompanying the strict encasing in the
body of but a single self, one must explode the myth of the
same. Like other myths, once it is seen as a myth, the
evidence against it is abundant. (From psychology we have
the evidence that for example, the hysterical body does not
operate at all like the non-hyster ical body nor in some
cases does it even resemble the other. From science we have
the evidence that the matter of a human body changes
completely in cycles over time. From folklore we hear the
impossible feats performed by various bodies under stress.
From our personal histories we have the impossibly small
school 219yard, the disbelief that we were babies, the
sensation that we are not "all there " nr "u .mere, o too much there."
And, to complete thi=; i • r.partial list, how strange it can be to
read our old notes, or letters fnnr,rq, ound after an interval of
time, and written by an alien hand.)
To maintain a liberating component to system-exiting one
most find one of the many selves that one is, although
perhaps one that has not yet existed. One must reject the
notion that we have a single ego that takes on new
characteristics over time. One must develop a subtler
meta-psychology. if „e have but one self, we must
constantly fear choosing the wrong strategy. There is no
question that one of our selves is a systemic one. Ideology
tells us that there is just one self, insuring that we
"protect" that one self [3].
Choosing the wrong strategy as a unitary and solitary
entity is to risk making one's self project into an
irreversible horror. A demogenic strategy allows one to
abandon a failed strategy, and even the self that chose it.
One must learn to not only assess and weigh the preferences
and intentions of others but also to perceive and care for
their bodies. if mistakes are made, they can be abandoned
(not corrected)
.
The way we have learned to talk and think about bodies
and the preferences of individuals has led to an alienation
that is not necessary to any economic stage of development.
220Political strategies that code only preferences and
utilities favor calculation, and produce an authoritarian
disregard of individual differences and the kinds of feeling
that accompany those differences. But demogenic strategies
turn to the formation of heterodemotic groups that the
initial demogenic strategy serves as practice for. Our many
selves are reflections towards our many groups. And we are
alienated by the society that recognises only our most
trivial self, the vessel.
Before turning to the three proposals whose structural
markers indicate whether any possible concrete strategy is
in fact a demogenic one, I offer the two general principles
that govern group formation. One can test any political
strategy to determine if it is a strategy which will help
foster heterodemotic groups by testing it against these two
principles. Everything in my theorizing so far suggests
that the notion of general principles is anathema to both
demogenic strategy and heterodemotic grouping. These
principles are offered as guidelines to guard against the
worst abuses of power and are not considered to be necessary
universal laws. (I give an example of an exception to the
first principle below.) The first principle of concrete
demogenic strategy is that any strategy for concrete
demogenics must be a strategy against existing hierarchy and
authority that controls and "writes" the vessel self. The
second principle of concrete demogenic strategy which is
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coincidental to the first is that a strategy is demogenic
only if it is available as an option right now.
Demogenic strategies are not planned in advance
according to general principles. They generate and act out
specific principles in specific circumstances. One does not
plan to reject the values embodied by the practices of the
primary domicile. I hope to elucidate these principles in
this chapter by testing three concrete strategies against
them
.
The context for the three strategies discussed in this
chapter comes from reactions to the categories which now
form our selves. Bourgeois senses of the self are
conceptually untenable, as we established in the first two
chapters. There is no rational justification for our
believing that we are merely self-interested selves who
share information nor that we are Bourgeois selves nor
Proletarian selves nor Vanguard selves who fill certain
roles at some level of abstraction. People cannot truly
believe that they are merely one of these things. We must
"lose faith" in these selves and in all long-term
ideological selves. The three strategies I will discuss
are, as previously noted, (1) overcoming self-deception, (2)
overcoming self-interest and (3) overcoming
self-representation. These are not independent strategies.
For example, the first strategy is merely the negation of
older categories. Ironically it is the abstract negation of
older categories. it is impossible to make this strategy
result in concrete action without the involvement o£ other
strategies. The first strategy prepares us for leaving our
old self by a distancing mechanism. I would violate the
second principle (strategies must be available now) if i did
not arrange my material in this way. That concrete
strategies must be immediate brings them outside of a
discourse of purely universal principles. Because the
strategies are, in part, the working out of the content of
psychoanalytic work on our bodies, they cannot be done
without the recognition which comes in simultaneously
overcoming traditional philosophical analyses of self. But
none of the strategies are demogenic until they become tied
to a concrete situational plan of action. in other words,
the principles tell us only that the first two strategies
are preconditions for the formation of new groups, but are
by themselves too abstract to entail concrete action.
Overcoming self-interest, the second strategy to be
discussed below, is a novel form of self-analysis, leading
away from recovery of a past functionality, and towards
location of a new self. The third strategy (overcoming
self-representation) shows that demogenics is something that
happens again and again. Overcoming is not to be construed
in any absolute or irreversible sense. No overcoming in the
strategies about to discussed is permanent—nor could it be.
There are always new selves waiting to be called forth by
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new situations. Demogenic strategies recognize their
limitations; they do not master the environment, they
provide a way of finding coherent responses to new
s i tuat ions
.
Overcoming Self-deception
The logical deadlock represented by the suspension
between the either/or's of ideological indoctrination
becomes the impetus for concrete demogenic strategies. We
have examined the problems theorists have encountered
concerning what constitutes the social and what constitutes
the political. The problems which surround this issue are
extremely important for our strategies because ideology
presses an obligation to leave what is private and
established, private. In fact, the violation of this
prescription often produces an outcry indicating that some
action by the State, or some powerful group is felt by its
members to be seriously wrong. But the problem is not
merely moral outrage in terms of the ideological background.
There is an epistemological problem that is covered up by
moral outrage. The old "selves" are already supposed to
know what is social, political and private. They cannot
know these things in advance for all social settings. When
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uncertainty arises, it threatens the sense of
epistemological control, which, being ideological, cannot be
realized
.
Our attempt is to be outside of the either/or's which
exist in the non-heterodemot ic space, in such a way that we
are demogenic actors and can become increasingly concrete
demogenic actors. One way to put this is that less
hierarchical cultures would be ones where people felt (with
justification) that their subcultures were not
underground that is, where subcultures and undergrounds
were neither "sub" nor "under." The images we have
discussed have been vertical and horizontal. Information
theorists, particularly Lyotard, showed the most fluid and
horizon-less images of those we have encountered. These
theorists, nonetheless, ended up turning to talk of size and
relative value within an imagery that especially in its
utopian moment does not force such talk. Why has it seemed
necessary that picturing of ourselves be ranked? The
guestion either mainstream or underground?" is a question
asked from a position of power. There is a possibility of
refusing that discourse.
I am not callously suggesting that this is always the
case. Counterexamples abound of situations that do not
allow the strategy of being ext r asystemic even if one would
so choose. Principle one--that no group be formed or
strategy chosen that necessitates h ier ar chy--can be given up
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when principle two--that strategies must be available
now—overrides it. Thus it would be bizarre to suggest,
within this theory that women reject the individualism that
forces hierarchy with respect to issues concerning their
sovereignty over their own bodies. in that struggle there
is no currently available option that does not produce power
hierarchies right now. Specifically, the notion of
sovereignty over self is politically more enlightened than
any other available to the situations. Nevertheless it is
not an image that should be reproduced in cultural contexts.
There will be no freedom from the interest in domination
until the body as the locus of individuation is also given
up, but many groups will have to force many social changes
before the ideology of control of one's self can be
eradicated
.
In previous chapters, I pointed out various deceptions
about the self. Understanding these self-deceptions
systematically is important to seeing the necessity of the
tri-part strategy suggested above. There are two kinds of
self-deception that are supportive of an ideology of
control. Perhaps through a classification they may begin
to lose their force. These deceptions are fostered by
States, corporations, media and other entities who need to
maintain power in order to maintain themselves. These
deceptions are, first, that there is a self, contained by
one body, which prefers, aspires, believes, etc. The
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overriding feature of this self is theoretical unity: its
preferences and beliefs are all commensurable with one
another. The second deception is that this self cannot be
deceived with respect to its preferences. The existing
critiques often argue that this sketch of ideological self
is a distortion of a "true" or "natural" self, but these
critiques retain the root ideological principle of
individuation: one self per body.
I have argued that it is philosophically untenable to
suppose that there is such a thing as one self that is
attached to a single body and that it desires, prefers,
aspires, believes qua self and that this self is conceivable
as an identity over time. Every successful deception has an
element of truth and the one body/one self lie is underlined
by a truth, namely, that there is a desire for unity, and
that at any given time, a consistent voice seems the vehicle
of rationality. The desires of moments need not all be the
desires of the same self; what is needed is a clear
recognition of the formal vacuity of the vessel self. The
result of the strategy of overcoming self-deception is not
merely the overcoming of the one body/one self thesis. This
is not a political or social strategy but a philosophical
analysis. Once developed, however, this analysis spurs
strategies that refuse either/or's developed outside of the
heterodemotic group and that are not relevant distinctions
for it. Many support groups begin as sub-groups of larger
organizations, (formed to help deal with injustices within
the larger organization. Often such "sub-groups" realize
together that the problem is not that of assimilating to the
larger group but in leaving it. The sub-group serves a
valuable function of helping individuals leave churches,
civic groups, political groups and so on that offer them
"choices" that destroy their radical difference. The new
groups eventually may either dissolve or become new
organizations on larger scales. it is my contention that
this small grouping and breaking away is constitutive of
societal change. if Hegelian ideas become realized in
history
,
they do not exist prior to their realization.
The work of the first strategy is to overcome the desire
for extended unity in time. And of course the work can be
risky in many ways psychological, physical, etc.. if one
has been swayed to any extent by Bataille's work the
response to this request is to extend the shaking of
concepts to the entire discourse of ideology, thereby
remaining strategically consistent. When this is done,
however, the risk for concrete strategists is in the
suggestion that any strategy must be as good as any other
provided that the notion of the unified self is denied.
The resulting virtue would be tolerance and this virtue does
not leave "liberal" space behind. We can view other groups
merely as not assimilated, and the modern project of
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resolving differences in full communication still seems
viable
.
The desire for unity can be used much too easily. No
concrete heterodemotic strategy should exploit this need.
Instead, the concrete "1 = 1" of political life should be that
part of ourselves that satisfies concrete desires in group
affirmations that do not wish to define a group boundary,
and destroy what lies outside. The desire for unity can
lead to a new group assimilation that cancels the repugnance
felt by the former self in its abjection. Kant suggests
that when one knows that one cannot do the right thing
socially, one has an obligation to exit the social. What is
difficult for theorists to accept is the permanent
heterogeneity of the social. This state of affairs forces a
theory of political action that promises no homogeneous
endpoin t--eve n as a conceptual measure of progress that
theorists recognize will never be met.
There is a self-deception to be overcome and the
overcoming embraces and rejects unity of self. Striving for
full unity of self leads automatically to an authoritarian
personality. Structurally this is so because the vessel
self is deceived into pretending that it exhausts all the
possibilities of being one's self. There is a concrete
marker of the self to be overcome in this sense: of the
selves to be overcome the vessel self is the only self for
which solipsism is a real conceptual possibility. While the
solipsism which
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IS the logical result of believing in only
one self breeds a gross parody of self-sufficiency in its
atheist forms, the strategy under discussion leads to a felt
practice of caring and material universalizability that
cancels the possibility of solipsism.
The old self-sufficiency can be overcome in two ways.
First one can point out that unity is just one of the things
we may seem to be—one of the descriptions that correctly
describe us. That prolonged unity in a human implies
solipsism should show how great is the self-deception
involved in taking one unity as an ideal state. Students in
an introductory Philosophy course are often surprised at the
suggestion that the so-called solution by analogy to the
problem of other minds is plausible. One such student, Lisa
Nelson, pointed out in a classroom discussion that one can
be certain that other minds exist not because others are so
similar to oneself but because they are so different from
each other [ 4 ]
.
Overcoming Self-interest
The n
incoher en
examined
.
otion of a self who has no self-interest
t according to the democratic theories we
Questions from these perspectives might
i s
have
be
:
IIWho
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is the self who could perform this strategy?" "what self
would want to overcome self-interest?" and "why suppose,
within an anti-authoritarian theory, that people "want" what
they cannot consciously articulate as what they want?" i
will answer these questions from the new perspective. The
answer to the first question is that the self who sacrifices
the old self is the self who makes strategies without
self-interest. This answer comes from rearranging the work
of Climacus. The central portion of the rearrangement is to
secularize the notion of sacrifice thereby making it
specific [5]. The answer to the second question is the self
who struggles against the power source is the self who wants
to overcome self-interest. Finally the answer to the last
question is that there is work to be done in finding out
motivations to action; however, while there might be
general rules to help determine those motivations, there is
no elite, or vanguard, or avant-garde who can determine
those rules for anyone or for any other group. My theory
makes of everyone a member of the vanguard class. Not to be
in that class is not to belong to the group. The remainder
of this section contains the elaboration of these answers.
The Sacrifice of the Old Self
The psychological basis of the political actor working
out new self-interests is linked to a theory of
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communication that credits everyone with a vessel self and
potentially at least one other self. It is not of g reat
significance how many selves we are. it seems that
political actors are always at least two-the vessel and the
other selves. At times we are clearly three-, vessel self,
another self and an emergent self. The vessel self
communicates trivially with other vessel selves along the
pre-laid rails of ideological discourse. Demogenic selves
communicate with other demogenic selves and as they do,
groups are formed that allow changes to take place. I have
to two specific cases--group actions against State
and social passivity before AIDS, and the initial strategy
in the primary domicile. In neither of these cases is
already existing self-interest an issue; since the self that
could plan strategically is in the process of formation.
Conditions require that certain kinds of selves and bodies
exist. The communication of a political and social
compulsion is an issue that Kierkegaard addresses by telling
an old story in novel fashion.
Kierkegaard retells the story of his desire for and
subsequent sacrifice of Regina as if it were the Abraham
story. All the roles but one are played by Kierkegaard.
While Kierkegaard focuses on the inscrutability of Abraham's
exterior, this is a minor part of the canonized version.
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There
,
the story is an essentially social and political one.
Combining the two stories, Kierkegaard's and the other one,
shows how the MHB dialectic helps us see that self,
communication and the demogenic strategies under discussion
open possibilities for new selves. The MHB dialectic saves
concreteness from abstraction by being a thoroughly material
dialectic. The demogenic strategies of this chapter become
concrete as the old self is emptied out, the new creation
appears in the world, and the process begins anew. The
articulation of them appears abstractly because each
demogenic strategy must be based in an individual
overcoming: they take on their concreteness in unique forms
sharing only an abstract but not a defining structure.
In Kierkegaard's story Abraham is tired. He has done
his best and although his son has been restored, he has
misplaced something in a space so distant he despairs of
remembering what it was. in the instant during which one
realizes that one is capable of sacrifice one loses
something the nature of which is also undefinable. Issac is
the issue. It is, after all, his body that could have been
broken. His eyes are those that saw the father raise an
arm. Issac is he who had lived his life with the burden of
being a miracle--whose mother's first thought of him was
laughter. Kierkegaard sees what the original version
contains only very obliquely: the sacrifice is Abraham as
much as it is Issac. Since Issac is "saved," the only
sacrifice is the sacrificer.
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Abraham symbolizes power in the world. issac is given
the lines of the oppressed realizing that his difference is
not miraculous but a marker of oppression. Because he is a
miracle, he is singled out; his importance is negative and
nothing to do with him. He asks: My father, behold the
fire, and the wood: but where is the lamb for a burnt
offering? The victim deserves what he gets: given the
chance he would be over something less than himself, an
oppressor. Issac would have helped a different sacrifice.
To sacrifice is to risk being sacrificed.
To then blame this victim for what he would have done,
however, is to overlook the structure of the struggle.
Oppression is a tri-part relation: oppressor, oppressed,
source of power. The source of power is strongest when
abstract: one is powerful because of one's relationship
with God, with a class, with a race, with a gender. (Inner
strength is almost always attributed to an external power
source.) Abstraction is strongest because it cannot be
located for concrete attack, but it is also most easily
dissipated once it is located and the rails of habit are
torn up. I am not suggesting that class, race, gender are
mere abstractions; but that in their use as sources of
power they are appropriately used as abstractions. Issac is
the oppressed in this story; Abraham the oppressor; the
That there is no real agency involvedpower source is God.
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is seen by Issac's implicit willingness to perform the
sacrifice of the lamb. (In that case the power source would
be Abraham.) This story cannot be read in any reasonable
manner such that no trace of authoritarianism remain. it is
completely authoritarian. It is almost an archetype of
power struggle: brutal, pointless, forever. Kierkegaard,
however, manages to personalize these forces, to subjectify
the subject of Abraham and in doing so shows that
individuation to be worthy of the power source must for some
period of time or in some space be independent from the
power source. What is of importance to us is that
Kierkegaard envisioned human consciousness untied from any
power source and hence from the impetus to be either
dominated or to dominate.
Ideologies come to an end in time. To use power is to
gain the ability to sacrifice an other at the expense of
something else. I suggest that what is lost is the ability
to recoil from show of force. The lost ability occurs in
both oppressed and oppressor. The focus of show of force is
traditionally on that used by oppressor because it causes
most harm right now. If the ability is lost in oppressed,
however, the structure and systems which maintain hierarchy
will never wither away. They will merely take new forms of
oppression
.
Thus, in the articulation of concrete demogenic
strategies one must confront the concrete problem: how does
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one confront power without losing the ability to recoil from
show of force? Specifically, we must focus on the question
concerning the nature of a new paradigm for human
arrangement such that society might function justly without
the instantiation of the power categories which have
previously moved history.
The Self Who Struggles Against the Power Source
The aim for a more just arrangement of society will
require an overcoming of hierarchical structures; this in
turn requires people who can behave in non-hierarchical
ways. Our language makes it impossible to name a form of
state government that does not partake of the tri-part
arrangement of oppressed, oppressor and source of power. I
do not discuss concepts such as the withering of the state
because what is required is an analysis of transitions. (No
one knows other than transitions.) The question which
concerns me is "What would people have to be like for the
state to cease to have power?" The solution offered by a
society in which many groups struggle for power is not in
view. The triangle oppressor/oppressed/source of power will
not dissolve hierarchy in the appropriate sense if there is
merely a complexity, a diversity, of hierarchies. The
strategy in asking this question is to overcome
self-interest radically. We must replace what we lose
through "sacrifi
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Ce '" viz *' the ability to recoil from the
Show of force
,
by refusing the struggle toward
heterodemotics as a struggle toward any kind of rule.
Two recent books that appear to offer concrete political
strategies make use of the concept of the zero-sum game
which requires the notion of self-interest. These books
seem initially to explain phenomena in new, insightful
manners. The findings of the authors can be made more
helpful if we reanalyze their data from the new perspective.
Both books contain directions a politics of difference might
take. These theorists mention the zero-sum game in order to
suggest that political struggle is not to be patterned on
that model. But they fail to escape the essential self on
which the zero—sum game is predicated.
In Chapter One, we saw Lyotard suggest that a new
politics is needed: one that "would respect both the desire
for justice and the desire for the unknown" (Lyotard {1984}
p. 67) . The first step in this theory is to build a
language game wherein all information is shared. "But they
[language games] would also be non-zero-sum games, and by
virtue of that fact discussion would never risk fixating in
a position of minimax equilibrium because it has exhausted
its stakes" (Lyotard {1984} p. 67)
.
A zero-sum game is a
game in which there are two players whose preferences are
strictly competitive, which is to say that players A and B
are such that everything that A prefers, B does not prefer
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and everything that B prefers A does not prefer. Zero-sum
games are models whose efficacy as heuristic device
diminishes to nothing if one takes into account the
possibility of compromise, cooperation, coalition building
etc. Lyotard's passage can be interpreted as referring to
non-zero sum games here because he wishes to indicate that
(1) there are no political battles that have only two sides
and (2) political battles are never finished because of (1)
His call for a politics that addresses the complexities of
struggles beyond that of a model of two self-interested
groups or classes is answered by Mouffe and Laclau:
These conditions arise originally in the field of
what we have termed the 'democratic revolution', butthey are only maximized in all their deconstruc t ive
effects in the project for a radical democracy, or,
other words, in a form of politics which isfounded not upon dogmatic postulation of any
essence of the social'
,
but, on the contrary, on
affirmation of the contingency and ambiguity of
every antagonism. Affirmation of a 'ground' which
lives only by negating its fundamental character;
of an 'order' which exists only as a partial
limiting of disorder; of a 'meaning' which is
constructed only as excess and paradox in the face
of meaninglessness— in other words, the field of the
political as the space for a game which is never
'zero-sum', because the rules and the players are
never fully explicit. This game, which eludes the
concept, does at least have a name: hegemony.
(Laclau and Mouffe {1985} p. 193)
I insert these passages because what they stand for
seems to be a critique of late capitalism similar to my own
in moving toward a heterogeneous democracy of communication.
I find both rejections of the "zero-sum" model
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unsatisfactory in that the self remains trapped nonetheless
in the expression of its own interests. One rejects a
clear-cut struggle and then there are no explicit rules or
players. But there are types remaining without the benefit
of a typical game plan. From there one can quickly see
tactical problems for those players still explicitly
bounded. To affirm contingencies and ambiguities of every
antagonism is a game-plan for a strategy. However its
ground is what Laclau and Mouffe indicate that it is:
nothing
.
There is a root level need for affirming the zero-sum
game which is the ideologically defined mirror struggle
between the oppressed and the oppressor. By advocating a
system-exit from this either/or I neither believe, by
default, in chance, nor do I deny the existence of System.
To deny a system is to say that it is not there. To exit is
to exit from something. Thus, the vessel self finds that it
is constantly being called back into existence by theorists
who almost recognized the emptiness and inability to act of
the vessel self. There is a clear-cut struggle that can be
fought head-on by always using the two principles of
demogenics. If no struggle is entered, the vessel self
patiently waiting to be filled by content becomes sacrificed
to an oppressor instead of being overridden by an acting
self. More importantly in this context, if the strategy
embarked on is a strategy against existing hierarchy and
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authority that controis the vessel self, the strategy win
have an effect on that power source which is as difficult to
theorize as the moment of change in political action. The
rich and diverse cultures that surround non-ass imilable
forms of music are an example here. No future strategies are
promised; the manner of the culture's existence and its
recuperative powers necessitate making temporary
oppositional selves. These small cultures chip away at the
power source, most successful when they are unnoticed
because they are mistaken for variants of the power source.
The music that sings to vessel selves likes to think that it
encompasses all variations.
The game-theoretic models depend on conflating the
individual with the relevant vessel self. Vessel selves may
be locked into a struggle with the state that can be called
unrest. The state (or any power system) may assign a slot
into which one should fit, any deviation from the slot being
a precisely corresponding "loss" for the state. But the
"gain" for the vessel self is problematic. Game- theoretic
models have to be written from the point of view of power,
since that is where the assignments come from, and where the
"irrational" desire to "deviate" may be seen as a gain for
the vessel self because it is a loss from the perspective of
power. This zero-sum game is trivial; and so is any
reiterative form with respect to political action. In
changing selves, the game-theoretic theoretical embrace is
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broken. Rather than looking for an adequate game-theor e t ic
image, we simply set all images (the would-be archetypes)
aside. We are not playing games in social and political
action
.
The Paradox of Self-interest
That the theory emerging is against the notion of a
vanguard or an avant-garde elite is becoming very clear.
However, the seemingly ubiquitous problem of a theorist
deciding what others really want or really are seems just
beneath the surface in this section. It appears that I must
be making the assumption that I have some privileged
knowledge about what people want and that although it
appears that what they want is to maintain themselves in
their interests what they really want is to explode the myth
of self-interest. Relevant questions at this point are:
first, "how does one know (or determine) that self-interest
is a deception for any group of persons or for any given
person?" and second, "isn't the preponderance of historical
evidence on the side of the old theorists of self--those who
maintain that there is at least some self-interested motive
in any political action?" I take these to be the same
question: one its theoretical formulation and the second
its practical formulation. I will answer them together.
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Demogenic political action, for the most part, occurs
outside of the decisions that interest Culture. One reason
for believing this is that there is no explanatory value in
saying otherwise. The old theories cannot explain why
people act in resistance politics. Such behavior can only
be seen as irrational: it is irrational to support the
"underdog," irrational to vote for a third-party candidate,
irrational to engage in revolutionary activity, and,
irrational to fail to do any of these things. My theory
shows that at the very most what the old theory can explain
is the self at the edge of metamorphosis, and this is always
the self just on the verge of the sacrifice of the old self
which results in new groups, new strategies and new selves.
The old theory can explain part of the groundwork, but not
the groundswell. The old selves are being overcome at a
huge rate. The selves who do not participate in the action
that can be tallied up by democratic theories are holding
society together by going on, oblivious to the interests
they are supposed to have. There is no avant-garde cadre
for them. They are the avant-garde. Everyone has at least
one world historical moment and many wish to repeat the
moment again and again.
When one realizes that one's culture is not one of a few
but one of more than one will ever know about, one can
recognize that there is an incredible potential for
resistance. There are more revolutions than we can see, or
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that we can act in. Host of them are not our revolutions.
Several serious and legitimate objections can be made
about theories which end in sentiments like that just
expressed. Most serious is that it is morally objectionable
on both consequentialist and deontological grounds to
suppose that there are just causes that are not the concern
of every individual. Put affirmatively: it is obligatory
to concern oneself with the prevention of human injustice to
humans even if the particular injustice is not directly an
injustice to oneself or one's immediate group. That
prescription assumes the perspective of grand theory. Not
every act of resistance is or ought to be universalizable.
I am not suggesting that people should act only on issues
which directly concern them. My theory requires that
emerging selves do so in a social environment that not
everyone can experience. Action, which takes precedence
over theory, is local. Theory could point to the resistance
which goes unnoticed because it does not stand up and point
to itself as such. I do not suggest that what is required
is a massive theoretical cataloging of this visible, vocal
and active resistance. That would only serve to point to
what is already over, and could only aid established power,
not emerging groups.
It is the small emerging groups that need protection
most and least. They need it most because they are
vulnerable due to their relative lack of the accoutrements
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of traditional power. They need it least because in the
final analysis they have a great deal of control in terms of
the reproduction of values, goods and services. To fully
make sense of the final strategy we must take account of a
huge hoax of power: that control of society is always from
the top down. Consideration of the matter will show that
small groups actually run society from the bottom up. An
example might help in clarifying this point. Most of us
have experienced the strange realization that some small
bureaucracy with which we contend is not run by its
administrators but by those who require its services, and
those who interact with those obtaining the services. Thus
one hears a helpful client suggesting an efficient manner of
r etr ievi ng information to the head of some computer
department. This phenomenon is not due to incompetence of
the workers in bureaucracies but to bureaucracies having no
workable structure. The glue which holds bureaucracies
together is the people who use them [6].
And, the example above ought not to be construed as
trivial because its concerns non-political transactions. I
might as easily have used a big example. Many believe,
myself included, that the persistent actions of small groups
(on the Left and on the Right) have had more to do with the
formulation of U.S. policy in Central America than any other
factor. The interest in the non-political example above is
entirely phenomenological: the actors of small groups (not
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leaders, not bureaucracies, and not huge blocks of people
with the same interest) not only do the work of the world
as they do, but they also are responsible for the change
that occurs in it.
Overcoming Self-represe n t a t i o
n
The three strategies of this chapter must be performed
simultaneously and continuously for communication in my
political sense to take place. This strategy, like the
others, is something one can do in the present--it does not
describe a possibility for which one need wait. This
strategy, like the others, is inherently anti-hierarchical.
It is anti-hierarchical in a different sense from the first
strategy, overcoming self-deception, because it involves
overcoming deceptions not of the self itself but those
deceptions concerning all manner of repressed content,
particularly the manner in which one represents one's selves
to others. Repressing one's selves is different from being
deceived about one's "self" in that the latter is a mistaken
belief about structure and the the material we are to
discuss concerns mistaken beliefs about specific matter with
respect to one's selves.
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As we saw at the end of the last section society is held
together at the bottom and its functioning is
underdetermined by commands from the top. Governments,
bureaucracies, institutions are superstruc tur al in more than
the sense that they arise out of economic necessity. They
are s uper s true tur al in the sense that they perch
precariously on structures that might notice they have no
need of them. Once a fiction is seen to be a fiction, those
perched on its tree are forced to take wing—and to die of
exhaustion or to alight anew, transformed by their flight.
Individuals, too, hold themselves together from the
bottom up. This is why our beliefs are often coherent on a
local level, but inconsistent as a totality, a fact that
philosophers have (mistakenly) taken as a proof of
irrationality in their writing on conformity to ideology.
The beliefs one has about specific matters that relate to
the development of one's many selves get arrested by the
thought police of ideology [7]. One such endpoint is that
the self that sees itself as a "divided subject," is in deep
trouble. This unhappy consciousness is not a final
dialectical state— a state in movement, a state needing
resolution, but evidence of a step towards overcoming an odd
self-representation. We do not always have to be vessel
selves; we do not always have to be "divided subjects."
In "The Dreamwork
,
Freud explains that:
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Healthy persons often contain a much simpler more
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and are therefore more difficult totranslate. (Freud {1938}, p. 383)
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The health of "healthy persons" is, for Freud, relative to
the possibilities offered a civilization that does not offer
"healthy" ones. All members of civilization are, to a
greater or lesser extent, neurotic and every communication
requires some translation of the symbols arising from
repression. To facilitate the translation of one's
communications, one needs to open up at least some repressed
content. It is difficult to apply psychoanalytic theories
to the strategy of overcoming self-representation without
bending meanings because the definition of a demogenic actor
in the world does not to my knowledge conflate with
traditional psychoanalytic theorizing. Lacan's notion of
the fading of the subject in linguistic positioning is
similar to what I have in mind, but the political intimation
is that the fading is the beginning of the realization that
now the positioned self has an awareness of specific
strategic content directed toward an end that in some sense
temporarily truncates possibilities of action and focuses
them on a specific target. Whereas Lacan describes
linguistic insertion as a single event in development, I
would suggest it must happen again and again in political
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action
, and that the faded subject does not choose the
individual's persona on any occasion. Lacan comes close to
describing the emergence of the vessel self in explicating
Freud
,
but attention to what is repressed at that moment
covers over the explosive political potential of a Lacanian
theory that would recognize the repeated creation of selves
by sacrificial insertion into temporary political
discour ses
.
Work has been done showing the Lacanian notion of
repression to be important to ethical life. John Rajchman,
for example, in "Lacan and the Ethics of Modernity," traces
the development of the conscience to repressed desire. He
argues that the law and the conscience result from parental
internalization. By showing that that internalization sets
up the first power struggle in the child, a private
hierarchy. I am attempting to show that groups who have
effect in political and social networks are possible in part
because they are able to suspend the "need" originating in
repression for power. Rajchman says:
Thus the moral law speaks to us from within,
acknowledges our propensity, to transgress it, and
yet enjoins us to act without regard for our
self-love or self-knowledge. Lacan reads these
elements of Kant's transcendental moral psychology
in terms of his theory of the subject. The
fundamental thesis is that "the law is repressed
desire" ... Fundamentally we do not suppress our
desire because we have an inner conscience; we
have an inner voice of conscience because we are
constituted as subject though a primal repression of
our desire; our conscience derives from that
repression. (Rajchman {1986}, p. 51)
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In his constancy of purpose, the historical Socrates
heard only one voice of conscience. As political actors in
a complex world, we need to cast off repressions in order to
hear other consciences. in this way, "the moral law" will
give way to workable tables of values for concrete
situations, but without relativism, since not all values
will be appropriate to one arbitrarily chosen social
situation.
The f uture-directedness of the Lacanian subject sheds
additional light on political action. Peter Dews represents
Lacan with respect to some issues of temporality as follows:
At the moment in which the subject grasps its
intended meaning, however, there takes place a
process which Lacan describes as the 'fading' of the
subject, a realization that whatever it represents
itself as being will fail to capture its
' non-being '... [B] efore it begins to speak, the
subject is simply a lack, a nothingness, which finds
itself confronted with 'the given of the signifiers
which cover it in an Other which is their
transcendental place.' (Dews {1987} p. 100)
For Lacan the subject sees itself in the future until it
turns into a signifier. The subject empties itself in
language and having spoken takes on a forward movement
again. Two things need to be examined in connection with
the future directedness of the subject. The first is that
Lacan states of analysts that:
It is a fact that we do not disclaim our competence
to promise happiness in a period in which the
question of its extent has become so complicated:
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principally because
become a political
happiness
,
as St. Just said,
factor. (Lacan {1977} p. 252)
has
Many analysts have written about their power (see e.g.,
Laing {1985} p. 10), but this small paragraph, which stands
alone m the essay "Direction of treatment and principles of
its power," recognizes this potential political power in a
stark manner. it is not so much that the analyst deals
with people who happen to be political animals. It is that
the manner in which analysts direct individuals toward
happiness" is interwoven with too many social and political
strands. The second statement that I wish to discuss with
respect to temporality comes from the same essay: "The
analyst is the man to whom one speaks and to whom one speaks
freely. That is what he is there for. What does that mean?
(Lacan {1977} p. 253). To me, it means that unstructured
conversation requires leaving system to one side. But in
typical practice, analysts cannot be seen as other than part
of the most visible of one's systems, i.e, the
state/political system. Waiting to be "cured" by the
analyst constitutes a fraudulent expectation that an old
self can be recovered. The analyst is precisely the person
to whom one could not speak freely, after one has
represented oneself as free from the deception of
self-interest. Part of the political agenda which could
come from psychoanalysis would be the dismantling of
raditional psychoanalytic practice. More importantly, it
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would recognize the deep roots of the need for power that
have been overlaid with the shallow ones of self-interest
(happiness) and liberation through focus on the speaking
self (talking therapy).
In considering the strategy of overcoming self-
representation, one apparently learns from psychoanalysis,
and from experience, the depressing idea that such an
overcoming is not totally possible. None of these strategies
are ever completed— they are continuous and simultaneous.
But there is a crucial ambiguity involved. If there is one
(vessel) self, overcoming does involve blatant paradox, and
the pessimism is warranted. This pessimism is grounded in a
notion of vessel self that mistaknly seems to exhaust the
conceptual field. There are always new situations which
will call to the selves waiting to come forward. Since
Nietzsche, when theorists discuss new selves, they often
mention new kinds or forms of subject that are already
existent, and these discussions are not formally unrelated
to the discussion here. Deleuze agrees with Foucault (who
agreed with Nietzsche) when he says:
As Foucault would say, the superman is much less
than the disappearance of living men, and much more
than a change of concept; it is the advent of a new
form that is neither God nor man and which, it is
hoped, will not prove worse than its two previous
forms. (Deleuze {1988} p. 132)
The new self has to be called from a concrete situation.
Rhetoric must be related to politcal praxis.
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The aim is to celebrate differences without falling into
the implicit hierarchy imminent in game-theoretic or
linguistic models. Overcoming self-representation is not a
prerequisite to the formation of every new self or new
group; however, if selves could always use this strategy
concurrently with the formation of specific groups it is
certain that some of the problems of group formation be
solved. I will discuss two problems that arise in
conjunction with group formation and show that if the actors
are using this third strategy, the problems can be addressed
in a satisfactory manner. The first problem I will discuss
is how to choose between two or more groups both or all of
which have come into existence because of the same
situation. The second problem concerns guarantees against
fascism
.
Decision Procedure
As selves represent themselves to each other , as they
repress specific content in order to offer the self
appropriate to (or believed to be appropriate to) a given
situation and an other, they are still under the influence
of orders from previous indoctrinations or repressions.
Certain situations force non-compliance with ideological
demands so strong that the old conforming selves may have
been unaware that their conformity was built into the
representations of who they were. Such situations are
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liberating in the respect of overcoming the old order;
ironically, the liberating component may come from finally
understanding that a situation is one of confinement and
oppression. So for instance, theory and ideology can
represent matters in such a way that citizens be oblivious
to many policies. Citizens who suddenly confront the
consequences of policies, first hand, may have opened to
them many options they had not previously considered. But
more than this, options may arise that even if theoretically
considered beforehand would have had no impact on political
action before viewing the situation.
Once representations have been rearranged sufficiently
that selves see new options, they may see so many that a new
acquiescence begi ns--ther e seem too many groups to satisfy,
and no manner of determining which arising from a given
situations are the "right" ones. If the demogenic actor
manages a new representation that is consonant with the two
principles we have discussed, then this question of choosing
the "right" group fades away. The groups and selves that
emerge may compete for time, but if they fall within the
space we have drawn, any acceptance cannot constitute a
wrong choice. Only failing to choose is a wrong choice here
because this "option" collapses into a conservative
repetition of the old order that is clearly wrong.
Given a situation where two groups compete for a self's
time one of which, group A, has hierarchical structure and
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long-term goals for itself as a group, the other of which
group B, overtly rejects hierarchical structure and is
planning a short-term action in relation to a specific
circumstance, group B will typically be the best choice.
(If both groups are hierarchical, the self should form Group
C.) Group A will have problems with control within itself
and its actions will concern not only the social or
political issue at hand, but the legitimation of the group
itself. Legitimation questions are a hierarchical deferral
of group formation. Group B will not appeal to selves who
do not undergo the three strategies; but it has no vested
interest in maintaining itself so it can accomodate selves
who need hierarchical structure by ignoring the need for the
duration of the action. Very small groups can discuss these
needs in between actions if that seems appropriate or
necessary. Group B has no needs as a group: it works out
its desire to address a concrete situation. Between two
groups who adhere to principles one and two and who are
addressing the same situation in the same area, the choice
can be made by tossing a coin. Or if the actions are
sufficiently similar, the two groups can merge with the
understanding that the merge is provisional.
I have avoided using the term "consensus" to describe
the method that might be used by either group. Groups like
group B ought not to use this method because it often ends
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up violating principle two. Consensus assumes commonality
with respect to more than the issue at hand and if the
commonality is resisted by some of members of groups using
consensus, such groups may end up violating principle one.
Consensus, in short, is agreement among already existing
selves and our demogenic strategies are instantiated, in a
sense, before consensus in this sense can be obtained.
Often some variation of principle one is the justification
for adopting consensus. Usually persons confronting various
groups end up contributing to them, what they feel good
about contributing nothing more. This is acceptable within
this theory. There is no argument against it that does not
rely on a utilization of the notion of a vessel self. Such
use, as we have seen, can often lead to political
quiescence
.
Excluding Fascism
The material in the last sections may seem to call for a
politics so diffuse and unstructured that nothing
"important" could ever get done. I have argued that the
notion of top-down organization is ideology, and that it is
the small changes that are important, the ones that power
cannot notice in time. In fact, most affairs take place
because groups come together through necessity to perform
the needed action, and then dissipate. In the absence of
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political principles, a theory could seem to end up
sanctioning many actions some of which would be seen to be
morally wrong in retrospect. Accordingly, fascist group
action may not seem to be ruled out in this theory.
Principle one serves as the bulwark against this
possibility. i wish to show that it is not just by
definition that this result accrues; but that principle one
is concretely incompatible with fascist strategies.
I have mentioned an exception to the first principle,
namely the justified use of the image of sovereignty over
self with respect to women's right to their own bodies [8].
Sovereignty is a form of hierarchy; using sovereignty in
the image violates principle one. I said that the principle
is correctly violated in this case. I make this exception
because there has been no other public way of communicating
and forming new groups, that helps to maintain this right in
the immediate present. One of the principles had to be
overridden and in this case it was principle one.
In many circumstances any strategy for concrete
demogenics can be a strategy against existing hierarchy and
authority that controls and "writes" the vessel self. In
the present situation two hierarchies are used against
women: the writing of their bodies as subservient to
society as a whole and the writing of their bodies as
properly under the control of mental activity of some kind.
The latter kind of control is so much to be preferred over
I
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the former that in the context of the present situation it
appears as an absolute good. But in other circumstances it
is shown in its undesirable consequences: anorexia and
agoraphobia
.
The present situation involves the immediate physical
and mental abuse of women as an undiffer lent iated class from
everything outside that class. The image of
self-sovereignty has been used with the result of lessening
that immediate abuse by exposing the systematic brutality
which resulted from the other image— that men and society as
a whole have sovereignty over women. No situation calls or
could call that could justify this latter image. It is
ruled out by definition according to my two principles and
there is no more encompassing hierarchy over it remaining to
be toppled. To accept it f one needs to forego all the
strategies discussed in this chapter; one needs to
represent oneself so completely as the persistent
self
—
persisting in hierarchical repressions— of ideology
that any political movements are anathema to oneself.
Indeed, I may be arguing too forcefully. Fascism and
hierarchy are in a conceptual interlock, as shown by their
link at the position of a leader (Fuhrer, Duce) . Fascism
seems to call rhetorically for a "new" self, for a change in
an existing and corrupt society. That is why it may also
seem ant i— 1 iber al
,
and to have limits to calls to demogenic
But fascist socialism would create a totality thataction
.
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could be manupulated by the crude two-step hierarchy of
leader and followers. In addition, the fascist "new" self
is typically a return to an "older” less sophisticated self.
By now, it should be obvious that these aspects of fascism
are incompatible with what I have developed as concrete
demogenic strategies.
Conclusions
People become conscious of who they are in complex webs
of discourse and power struggles. I have tried to show
phenomenologically that those discourses and that power are
not the result of necessary patterns or species-specific
behaviors. I have argued that political action in
particular escapes its own categories. When something
happens politically, it happens outside of the discourse
delegated by power to represent it. Strength, but not
power, can come upon the realization that many successful
victories against the power source occur and do so
constantly. The ideological blending of strength and power,
over time, blinded selves to the dangers of the hierarchical
formations that lead to power. The reliance on power as the
motivation for all political action resulted in the myth
that the task required of political actors is a
proliferation of efficient organizations to take the place
of already existing efficient organizations. The discussion
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of the two principles in conjunct
strategies we have examined shows
about organization already exists
choose a form of organization, bu
misperceived need to pre-select a
ion with the three
that what we need
. The task is not
t to overthrow the
n optimal group st
to know
to
r uctur e
.
Notes to Chapter Four
1. New selves have been
Act UP and People With AIDS i
societal refusal to deal with
Needless to say, the possibil
laid out in advance at a cone
implied a definite social str
is a good example of a random
environment that calls forth
strategies. Here the more tr
be painfully inadequate. See
discussions and analysis.
formed through such groups as
n reaction to State and
this health care reality,
ity of AIDS could not have been
rete level that would have
ategy. The appearance of AIDS
change in the social
new selves, and new social
aditional analyses are seen to
OCTOBER
, 43, Winter 1987 for
• i.
2
‘u
R® centl y the leader of the False Prophets exploded
tSoo m
he
,
news " for his costume and actions in the Summer of1988 Tompkins Square riot. See Village Voice, XXXIII. No.
34, Aug. 23, 1988, numerous articles.
3. A rejection of ideology that denies that we have one
self, claiming not that there is no self at all like theideological self, remains ideological—and misses the
possibilities explored here.
4. It seems significant that she did not say that there
are many who are different from "me." H. H. Price gives a
non-naive version of the argument that is of considerable
interest to those who are interested in the topics of this
dissertation. See "Our Evidence for the Existence of Other
Minds" (Price {1938}) . Part of Price's argument involves
noticing the different ways humans use the non-information
dispersal functions of language.
5. Sacrifice, as I use it, can take on many meanings.
There is no limit on how it can be interpreted as long as it
applies only to the old self and that it is carried out in
ways consistent with the two principles of demogenics. (The
sacrifice of anyone against their will is obviously not a
strategy in concrete demogenics.) The meanings I have in
mind when I use the term are (1) the surrender or loss of
profit (2) the destruction, surrender, or giving up of some
prized or desirable thing in behalf of a higher object, or
to a claim considered more pressing, and (3) the making
sacred of some thing--in this case a self (the old self).
("Sacred" I use in the political/secularized sense, viz.,
"not amenable to punishment or enjoying immunity," as in
"the King's person is sacred." These meanings are loosely
quoted from the 1902 edition of the Century Dictionary.
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6. I am grateful to Bob Ackermann for this and many
other points. y
7. The connection between psychological development andpolitical action gets overlooked in some respects becausethe ideologies that bind them together (in inaction at
times) come and go. The arresting conponents linger on
after the institutions that made them possible have long
since dissappeared
.
8. Cynthia Kaufman provided this example and I have
profited both from the example and discussion with her about
it.
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